
MONOGRAPH · 22 Nov 2026 · AntLevee Research Team · Flagship Monograph

Off-Balance-Sheet Compute Commitments, Normalised Gross Margins, and Cross-Market Credit Transfer: An Empirical Study of Anthropic, PBC (NASDAQ: ANT)

Balance-Sheet Reconstruction, Payment-Chain Attribution, and Bayesian Calibration from Form 424B4, Early-Session Exchange Tapes, and Counterparty Filings

Request Data (.zip) → Copy BibTeX

> "When an AI laboratory keeps USD 900.9 billion of rigid compute commitments off balance sheet whilst over four-fifths of its revenue relies on cancellable usage, a trillion-dollar valuation prices not software margins, but cross-market infrastructure credit risk."
>
> — AntLevee Research · Core Monograph Proposition



Key Empirical Findings

- **Off-Balance-Sheet Compute & Zero Insurance:** Fixed commitments reach USD 900.9bn (`65.3x` RPO; `USD 1,075.9bn` incl. variable), leaving `98.6%` of leases off-balance-sheet (`USD 156.2bn` VIEs, p. F-36) alongside capped Broadcom (`USD 72bn`) and Google (`USD 19bn WULF`) wraps, zero external credit insurance, and NVIDIA (`USD 118bn`) excluding GPU residual value.
- **GAAP Restatement & Survival Frontier:** Normalised 9M26 gross margin drops from `85.52%` to `67.50%` and `46.45%–33.82%`, operating margin flips to `−23.9% to −26.4%`, and full-scope survival requires `+22.2%` CAGR post-greenshoe (`+30.4%` at 50% escrow; `+37.2%` uninjected), invariant across hardware efficiency (`theta`).
- **Liquidity, MTM EV & Reverse-DCF:** Post-greenshoe cash hits `USD 244.55bn`; Day-2 close (`USD 88.91`, `−20.26%` vs open) implies `USD −31.40bn` Amazon Q4 MTM (`USD −44.19bn` at `USD 97.17`), `USD 1,392.2–1,414.4bn` Basic MTM EV, and `USD 327.2–461.7bn` (`41.3%–51.4%` CAGR) 2031 Reverse-DCF revenue before `7.74x–8.91x` Day-180 unlocks.
- **End-Holders & Dependence-Aware Audit:** Three-domain financial-statement Bayesian tests (`S1–S7`) yield `1,168.20x` BF (`99.24%` posterior; `90.18%` at `rho = 0.30`); NAIC rating gates concentrate debt across Athene (`USD 15.73–20.98bn` = `117.3%–156.4%` equity), 16 BDCs, 2,411 `NPORT-P` XMLs, and `88.7%` recourse CoreWeave debt.

Abstract

This monograph examines how off-balance-sheet compute commitments, accounting presentation choices, and credit-enhancement wraps allocate cash-flow risk across the artificial intelligence infrastructure debt chain centred on Anthropic, PBC (NASDAQ: ANT). The sample spans Anthropic's registration cycle from Form S-1 (26 October 2026) through Form 424B4 (USD 83.00, 19 November 2026), full greenshoe closing and Nasdaq trading (19 – 20 November 2026), counterparty filings for Broadcom, TeraWulf, NVIDIA (17 November 2026), SB Energy, CoreWeave, Nebius, and IREN, plus ten U.S. life-insurer statutory filings, sixteen BDCs, and 2,411 full-population NPORT-P

XML filings. Methodologically, we reconstruct functional US GAAP baselines from footnotes without alleging fraud, solve 192 non-double-counted quarterly bisection roots, evaluate a 10-year Reverse-DCF, and combine a dependence-aware Bayesian statement audit with four controlled rating-gate experiments. Quantitatively, we document USD 900.9bn fixed commitments (`98.6%` off-balance-sheet leases; `USD 156.2bn` VIEs), restated 9M26 gross margins of `67.5%` to `33.8%`, normalised operating margins of `−23.9%` to `−26.4%`, core FCF of `3.3%–4.0%`, survival CAGRs of `+22.2%` post-greenshoe (`+30.4%` to `+37.2%` base/uninjected; `34.4%–62.1%` upper bound), USD 244.55bn post-greenshoe cash versus USD 109.74bn retained Amazon debt (Basic MTM EV `USD 1,392.2–1,414.4bn` and 2031 Reverse-DCF revenue `USD 327.2–461.7bn` at `USD 88.91`), `5% + 2%` discretionary dilution above a `0.079%` Class F wedge, and a `99.24%` 3-domain Bayesian posterior (`90.18%` at `rho = 0.30` , `62.50%` floor). Under rigid take-or-pay floors and late-November neocloud credit repricing, equity and upstream credit recoveries remain governed by downstream token pricing power.

Executive Scorecard: Six Empirical Findings & Economic Scale

Ordered by risk hierarchy: off-BS liability base ➔ unit-margin & survival hurdles ➔ cash, capital loop & governance allocation

Finding 1 · Ch. 2 →

● Primary Fact

PRIMARY FINDING · OFF-BALANCE-SHEET COMPUTE

65.3×

USD 900.9B Fixed Commitments vs USD 13.8B Customer RPO

Fixed Compute & Lease Commitments	USD 900.9B
Non-Cancellable Customer Backlog (RPO)	USD 13.8B (1.5%)

Anthropic keeps near-trillion-dollar 5–20-year compute and data-centre bills off balance sheet, with 98.6% of undiscounted leases uncommenced.

Investor Implication: Obligations equal ~13x annualised run-rate revenue against just USD 13.8B in locked customer backlog (USD 156.2B sits inside unconsolidated VIEs), requiring Broadcom (USD 72B capped) and Google (USD 19B CSA) wraps to close.

Inspect Chapter 2 Primary Filings →

Finding 2 · Ch. 3 →

◆ Arithmetic Restatement

CORE RESTATEMENT · FUNCTIONAL US GAAP

85.5% → 33.8% Restated Gross Margin · –USD 8.75B Normalised Op. Loss

Note 8 Implied vs Conventional GAAP (λ=0.80) **85.5% → 33.8%**

Eliminating Gross Profit on p. F-7 masks 74.4% sub-line compute and cloud pass-through fees whilst Q3 pricing drag surged 8.57x to USD –600M.

Investor Implication: Restoring channel fees (USD 4.80B) and inference compute yields 67.5% arithmetic and 33.8%–46.5% functional GM; adding zero-overlap RSU pay leaves –23.9% to –26.4% operating margin (S1–S7 Bayesian audit: 99.24%).

Finding 4 · Ch. 5 →

◌ Explicit Scenario

SOLVENCY CONSTRAINT · 192-STATE BISECTION

22.1%–37.2% 15-Year Survival CAGR g* · Irrevocable Core Flips Positive

Non-Cancellable Core Reversal: -3.5% → +10.5% to +13.7%

After correcting horizon truncation and omitted taxes, multi-year CAGR hurdles remain steep even under 50%–100% IPO cash escrow.

Investor Implication: Because 87.2% of October run-rate lacks 12-month RPO cover, growth slowing below g* triggers SpaceXAI 90-day termination, neocloud deferrals, and Broadcom's 13% PIK debt switch.

Finding 3 · Ch. 4 →

CASH QUALITY · WORKING CAPITAL & RSUS

USD 1.08B

Core FCF (3.3% of Rev) vs USD

Finding 5 · Ch. 6 →

● Primary Fact

CAPITAL LOOP · SENIOR RETAINED DEBT

17 / 22 Firms Conflicted Syndicate · USD 109.74B Retained Amazon Notes

17 of 22 underwriters double as RCF lenders or pre-IPO holders; 48.1% of the USD 26B PP recycles commitments; 84.1% of AMZN notes stay debt.

Investor Implication: Amazon waived zero cap above 12% and kept USD 109.74B carrying liability senior to equity (USD –31.40B Q4 MTM at Day-2 USD 88.91), while IPO buyers suffer 88.2%–88.3% NTBV dilution.

4.28B Day-1 RSU Tax

Over one-third of reported USD 6.57B OCF comes from Treasury interest, leaving less than a third of IPO Day-1 withholding taxes.

Investor Implication: Stripping USD 2.36B deposit interest,

lease prepayments, and +9.9d cloud AP stretching leaves core FCF near zero ahead of a USD 41.5B unrecognised equity backlog.

Finding 6 · Ch. 7 →

▲ Cross-Document Inference

GOVERNANCE WEDGE · LOCK-UP OVERHANG

0.079% Voting Floor · 5%+2% PBF Dilution & 7.74×/8.91× Unlocks

One Class F share locks 50.1% votes down to 0.079% FD equity while 4/7 Trust seats block non-bankruptcy takeovers.

Investor Implication: Class A public buyers get ~6.4% aggregate vote while absorbing discretionary 5%+2% PBF issuances, 8.73B Day-180 lock-up unlocks, USD 83.05 Day-2 support tests, and five legal proceedings.

Table 0 — Executive Summary of Core Empirical Findings, Evidence Tiers & Filing Anchors

Finding	Core Research Thesis	Verified Primary Figures	Evidence Grade	Primary Filing Locators
Finding 1 (Ch. 2)	Off-BS compute commitments, VIEs, wraps & physical residual reality	USD 900.9bn fixed commitments vs USD 13.8bn RPO (**65.3x**; total **USD 1,075.9bn / 78.0x**); 98.6% leases off-BS (PV **USD 306.2–315.5bn** lagged / **USD 314.0–328.4bn** immediate; **USD 156.2bn VIEs**); Broadcom USD 72bn & Google USD 19bn WULF caps; zero external credit insurance; NVDA USD 105bn PORTS-Pike excludes GPUs	● Primary Fact	424B4 pp. 7–8, 39–42, 80, 143 F-27, F-36–F-37, F-60; AVGO 8 8-K; SB Energy S-1/A-1; NVDA (
Finding 2 (Ch. 3)	ASC 606 gross-up, eliminated CoR line, pricing erosion & Bayesian audit	Net rev USD 28.442bn (–14.4%; gross-up mcap USD 185.5–254.5bn); GM **85.52% → 67.50% → 46.45% → 33.82%** (39.52% net); normalised OI **USD –7.954bn to –8.789bn** (p. 28 exact **USD –8.747bn / –26.3%**); Q3 price drag USD –600m; 3-domain S1–S7 BF **1,168.20x (99.24%; 90.18% at rho=0.30; 3,446.19x incl. S8)**	◆ Arithmetic Restatement	424B4 pp. 2, 11, 28–29, 60, 14 203, 265, 348, F-5–F-54; Dech (2011); antlevee_bayesian_accountin
Finding 3 (Ch. 4)	Interest-driven OCF, CSP payables stretch & USD 41.5bn equity overhang	OCF USD 6.569bn → Core FCF **USD 1.082–1.330bn (3.3%–4.0%)** (USD 0.994–1.242bn after fin. lease); CSP payables USD 4.231bn (29.6→39.5d, +USD 1.059bn; 3 tailwinds = USD 2.865bn); Customer E 13% AR (USD 1.026bn); Day-1 RSU tax **USD 4.281bn**; zero-overlap backlog **USD 41.5bn** (RSUs **USD 39.4bn**)	● Primary Fact	424B4 pp. 23, 25, 28–29, 129, 183, 280, F-13–F-18, F-39–F-4 66–F-67

Finding	Core Research Thesis	Verified Primary Figures	Evidence Grade	Primary Filing Locators
Finding 4 (Ch. 5)	192-state survival CAGR g^*, theta invariance & 13% PIK triggers	Primary aggregate (USD 900.9bn + 157.5bn var): **+22.2% post-GS** (+23.4% base 100% / +30.4% 50% / +37.2% 0%; core non-cancellable **+11.8% to +13.7%**); Upper bound **34.4%–62.1%**; invariant across theta in {0.5817, 0.45, 0.35} (0.00pp); decelerating paths breach USD 5.0bn floor in 2028Q3–2029Q3	◌ Explicit Scenario	antlevee_gaap_restatement.j antlevee_stress_results.jso antlevee_exact_audit.json; 4 8, 39–40, 71, 80, 174–175, F-4
Finding 5 (Ch. 6)	Conflicted syndicate, recycled PP, retained debt, MTM EV & Reverse-DCF	**17/22** conflicted underwriters; **48.1% (USD 12.5bn)** Google/AMD PP recycling; greenshoe cash **USD 244.55bn**; Amazon notes **84.1% retained (USD 109.742bn book)** → **USD −31.40bn** Q4 MTM at USD 88.91 (USD −44.19bn at USD 97.17); Basic MTM EV **USD 1,392.2–1,414.4bn**; 2-stage Reverse-DCF 2031E rev **USD 327.2–461.7bn (41.3%–51.4% CAGR)**	◆ Arithmetic Restatement	424B4 cover, pp. 19–25, 131–1 175, 310, 328, 336–337, 347; E Nasdaq; antlevee_exact_audit
Finding 6 (Ch. 7)	Discretionary PBF 5% + 2% dilution, 0.079% wedge, unlocks & legal fronts	Board-approved **5% (846.84m sh) + up to 2% per +50% milestone** (90/120d gate, p. 243); Class F **50.1%** vote at **0.079%–0.108%** floor (**464–636x** wedge) + PBC shield; Day-1 close **USD 97.17**, Day-2 low **USD 83.05** / close **USD 88.91 (−20.26% vs open)**; Day-180 **8,727m sh (7.74x expanded / 8.91x base)**; §4713 2–1 loss + FTC CID	● Primary Fact	424B4 pp. 13–16, 19–25, 54–5 97, 101–102, 111–115, 123, 13 253–266, 293, 298, 310, 317–3 335; Nasdaq

Finding	Core Research Thesis	Verified Primary Figures	Evidence Grade	Primary Filing Locators
Finding 7 (Ch. 8)	Bank 0% isolation, 4-layer risk transfer & H5 statutory rating gate	Athene frontier-AI exposure **USD 15.73–20.98bn (117.3%–156.4% equity)** incl. **USD 7.045bn Big Sky + 15% WHCO guarantee**; **10 insurers Q3** (AAIA p. 2523 **5.56x / 11.12x** jump; PBBD **29.5x–44.3x**); 16 BDCs (GECC 15.55–pt gap); **2,411 NPORT-P XMLs**; NVIDIA Q3 FY27 **USD 118.0bn** guarantees; **88.7% recourse CRWV** (14.9%–15.8% yields, 1,000–1,250 bps CDS)	▲ Cross-Document Inference	Athene Q3 10-Q Notes 4, 11–12 2523; AANY p. 337; 10 insurer Q (2026); NVDA 10-Q; NPORT-P; C
Finding 8 (Sec. 8.3–8.4)	Pre-registered falsifiable checkpoints (P1–P18) & zero-position notice	Eighteen timestamped, quantitative accounting/credit/governance triggers sealed under EN Table 32 SHA-256 397622d1a932d9e1 (P1–P18); AntLevee Research and the authors hold zero long, short, or derivative positions in any security discussed	◌ Explicit Scenario	antlevee_exact_audit.json; catalyst_tracker.json; Sectic 8.4

Four-Tier Evidence Classification Legend

Every summary table and empirical finding encodes epistemic strength across colour, symbol, and stroke rule

● Primary Fact — Solid · Pine

Quoted verbatim from SEC prospectuses, Form 8-K exhibits, statutory insurer schedules, or Nasdaq exchange prints.

◆ Arithmetic Restatement — Solid · Slate

Computed algebraically from disclosed primary figures via accounting identities with zero free assumptions.

▲ Cross-Document Inference — Dashed · Ochre

Structural credit or governance conclusion derived by cross-checking two or more independent filings.

◌ Explicit Scenario — Dotted · Violet

Parametric stress sensitivity explicitly conditioned on stated inputs such as λ reclassification or CAGR path g.

PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY **The Core Structural Thesis**

Strip away the accounting formatting and Anthropic looks very different under the hood. It holds USD 244.55bn in cash after its greenshoe closing, yet it has signed USD 900.9bn in fixed compute bills (nearly 78 times its locked-in USD 13.8bn customer backlog when variable deals are included). Nearly 99% of its data-centre leases remain off the balance sheet, true cash flow without deposit interest and one-off vendor payment stretching is only 3%–4% of revenue, and to survive without running out of cash it needs years of 22%–37% compound growth. Meanwhile, chip vendors and banks sit senior with capped guarantees, while public equity holders and U.S. life insurers holding SPV bonds absorb the long-tail downside.

Chapter 1: Introduction, Registration Timeline, and Empirical Research Design

1.1 Research Programme Origin and Empirical Chronology (14 October – 22 November 2026)

AntLevee Research initiated this payment-chain investigation on 14 October 2026 following the distressed syndication of Volta Infrastructure Holdings Ltd.'s USD 5.0bn Norwegian AI data-centre financing, where JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs underwrote only USD 1.3bn whilst relegating USD 3.712bn of six-year GPU loans at 11.21% – 11.75% yield-to-maturity to best-efforts syndication backed by an Anthropic compute contract.

By 18 October 2026, our team had mapped cross-industry cash-flow settlement, Microsoft Azure commercial RPO bounds, and Nscale acceptance-lag working-capital constraints; by 25 October 2026, we completed entity-level banking and credit-transmission audits. Following Anthropic's `Form S-1` filing on 26 October 2026, we audited every amendment through `Form 424B4` (`USD 83.00`, 19 November 2026), cross-examined CoreWeave's parent-recourse neocloud debt structure (`CoreWeave Q3 2026 Form 10-Q`), and integrated the 20 November full greenshoe closing, Day-1/Day-2 Nasdaq tapes, NVIDIA's 17 November Q3 FY27 filing, and late-November neocloud credit repricing on 22 – 23 November 2026.

1.2 Theoretical Positioning: The 2026 Central-Bank Canon, Macro Credit Tightening, and Payment-Chain Hypotheses (`H1–H5`)

In the second half of 2026, central banks, NBER economists, rating agencies, and restructuring practitioners converged on the structural risks embedded in the artificial intelligence infrastructure debt complex. Van Nieuwerburgh (2026) projects USD 9.0tn – 10.3tn of U.S. AI infrastructure investment through 2032 (>3.5% of GDP annually), documenting hyperscalers' migration into negative free cash flow, off-balance-sheet SPVs (such as Meta Hyperion's USD 30bn campus and USD 27bn Beignet debt), USD 125bn of contingent vendor residual guarantees, and widening hyperscaler 5-year CDS spreads. Its November companion paper, Su and Van Nieuwerburgh (2026), models the compute financial web and shows that debt finances roughly 60% of ongoing expansion, competitive externalities drive excessive buildouts, and a low-productivity shock propagates through non-recourse project debt into multi-trillion-dollar private losses.

Nine days before Anthropic's IPO, the European Central Bank (Bosio et al., 2026) warned in *Financial Stability Review* Box 3 that USD 5.5tn of projected hyperscaler CapEx and over USD 4.0tn – 4.5tn of off-balance-sheet `ASC 842` uncommenced lease commitments combine dot-com-era overinvestment with non-bank leverage, subprime-style opacity, and circular financing, stressing the acute duration mismatch between 6-year accounting server depreciation (versus 1 – 3 year economic chip life) and decade-long bond tenors. The Bank for International Settlements (Aldasoro, Doerr and Rees, 2026; BIS, 2026a, 2026b; Drehmann and Eren, 2026; Frost et al., 2026) demonstrates that over 55% of AI investments (2021 – 2025) originated within the AI ecosystem itself—nearly half tied to

supplier-customer contracts—and traces bank credit lines into private-credit SPVs across refinancing squeezes and guarantee triggers, whilst both the IMF (2026) and the Bank of England (2026) highlight amplification across AI repricing, private-credit illiquidity, and sovereign yield stress.

At the ratings and macro-micro layers, Moody's Ratings (2026) quantifies USD 662bn of uncommenced hyperscaler leases (113% of combined adjusted debt), Fitch Ratings (2026) documents USD 940bn (+33% YoY) of 10M26 U.S. IG bond issuance projecting AI-linked sectors to reach 43% of outstanding U.S. non-financial IG debt by 2027, and Pari Passu (2026) together with Quinn Emanuel (2026) map collateral-recovery and litigation failures when long-lived power and land are commingled with rapidly depreciating GPUs. Linking micro pricing to macro funding, Wong (2026a, 2026b) connects post-September token price compression (Ramp, 2026; Silicon Data, 2026) to expanding U.S. Treasury term premia (Kim and Wright, 2005) and bank credit contraction (Minoiu, Schneider and Wei, 2026).

Payment-Chain Hypotheses (`H1–H5`)

Whereas the central-bank canon maps aggregate debt *stocks*, AntLevee Research descends to the contract-level payment chain (`End-Customer Cash → Frontier Lab OCF → Compute Landlords / Neoclouds → SPV / DDTL / Bond Debt Service → Life Insurers / BDCs / 401(k) Funds`) and evaluates five empirical hypotheses:

- *Hypothesis* `H1` *(Asymmetric Payment-Chain Scissors / Anti-Jevons Fixed-Bill Hypothesis):* Bull-case appeals to the Jevons Paradox (citing Ramp's four-week readings of −10.2% Anthropic token price, +31.4% token volume, and +15.5% dollar spend) hold *only* when marginal compute costs float down with selling prices. Because 79.3% (USD 714.7bn) of Anthropic's upstream compute liabilities are locked at fixed 2025 – 2026 dollar floors while upstream NVIDIA B200 hourly rentals rose from ~USD 5/hr to USD 7.10/hr (Aug – Nov 2026; Silicon Data, 2026) and 87.22% of October run-rate revenue lacks non-cancellable RPO backing, price-driven volume expansion compresses dollar cash-flow coverage asymmetrically (corroborated in 2026Q3 as compute rose +10.1pp to 58.2% of revenue and GAAP OI swung back to USD −567m, p. 165).
- *Hypothesis* `H2` *(Endogenous Revenue and Working-Capital Distortion Hypothesis):* In circular AI capital ecosystems, headline solvency signals are inflated by four non-operating accounting

wedges: (i) `ASC 606` pass-through cloud fee gross-up (`+14.44%`), (ii) `ASC 230` interest on financing cash (`35.9%` of Anthropic OCF) and upfront prepayments (`88.2%` of CoreWeave 7Q OCF), (iii) CSP payables DPO stretching (`+9.9 days = USD 1.059bn`), and (iv) extreme Top-1% VC-funded enterprise concentration (80% of OpenAI & Anthropic revenue, Ramp, 2026).

- *Hypothesis `H3` (Four-Stage Pro-Cyclical Credit-Chain Contagion Hypothesis):* Once quarterly public-market scrutiny exposes `H1` and `H2` amidst rising Kim – Wright term premia, stress propagates sequentially through four contractual gates: (1) exercise of 90-day cancellation clauses on Class C/D neoclouds (`SpaceXAI`, `Lambda USD 34.9bn`), (2) breach of the USD 5.0bn minimum liquidity covenant locking out the USD 15bn revolver and stepping Broadcom's USD 42bn NPA to 13% PIK / 85% floating conversion, (3) activation of USD 72bn Broadcom SPV backstops and Google's TeraWulf CSAs, and (4) neocloud collateral repricing across 130k (2027) / 170k (2028) off-contract GPUs (`CoreWeave`).
- *Macro-Micro Credit Resonance (Term Funding Premia, ~900 Bottlenecks, and the Public 'Fishbowl'):* Mainstream headlines reduced Wong (2026a) to a routine pricing comment, missing the former Federal Reserve economist's systemic warning:
    1. *Term Funding Premia and Bank Credit Contraction:* Beyond Kim and Wright (2005) and Adrian, Crump and Moench (2014), the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Ramaswamy et al., 2026) demonstrated on 25 June 2026 that multi-year term financing commands an independent *term funding premium* even absent interest-rate risk, while Minoiu, Schneider and Wei (2026) prove widening term premia contract bank lending supply. This collides with ~USD 8tn of global AI financing needs; as El-Erian (2026) noted on 19 November, Anthropic's mega-IPO forced institutional portfolio liquidations (*"making room"*) and raised market-wide cost of capital.
    2. *~900 Supply-Chain Bottlenecks and 4.6% High-Frequency Inflation:* Physical bottlenecks across ~900 planned U.S. data-centre projects—compounded by local voter and state data-centre moratoria (Atrani Capital, 2026)—drove DRAM/HBM/SSD spot costs up 300% – 700%+ and memory equities up to 900% (Seeking Alpha, 2026), pushing NVIDIA B200 rentals to USD 7.10/hr (BigGo Finance, 2026; Silicon Data, 2026). Simultaneously, Wong (2026b) reported on NPR *Marketplace* (12 November 2026) that the *Bloomberg Price Project* registered ~4.6% YoY U.S. inflation in October, narrowing the Fed easing window.

3. *October – November 2026 Credit Repricing and Audited Transparency:* Lenders underwrote trillions of neocloud, data-centre, and Broadcom SPV debt on durable monopoly pricing power at frontier labs. Credit stress emerged in mid-October 2026—when Volta Infrastructure's USD 5.0bn Anthropic-backed GPU loan failed full underwriting—and intensified through late November 2026 as CoreWeave's 5-year CDS widened into `1,000–1,250 bps` (`>1,140 bps` mid-October baseline, Invesco, 2026) and its 2030/2031 senior unsecured notes repriced to 14.9% – 15.8% yield (CoreWeave, 2026). Listing converts Anthropic from a private issuer into a quarterly audited public company where post-30-September price deflation directly transmits to the upstream credit stack.

- *Hypothesis `H4` (Capability-Compute-Cashflow Negative Feedback Loop and Dependence-Aware Statement Audit):* Anthropic's valuation moat presupposes sustained frontier-capability leadership measured on public leaderboards, yet Anthropic possesses neither proprietary compute silicon nor proprietary internal engineering training data—unlike Google's Trillium/Ironwood TPUs and internal failure-case corpora (Johnson, 2026), while enterprise buyers increasingly deploy multi-model routing to contain cost (Menlo Ventures, 2025; Andreessen Horowitz, 2026). Under Bayesian-calibrated scoring (Artificial Analysis, 2025, 2026), `Claude Fable 5.2` (`USD 8/USD 40`) exhibits severe blind-spot hallucination on unfamiliar domains (`59.3%` bluffing rate), forcing reliance on costly external compute purchases that risk flipping into a negative capability – revenue – compute feedback loop once net operating cash falls short of rising compute outlays. Concurrently, our Section 3.5 auditor (`antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py`, extending Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan, 2011) yields a non-circular 3-domain financial-statement Bayes factor across `S1–S7` of **1,168.20x** (`99.24%` posterior at `10%` prior; `90.18%` under `rho = 0.30` common-cause correlation; `3,446.19x / 99.74%` sensitivity including governance signal `S8`):
  1. *Primary Benchmark Facts and Exact Identity Theorem 1 (Critical Familiarity $\alpha^*(P^*)$):* Per `AA-Omniscience v1.1` (Artificial Analysis, 2025, 2026), conditional hallucination is $h = i/(i+p+a) = i/(1-c)$ and headline index $100(c-i)$ fixes $\lambda = 1$ (rewarding guessing; Kalai et al., 2025). Whenever partial responses $p \geq 0$, observational selective accuracy satisfies $P(C \mid \text{Ans}) \leq c/[c+(1-c)h]$ with Bayes Factor $\text{BF} = 1/h$. Verified scores show `Claude Fable 5.2 (max)` bluffs on 59.3% of unknowns (`BF = 1.7x`; `Opus 5.5`: `2.0x`) while

adaptive-thinking token expansion pushes its evaluated task cost to ~USD 26.54/task versus ~USD 4.00/task for `GPT-6.2 Astra` at identical `USD 8/USD 40` list prices. Theorem 1 proves clearing verification-tax gate $P^* = 1 - C_v/L$ requires $\alpha \geq \alpha^*(P^*) = \frac{1}{c}\frac{P^*h}{1-P^*+P^*h}$: at $P^* = 0.90$, `Claude Fable 5.2` requires $\alpha^*(0.90) = 1.065 > 1.00$—failing even at 100% familiarity (at illustrative OOD $\alpha = 0.60$, trust falls to 60.4% and 5-step unverified agent reliability drops to 8.0%). Because distribution shift worsens calibration (Ovadia et al., 2019; Kadavath et al., 2022), holding $h_{\text{OOD}} = h$ favours Fable conservatively.

2. *TPU Unit Economics and Gemini 4 Competitive Release Cadence:* Conversely, Google—Anthropic's USD 121.3bn fixed / USD 125 – 150bn variable cloud/TPU landlord—shipped four Gemini 4 tiers in 50 days (`Argon` 13 Oct, `Carbon` 10 Nov, `Hydrogen` 12 Nov, `Gemini 4 Neon (xhigh)` / Extra High 18 Nov) on internally co-designed Trillium/Ironwood TPUs, with SemiAnalysis (2026) benchmarking TPU v7 Ironwood at up to 50% better perf/dollar vs NVIDIA B200/B300 (`USD 0.181` vs `USD 0.222/0.276` per MTok; GCP also deploys GPUs for cloud tenants). All four Gemini 4 models satisfy $\alpha^*(0.90) < 1$ (`Argon` 0.578, `BF 23.3x`) at 50% – 81.3% lower standard list prices (`Hydrogen` flat `USD 1.50/7.50` , `Gemini 4 Neon (xhigh)` flat `USD 3/15` , and `Argon` / `Carbon` `USD 2/10` intro expiring 30 Nov → `USD 4/20` standard on 1 Dec 2026), overtaking Fable at $\lambda = 3$ and sweeping Ranks `#1–#4` at $\lambda = 5$ (`Opus 5.5` turns negative at `-21.3`).

3. *Parametric Routing Theorems and Unverified Live Inference (Theorems 2 – 3):* Whilst peer-reviewed studies establish multi-model routing cost cuts— `FrugalGPT` up to 98% (Chen, Zaharia and Zou, 2024), `AutoMix` >50% (Aggarwal et al., 2024), and `RouteLLM` 35% – 85% (Ong et al., 2025)—Kim et al. (2025, ICML, 350+ LLMs) prove distinct frontier families exhibit correlated errors. We therefore classify AntLevee's three-layer Bayesian router as an analytical theorem awaiting live enterprise telemetry verification: Theorem 2 proves a pure L1→L2 cascade ($\rho = 0$) cuts customer total bills by 17.5% – 36.0%, whereas adding RAG diversion ($\rho = 0.75$) cuts net customer bills by 37.4% – 54.4% at equal token counts (60.7% – 69.4% under 2× thinking-token overhead) while diverting 84.1% – 88.7% of Anthropic's flagship Fable volume; Theorem 3 replaces naive independence (97.5%) with the Fréchet – Hoeffding blind-audit bound ($h_{12} \leq \min(h_1, h_2)$): withholding L2's reasoning chain keeps Fable+Argon on a 50%-prior query within 95.9% – 97.5% (`Fable+Neon xhigh` : 87.4% – 92.1%).

- *Hypothesis* `H5` *(AI Compute Credit-Payment Chain as Cross-Market Risk-Transfer Chain — Verified via Four Controlled Natural Experiments in* `antlevee_payment_chain_audit.py` *):* Economically, the AI compute credit-payment chain operates in reverse as a **cross-market risk-transfer chain**, shifting concentrated default and asset-stranding exposure from unrated, loss-making AI laboratories via off-balance-sheet SPVs and capped upstream credit wraps onto U.S. life-insurer general accounts, private credit funds, and public retirement portfolios constrained by statutory NAIC rating gates:

  1. *Controlled Filing Experiments on Direct Wrap and Recourse Pricing (Anthropic Big Sky & CoreWeave):* (i) Anthropic Big Sky / AP Compute Same-SPV, Same-Day, Same-Maturity Proof (Athene Holding Ltd., 2026; `Athene_AAIA_3Q26.pdf` , p. 2523, 22 Sep 2026, maturing 20 Oct 2035): Broadcom-wrapped `Class A–2` (`001867–AA–8` , `5.750%` , USD 116.61m) achieves `1.F PL` (`0.816%` RBC C-1), whereas unwrapped `Class B` (`001866–AA–0` USD 21.11m + `08953#–BH–8` USD 62.18m, `8.500%` , pure Anthropic `KBRA BB+` risk) drops to `3.B PL / 3.B FE` (`4.537%` RBC), multiplying required capital by **5.56x** and coupon by +275 bps; (ii) CoreWeave Same-Issuer Recourse and Spread Split (CoreWeave, 2026): *only* Meta-backed `DDTL 4.0` (`CCAC VIII`) attains non-recourse IG `1.G FE` (`SOFR + 225 bps`), while unwrapped `DDTL 5.0` (`SOFR + 450 bps`) and `DDTL 5.5` (`SOFR + 550 bps` , 3-year contracts on 5-year debt + 100% ECF sweep) drop to `3.B FE` (`4.47x` capital) and force parent recourse (`88.73%` of CoreWeave's USD 47.51bn debt).

  2. *Structured Cayman Arbitrage and NAIC PBBD Disqualification Cliffs (SoftBank/SVF II & NAIC SSAP 26R/43R):* (iii) SoftBank / OpenAI Same-Day Ledger Arbitrage (`AAIA` pp. 2521 & 2523; `AANY` p. 337, 23 Sep 2026): SoftBank parent senior notes (`8.625%–9.750%` , USD 355m) carry junk `3.A FE` (`3.151%` RBC), yet same-day structured Cayman notes `SVF II Finco B4` (USD 947.8m, `1.G Z` , `1.016%` RBC) and OpenAI-linked `SVF II Tsubaki` (USD 1,057.5m par, `2.C Z`) capture IG designations (`3.10x` downgrade cliff); and (iv) NAIC Principles-Based Bond Definition (`SSAP 26R/43R` , effective 1 Jan 2025) Statutory Cliff (National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2026, 24 Sep 2026 response to Senator Warren): SPV notes lacking *substantive credit enhancement* fail Schedule D bond eligibility, lose Filing Exemption (`FE`), and move to Schedule BA (`30%` non-bond = `29.5x` or `45%` residual = `44.3x` capital—line-coded `0599999` on `AAIA` p. 2516), reinforced by 2026 SVO

unilateral override authority, the 120-day `Z`-suffix lapse rule, state BIG caps (`NY Insurance Law § 1405`), and initial April 2026 `AG 55` offshore asset-adequacy filings alongside `AG 53` scrutiny (Corebridge Financial, 2026).

3. *Statutory Legal Precision (Regulatory Disqualification vs. Fraud Liability):* Holding an unrated or sub-IG loan triggers statutory capital disqualification (`30%–45%` Schedule BA RBC, state BIG-basket limits, and Appointed Actuary deficiency reserves under `VM-30 / ASOP 22 / AG 53 / AG 55`), rather than criminal fraud per se. Civil and criminal fraud exposure applies only if sponsors or officers *wilfully misrepresent* affiliate ties, hidden backstop caps/exit gates (Broadcom's 85%/72.5% ceilings, Cipher's construction-period backstop gap, TeraWulf's 3-month IG termination gate), or inflated Level 3 marks in statutory statements or offering memoranda—engaging `18 U.S.C. § 1033`, `SEC Rule 10b-5`, and `777 Partners / A-CAP`-style regulatory intervention precedents.

1.3 IPO Execution, Full Greenshoe Closing, and Early-Session Nasdaq Microstructure (19–20 November 2026)

On 19 November 2026, Anthropic, PBC (`NASDAQ: ANT`) priced 980,000,000 shares of Class A common stock at **USD 83.00 per share** (above the amended USD 70.00 – 78.00 range) alongside a concurrent private placement of 313,253,007 shares of non-voting Class N common stock at USD 83.00 per share (USD 26.00bn) to seven upstream hardware and cloud suppliers (Anthropic, 2026g; 2026h, cover and pp. 19, 347). Base gross proceeds totalled USD 107.34bn (`USD 81.34bn` public plus `USD 26.00bn` private placement), adding USD 100.506bn of net cash after USD 4.281bn of RSU tax withholding and ~USD 550m of base underwriting fees (`0.676%`), bringing pre-greenshoe pro forma liquidity to USD 232.351bn (p. 132).

On 20 November 2026, the IPO officially closed with full exercise of the 147,000,000-share underwriters' overallotment option (carrying a 0.00% underwriting commission), raising total public Class A shares sold to 1,127,000,000, public gross proceeds to USD 93.541bn (`USD 93.54bn`), and combined gross capital raised including the USD 26.00bn private placement to USD 119.541bn (`USD 119.54bn`). The full greenshoe adds USD 12.201bn of net cash, elevating total net offering cash

added to USD 112.707bn and **post-greenshoe pro forma cash and short-term investments to USD 244.55bn** (`USD 244.552bn`).

Secondary-market trading across the opening two sessions documented rapid distribution despite full overallotment exercise. On Day 1 (19 November 2026), `ANT` opened at approximately USD 111.50, touched an intraday high of USD 115.10 (+38.7% above the offer price, reaching 92.5% of the USD 124.50 first public-benefit dilution price level), dipped to USD 92.72, and closed at **USD 97.17** (−12.85% vs the opening print; −15.58% vs peak) on volume of 852.98 million shares (87.04% of the 980m base float).

On Day 2 (20 November 2026), shares touched an intraday low of USD 83.05 (high USD 92.56), testing within five cents of the USD 83.00 syndicate stabilisation floor, before closing at **USD 88.91**—down −20.26% from Day-1's ~USD 111.50 opening print (−8.50% vs Day-1 close; +7.12% vs offer price) (Nasdaq, 2026). Consistent with Aggarwal (2000) on underwriter aftermarket stabilisation and greenshoe short-covering, full overallotment exercise paired with immediate testing of the USD 83.00 offer floor indicates heavy initial distribution rather than durable secondary demand, with zero new Form 8-K or Section 16 Form 4 filings posted on EDGAR across 20 – 21 November 2026.

1.4 Why Conventional AI Valuation Multiples Fail Here

Sell-side coverage evaluates Anthropic on five headline non-GAAP metrics: USD 81.0bn of October annualised run-rate revenue (p. 203), an implied 85.5% functional gross margin from Note 8 (p. F-41), +12.3% Adjusted Operating Margin (USD +4.081bn, pp. 162 – 163), USD 6.569bn of nine-month operating cash flow (p. F-13), and a ~900% Net Revenue Retention rate (pp. 2, 11).

Prior accounting literature documents how earnings-quality screens often fail to detect lawful classification choices that tilt profitability upward within GAAP boundaries (Sloan, 1996; Beneish, 1999; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Bloomfield, 2002; Bowen, Davis and Rajgopal, 2002; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Davis, 2002; McVay, 2006; Li, 2008; Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010; Barth, Gow and Taylor, 2012). Applying standard accounting-restatement and disclosure-comparability principles to Anthropic's Form 424B4 and SEC guidance (FASB, 2014, 2016; SEC, 2022; FASB, 2024), this

monograph demonstrates that each of those five headline metrics rests on gross-revenue reporting (`ASC 606-10-55-36`), liquidity-condition RSU deferral (`ASC 718`), deposit-interest inclusion in operating cash flow (`ASC 230-10-50-2`), and dispersed footnote presentation.

1.5 Registration Cycle Evolution and Summary of Findings 1–6

Table 1 — Filing Evolution Across the Registration and Closing Cycle (26 Oct – 20 Nov 2026)

Filing / Event Stage	Date	Financial Cutoff	Offering Size & Pricing	Key Newly Disclosed Structural Facts
`Form S-1` (2026a)	2026-10-26	2026-06-30 (6M26)	Placeholder	USD 321.4bn uncommenced leases; switch to Ernst & Young and nature-based P&L; survival CAGR 61.9%
`Form S-1/A-1` (2026b)	2026-11-02	2026-06-30	Placeholder	Initial governance and LTBT charter exhibits
`Form S-1/A-2` (2026c)	2026-11-10	2026-09-30 (9M26)	Placeholder (USD 74 ref)	9M26 revenue USD 33.242bn; Q3 price drag USD –600m; USD 900.9bn fixed commitments; Nov 9 RSU mod
`Form S-1/A-3` (2026e)	2026-11-17	2026-09-30	825m sh @ USD 70–78 + USD 26bn PP	7-supplier USD 26bn private placement; October USD 81bn 28-day run-rate; 5% + 2% PBF dilution framework
`Form S-1MEF` / `FWP` (2026f/g)	2026-11-18	2026-09-30	980m base + 147m GS @ **USD 83.00**	Rule 462(b) upsizing (+155m firm / +23.25m GS); 0.676% base underwriting discount (0% on greenshoe)
`Form 424B4` & `S-8` (2026h/i/j)	2026-11-19	2026-09-30	Final USD 83.00 (392 pages)	17 Bookrunners + 5 Co-managers; USD 14.7bn Day-1 RSU charge; 121.89m S-8 resale; Google cap confirmed unbreached; Day-1 close USD 97.17
Official Closing & Day-2 Tape	2026-11-20	2026-11-20 / 09-30	**1,127m sh** (full 147m GS) + PP	**USD 93.54bn** public gross / **USD 119.54bn** combined; **USD 244.55bn** pro forma liquidity; Day-2 low **USD 83.05** / close **USD 88.91 (–20.26% vs open)**

PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY **The Core Valuation Paradox**

On the surface, Anthropic raised a record cash pile (`USD 244.55bn` post-greenshoe) and trades around USD 1.6tn–1.8tn on a fully diluted equity basis. Underneath, nearly USD 1.08tn in compute bills already signed exceeds its locked-in customer revenue backlog (`USD 13.8bn`) by up to 78 times, whilst secondary-market trading fell to USD 83.05 (just five cents above the USD 83.00 offer floor) on Day 2 as institutions digested the filings.

1.6 Research Design, Verification Standards, and Replication Protocol

Adopting a multi-tier institutional case-study research design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2018) and extending recent central-bank and academic frameworks on AI credit circularity (FSOC, 2025; Aldasoro, Doerr and Rees, 2026; Drehmann and Eren, 2026; Frost et al., 2026; Hepp, 2026; Van Nieuwerburgh, 2026), we examine contractual risk allocation strictly within US GAAP without alleging accounting fraud or statutory illegality. All empirical figures anchor directly to primary SEC filings (Anthropic, 2026a – 2026j; SEC, 2026) and statutory counterparty disclosures of Broadcom, TeraWulf, NVIDIA, CoreWeave, Nebius, IREN, SpaceX, Nscale, and Apollo.

We separate all findings into four transparent verification tiers: (1) Primary Fact (verbatim figures and clauses with printed page locators); (2) Arithmetic Restatement (deterministic reclassifications with zero free parameters, such as $\lambda = 0$ gross margin `67.5%` and Form 424B4 p. 28 pro forma operating margin `-26.3%`); (3) Explicit Scenario (parametric bounds such as $\lambda \in [0.5, 0.8]$ and the 192-state cash-flow bisection matrix); and (4) Cross-Document Inference (triangulated across issuer and counterparty filings, paired with competing explanations and scheduled filing checkpoints `P1–P18` in Section 8.3).

RESEARCH ARCHITECTURE EXPLORER · CH 2–8

Research Architecture Explorer: Core Findings, Quantitative Formulae & Primary Filings

Ch. 2 · Finding 1 Jump to Chapter →

Anthropic signs USD 900.9bn in fixed compute and lease commitments (USD 13.8bn customer RPO) with 98.6% of leases and USD 156.2bn VIEs off balance sheet.

CORE RESEARCH QUESTION

How large are off-BS compute liabilities and who absorbs credit wraps?

KEY EMPIRICAL RESULT

Commitment/RPO reaches 65.3x (USD 1.076tn total / 78.0x); Broadcom caps dual-SPV wraps at USD 72bn and Google wraps USD 19bn Hawesville CSAs.

THEORETICAL CANON

Constructive Capitalisation (Imhoff et al., 1991); Incomplete Contracts & Asset Specificity (Williamson, 1985; Hart & Moore, 1990).

SPECIFICATION & EQUATIONS

Eq. (1) Commitment/RPO ratio; Eq. (2) Broadcom dual-SPV net residual formula

PRIMARY FILINGS & EXHIBITS

Form 424B4 pp. 7, 177–180, F-35–F-37; AVGO 8-K; WULF 8-K · Tables 2–6 · Fig. 2


Figure 01 NASDAQ: ANT Listing-Day Minute Tape (19 Nov 2026) and Two-Day Stabilisation Overview

20 NOV DAY-2 CLOSE
$88.91

VS OPENING TRADE (~$111.50)
-20.26%

IMPLIED FD EQUITY VALUE
$1.63T (Post-GS)

AMZN RETAINED NOTE Q4 P&L
-USD 31.40B



Interactive Tape: hover along Day-1 minutes or Day-2 stabilisation checkpoints to inspect live price, fully diluted equity value, and Amazon convertible Q4 MTM loss (Aggarwal 2000 greenshoe stabilisation around USD 83.00; total proceeds USD 119.54B after 147m greenshoe).

Chapter 2: Off-Balance-Sheet Compute Commitments, Unconsolidated VIEs, and Dual Backstops

2.1 Commitment Scale vs Customer RPO (`65.3x` / `78.0x`) and `187.9:1` / `240.6:1` Forward Duration Mismatch

As of 30 September 2026 and including subsequent agreements through the prospectus date, Anthropic has entered into **USD 900.9bn** of fixed or minimum compute, cloud, and data-centre lease commitments—comprising USD 319.993bn in the Contractual Obligations table (p. 177), USD 17.4bn of short-term purchase commitments, USD 451.2bn of uncommenced leases (p. 178, F-36), USD 105.7bn of post-30 September long-term commitments, and USD 6.6bn of post-30 September short-term commitments ($\sum = \text{USD } 900.893\text{bn} \approx \text{USD } 900.9\text{bn}$). Adding two variable arrangements without fixed dollar floors—Google's additional TPU expansion (USD 125.0bn – 150.0bn, p. 178) and AMD's Helios/MI450 supply framework (over USD 20.0bn, p. 171)—brings total compute exposure to **USD 1,045.9bn – 1,075.9bn** (Anthropic, 2026h, pp. 7 – 8, 39 – 42, 143, 177 – 180). Within this contracting structure (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1990; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), irreversibility concentrates heavily on Anthropic's side:

$$\text{Multiple}_{\text{fixed}} = \frac{900.9}{13.8} = 65.3\times, \qquad \text{Multiple}_{\text{total}} = \frac{1{,}075.9}{13.8} = 78.0\times \quad \text{(USD b} \tag{1}$$

Across the entire USD 900.9bn fixed pool, **79.3% (USD 714.7bn)** is strictly non-cancellable and 20.7% (USD 186.2bn) is subject to termination rights or pre-commencement conditions (p. 178). Deducting the USD 70.7bn due within 12 months (of which only USD 4.2bn is terminable/contingent, p. 178), forward commitments beyond 12 months total USD 830.2bn across all contracts and USD 648.2bn across strictly non-cancellable contracts. Against USD 3.45bn of customer RPO extending beyond 12 months (25% of USD 13.8bn, p. F-27), Anthropic's forward duration mismatch beyond one year stands at **240.6 : 1** (total) and **187.9 : 1** (strictly non-cancellable). Relative to 31 December 2025 non-cancellable purchase commitments of USD 54.559bn (`coverage_results.json`), the nine-month commitment book expanded `5.75x` in pre-2031 fixed minimums (`USD 313.8bn`), `16.51x` in fixed totals (`USD 900.9bn`), and `19.72x` including variable capacity (`USD 1,075.9bn`).

Table 2 — Commitments vs Customer Remaining Performance Obligations (30 Sep 2026 & Post-Period; USD bn)

Obligation Bucket / Time Horizon	Undiscounted Total	Within 12 Months	Beyond 12 Months	Multiple vs Customer RPO	Form 424B4 Locator
1. Customer Remaining Performance Obligations (RPO, Locked Revenue)	**13.80**	10.35 (75%)	3.45 (25%)	**1.0x (Base)**	p. F-27
2. Strictly Non-Cancellable Fixed Compute & Leases (79.3%)	**714.70**	66.50	**648.20**	**51.8x (187.9x >12m)**	pp. 8, 40, 178
3. Terminable or Conditioned Fixed Commitments (20.7%)	**186.20**	4.20	182.00	13.5x	p. 178
4. Aggregate Fixed or Minimum Commitments (2 + 3)	**900.90**	**70.70**	**830.20**	**65.3x (240.6x >12m)**	pp. 7–8, 40, 177–178
5. Variable & Unpriced Capacity (Google TPU 125–150bn + AMD >20bn)	**145.0–175.0**	—	145.0–175.0	+10.5x–12.7x	pp. 171, 178
6. Grand Total Compute & Data-Centre Exposure (4 + 5)	**1,045.9–1,075.9**	**70.70**	**975.2–1,005.2**	**78.0x (Upper Bound)**	pp. 7–8, 171, 178

2.2 Off-Balance-Sheet Leases (`98.6%`), Unconsolidated VIEs (`USD 156.2bn`), and Constructive Capitalisation

On Anthropic's balance sheet as of 30 September 2026 (pp. F-6, F-36), commenced operating and finance lease liabilities total USD 4.484bn in present value (USD 2.810bn operating + USD 1.674bn finance; USD 6.174bn undiscounted), representing 1.35% of total undiscounted lease obligations (USD 457.374bn) and 0.50% of total undiscounted commitments (USD 900.9bn). The remaining **98.6% (USD 451.2bn undiscounted)** sits off-balance-sheet as *"leases that have not yet commenced"* scheduled to commence between 2026 and 2028 over a weighted-average term of approximately 10 years (pp. 178, F-36).

Extending the constructive lease capitalisation framework of Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991) and related analyses of lease debt capacity and collateral specificity (Myers, 1977; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Benmelech and Bergman, 2009; Lim, Mann and Mihov, 2017), we discount Anthropic's uncommenced leases at the disclosed lease borrowing rates (7.2% operating / 6.6% finance, p. F-36) over the 10-year weighted-average term. This yields an unrecorded lease liability present value of **USD 313.99bn – 322.85bn** at commencement (USD 319.68bn – 328.39bn quarterly) or USD

306.24bn – 315.49bn as of 30 September 2026 under staggered 2026 – 2028 commencement (`starts = [0.125, 0.75, 1.75]` years)—equivalent to 2.38x – 2.55x pro forma equity (USD 128.887bn). Note 7 (p. F-36) further discloses that **USD 156.2bn (34.62%)** sit inside unconsolidated VIEs excluded because Anthropic lacks post-lease *"asset remarketing"* control, whilst Note 13 (p. F-60) carries USD 4.2bn of developer cost-reimbursement and USD 0.5bn of power-supply guarantees (`USD 4.7bn` total) at approximately zero balance-sheet accrual.

Table 3 — Constructive Capitalisation Present Value of Off-Balance-Sheet Leases & VIEs (`30 Sep 2026` ; USD bn)

Discounting & Commencement Convention	Discount Rate	Operating Lease Split	Undiscounted Face	Present Value (USD bn)	Multiple vs Pro Forma Equity (128.89bn)	Share of Total Leases (Incl. On-BS)
On-Balance-Sheet Commenced Leases (`p. F-36`)	6.6%–7.2%	USD 2.81bn Op + 1.67bn Fin	6.17	**4.48**	0.03x	**1.35% (undisc.)**
Uncommenced: Lagged Staggered (`2026–2028`)	7.2% (Op.)	Mid-year staggered starts	451.20	**295.78 / 306.24**	2.29x–2.38x	98.59% (PV)
Uncommenced: Lagged Staggered (`2026–2028`)	6.6% (Fin.)	Mid-year staggered starts	451.20	**305.57 / 315.49**	2.37x–2.45x	98.64% (PV)
Uncommenced: Immediate Commencement (Annual)	7.2% / 6.6%	10-year uniform maturity	451.20	**313.99–322.85**	2.44x–2.50x	98.60% (PV)
Uncommenced: Immediate Commencement (Quarterly)	7.2% / 6.6%	Quarterly level payments	451.20	**319.68–328.39**	2.48x–2.55x	98.65% (PV)
Memo: Unconsolidated Developer VIE Share (`Note 7`)	—	Excluded ("remarketing")	**156.20**	**102.4–113.7**	0.79x–0.88x	**34.62% of uncommenced**

2.3 Counterparty Credit Contradiction, NVIDIA Chip Dependency, and Residual-Value Reality

If Anthropic's balance-sheet liquidity eliminated counterparty credit concern, project-finance lenders would lend against Anthropic's lease signature directly. Counterparty filings show the opposite: consistent with off-balance-sheet securitisation without full risk transfer and compute collateral discounting (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2013; Kroll Bond Rating Agency, 2026; Morningstar DBRS, 2026a, 2026b), vendor-sponsored vehicles rely on explicit residual backstops:

$$\text{Guarantee}_{\text{AVGO}} = \max\left(0,\ \alpha \cdot \text{UnpaidRent}_{5\text{yr}} - \text{NetProceeds}_{\text{RackSale}}\right), \quad \alpha \in \{85\% \quad (2)$$

1. *Broadcom Dual SPVs (`Table 4`):* Under Broadcom's Form 10-Q and Form 8-K filed 27 October 2026 (Broadcom Inc., 2026a, 2026b), Broadcom's USD 161.2bn 5-year device leases with Anthropic (USD 190.6bn including 6.6% level-payment interest) are financed through **SPV #1 (`AI XPV` / `Big Sky`, ~USD 35bn)** with an 85% Broadcom backstop capped at USD 29bn (alongside Athene's remaining 15% WHCO guarantee, Apollo Global Management, 2026) and **SPV #2 (~USD 63bn, 26 October 2026, first-lien led by BofA, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley; second-lien by Blackstone)** with a 72.5% Broadcom backstop capped at USD 43bn (USD 72bn combined).
2. *TeraWulf Hawesville Lease (`Form 8-K`, 4 November 2026):* Fifteen days before Anthropic's IPO pricing, TeraWulf's 401 MW, 20-year data-centre lease (~USD 19bn, carrying 20-year annual escalators and uncapped fuel-cost pass-throughs, p. 80) required three Google Credit Support Agreements locking the campus exclusively to Google-approved TPUs until Anthropic maintains an investment-grade rating from two agencies for three consecutive months (TeraWulf Inc., 2026a, 2026b).

Table 4 — Broadcom Dual Device-Lease SPVs and Combined Residual-Value Backstops (USD bn)

Vehicle / Facility	Facility Size	Lease Principal / Cash Rent	Broadcom Guarantee %	Broadcom Dollar Cap	Junior / Residual Gap & Creditors
SPV #1 (AI XPV / Big Sky · WHCO)	**35.00**	Part of USD 161.2bn (190.6bn)	**85.0%**	**29.00**	Remaining **15% (USD 5.25bn gross / 3.41bn net)** backstopped by Athene Holding Ltd. (Q3 10-Q Note 12); Athene holds USD 7.045bn debt/VIE + 55 mutual funds (USD 713.77m)
SPV #2 (26 Oct 2026 Commitment)	**63.00**	Part of USD 161.2bn (190.6bn)	**72.5%**	**43.00**	**27.5% (~USD 17.3bn)** unguaranteed shortfall borne by 1L syndicate (BofA, Citi, Morgan Stanley) & 2L (Blackstone)
Combined Broadcom SPV Stack	**98.00**	**161.20 (190.60 cash)**	**77.0% wtd avg**	**72.00**	Broadcom steps back **12.5pp** (85% → 72.5%) on SPV #2, confirming lender haircutting of 5-year custom silicon liquidation value

Table 5 — Master Ledger of Named Anthropic Compute & Data-Centre Commitments (USD bn)

Counterparty / Category	Class	Undiscounted Total	Term / Window	Cancellability & Key Contractual Terms (Form 424B4 & Counterparty 8-Ks)
Microsoft (Azure)	Class A (Rigid)	47.2	2026-11 to 2033-06	Non-cancellable take-or-pay cloud commitment (pp. 177–178)
Google (Cloud & Colocation)	Class A (Rigid)	121.3	2026-04 to 2033-07	Non-cancellable take-or-pay; shortfall settled via cash true-up (p. 178)
Amazon (AWS & Trainium)	Class A (Rigid)	110.0	2026-05 to 2036-04	Non-cancellable 10-year take-or-pay cloud commitment (p. 178)
Broadcom Device Leases	Class B (Rigid)	161.2 (190.6 cash)	2027-01 to 2031-12	5-year finance leases guaranteed by parent; USD 190.6bn incl. 6.6% interest; USD 98bn dual SPVs
SpaceXAI (`xAI` / SpaceX)	Class D (90d notice)	120.5 (114.7 model)	2026-12 to 2029-12	USD 3.1bn/month; either party may terminate on 90 days' notice (~USD 19.6bn irrevocable floor, p. 179)
Nscale	Class C (Contingent)	44.6	2028-01 to 2033-12	Delivery-contingent neocloud; Nscale draft S-1 discloses financing not yet committed (p. 179)
Lambda	Class C (Contingent)	41.3	2027-01 to 2034-12	Includes Aug 2026 ~USD 34.9bn agreement currently **terminable by either party** due to missed facility lease deadline (p. 179)
Other Uncommenced & Post-Sep-30	Aggregate Balance	254.8	2026 to 2045	Reconciles to **USD 900.9bn** fixed/minimum total (USD 714.7bn non-cancellable; USD 156.2bn VIEs)
Google Additional TPUs + AMD	Class V (Variable)	145.0–175.0	2027-07 to 2033-12	Google USD 125–150bn TPU expansion + AMD >USD 20bn Helios/MI450 (**USD 1,075.9bn** grand total)

Hardware Bottleneck Vulnerability: NVIDIA GPU Dependency and Chip-Portability Claims

Anthropic publicly emphasises engineering portability across AWS Trainium, Google TPUs, and NVIDIA GPUs (`Anthropic, 2026h, p. 41`). Read alongside Table 5 (`>USD 206.4bn` in NVIDIA-based neocloud commitments across SpaceXAI, Nscale, and Lambda) and NVIDIA's `Q3`

`FY27 Form 10-Q` (filed 17 November 2026, revenue USD 115.8bn, data centre USD 107.6bn), that portability narrative underscores an acute operational concentration risk rather than insulation. Because over 80% of Q3 2026 revenue came from model releases shipped within six months (p. 148), any NVIDIA allocation constraint, export-licence disruption, or generation slip across Blackwell/Rubin clusters threatens to stall Anthropic's frontier training cadence.

Equally critical, NVIDIA Corporation (2026b, 2026c) and SB Energy Inc. (2026) resolve three decisive questions about collateral and insurance across the sector: (i) **zero third-party insurers write commercial default or chip-residual insurance** on these SPVs—property insurers cover only physical casualty (and in `PORTS-Pike`, tenant property-insurance proceeds reduce NVIDIA's guarantee cap dollar-for-dollar), while U.S. life insurers sit on the *asset side* buying SPV notes; (ii) NVIDIA's USD 105.0bn `SB Energy PORTS-Pike` guarantee (`89%` of its USD 118.0bn Q3 FY27 gross guarantees) expressly excludes GPU silicon residual value, covering strictly land, AEP transmission, power, and building shells until OpenAI gains investment-grade status; and (iii) in a sector bust, 3 – 5-year accelerators depreciate rapidly while energised land, high-voltage substation interconnects, and powered shells form the durable terminal recovery (`Table 6`).

Table 6 — Sector-Wide Residual-Value Guarantee Ledger, Role of Insurers, and Terminal Physical Recovery (`USD bn`)

Vehicle / Project (Lessee)	Facility & Backstop Cap	Covered Collateral & Release Gate	Role of Insurance Institutions	Terminal Loss Priority & Physical Residual Value
Broadcom SPV #1 (Big Sky / Anthropic)	**35.0** facility; AVGO 85% (**29.0** cap) + Athene 15% (**5.25** gross)	Custom AI rack rents net of liquidation proceeds; USD 0 GAAP loss reserve	Zero third-party credit insurance; Apollo's **Athene buys USD 7.045bn debt/VIE + backstops 15% WHCO**	Broadcom & Athene share first-loss → 55 mutual funds; custom ASIC racks suffer steep secondary discount
Broadcom SPV #2 (Anthropic)	**63.0** facility; AVGO **72.5%** (**43.0** cap)	Custom AI rack rents net of rack disposal proceeds; 12.5pp lower wrap	Zero external credit insurance; unguaranteed **27.5% (~USD 17.3bn)** tail sits directly on lenders	BofA/Citi/MS 1L syndicate & Blackstone 2L absorb residual gap on rapidly obsolescing racks
TeraWulf Hawesville (Anthropic)	**19.0** (20y, 401 MW); 3 **Google** CSAs	Tenant lease defaults & site continuance; released after **3-mo dual IG rating**	Zero external default insurance; Google corporate balance sheet replaces commercial wrap & locks TPUs	Google steps into site or creditors foreclose; durable value sits in **401 MW grid interconnect & site land**
SB Energy PORTS–Pike (OpenAI Peer Benchmark)	**105.0** (4.25 GW 20y; **89%** of NVDA 118.0bn)	**Expressly excludes GPUs**; backs land, AEP grid, power & building shell	**Property insurance proceeds offset NVDA liability dollar-for-dollar**; zero GPU residual coverage	NVIDIA absorbs capped shortfall above land/power; terminal value is **4.25 GW power rights & powered shell**

Note: Beyond Table 6, Anthropic discloses USD 4.7bn in Note 13 (p. F-60) unaccrued guarantees (USD 4.2bn developer cost reimbursements + USD 0.5bn power commitments to 2038). Sources: Anthropic (2026h, p. F-60), Broadcom Inc. (2026a, 2026b), TeraWulf Inc. (2026b), Athene Holding Ltd. (2026), SB Energy Inc. (2026), and NVIDIA Corporation (2026c).

PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY


Who Actually Holds the Empty Bag on Used Chips?

Even the chipmakers themselves refuse to bet on used AI chips holding their value. Broadcom cut its guarantee from 85% on its first Anthropic hardware SPV to 72.5% on its second, and NVIDIA's massive USD 105bn Ohio guarantee for OpenAI explicitly leaves GPU chips out altogether, insuring only land, high-voltage power hook-ups, and concrete data-centre shells. Meanwhile, traditional insurers are not selling protection against defaults here—life insurers like Athene are buying the bonds themselves. If frontier AI demand stalls, yesterday's racks depreciate fast, leaving electricity rights and real estate as the only lasting collateral.

Figure 02 Off-Balance-Sheet Compute & Lease Commitment Cascade (USD 900.9bn Fixed / USD 1.076tn Total)

INTERACTIVE COMMITMENT & BACKSTOP ARCHITECTURE

Switch views to inspect why USD 900.9bn of off-BS obligations dwarf USD 13.8bn of customer RPO, which contracts lock up cash first, and how Broadcom & Google backstop the SPVs.



65.3x / 78.0x
Fixed / Max vs RPO
USD 900.9B fixed (USD 1.08T max) vs USD 13.8B customer RPO

98.6% Off-BS
Leases Outside Table
USD 451.2B uncommenced (USD 156.2B VIE) vs USD 4.48B on-BS

79.3% ($714.7B)
Irrevocable Core
Only 20.7% (USD 186.2B) can be cancelled if demand falls

USD 72B + 19B
Broadcom + Google Backstops
85%/72.5% AVGO caps + Nov 4 Google credit support (no insurance)

Broadcom lease principal ($161.2B, $190.6B incl. interest) is parent-guaranteed; verified verbatim against Form 424B4 (pp. 177–180, F-35–F-37), Broadcom 8-K, TeraWulf 8-K, and Athene 3Q26 10-Q.

Chapter 3: ASC 606 Gross-Up Effects, Functional Gross Margin Reconstruction, Frontier Model Calibration, and Dependence-Aware Statement Audit

3.1 Auditor Switch (Grant Thornton → Ernst & Young) and Elimination of Cost of Revenue

In FY2025, Anthropic dismissed Grant Thornton LLP, appointed Ernst & Young LLP (p. 348), and shifted its Consolidated Statements of Operations from functional presentation to nature-based presentation—removing *Cost of Revenue* and *Gross Profit* from the face of the income statement (pp. F-4, F-8). Relegated to Note 8 (pp. F-40 – F-41), functional *Cost of revenue* is reported at **USD 4.812bn** against USD 33.242bn of 9M26 revenue (an implied 85.52% gross margin, up 46.0pp from audited FY2025's 39.52% and up from FY2023's 36.59% / FY2024's −94.82% / 9M2025's 29.43%), whilst *Research and development* absorbs USD 19.240bn and *Sales and marketing* absorbs USD 6.619bn (up `12.49x` YoY from USD 530m). Simultaneously, `Table 7` shows Q3 2026 compute surging to 58.2% of revenue (`USD 9.863bn`) as GAAP operating income reverted to USD −567m (`p. 165`) and quarterly price-discount drag expanded `8.57x` to USD −600m (`p. 166`).

Table 7 — Anthropic Quarterly Operating Trajectory (`2025Q1–2026Q3`; USD bn)

Line Item (Form 424B4 Quarterly Series)	2025Q1	2025Q2	2025Q3	2025Q4	2026Q1	2026Q2	2026Q3
Consolidated Revenue	0.376	0.787	1.382	2.040	4.731	11.555	**16.956**
Compute and Infrastructure Expense (Nature)	0.944	1.390	2.047	2.945	3.387	5.558	**9.863**
Compute / Revenue (%)	251.1%	176.6%	148.1%	144.4%	71.6%	**48.1%**	**58.2%**
Personnel (Incl. Option SBC)	0.218	0.320	0.489	0.812	1.295	1.857	1.711
Sales, Marketing and Partnerships	0.024	0.096	0.202	0.246	1.033	2.135	2.361
Other Operating & General Admin (Incl. Donations/Settlements)	0.125	0.181	1.733	0.873	0.683	1.031	3.588
GAAP Operating Income / (Loss)	**(0.935)**	**(1.200)**	**(3.089)**	**(2.836)**	**(1.667)**	**+0.974**	**(0.567)**

3.2 ASC 606 Principal vs Agent Gross-Up (`USD 185.5bn–254.5bn` Gross-Up Valuation Effect)

Approximately 44% of 9M26 revenue is generated through cloud service provider marketplaces (`AWS Bedrock` , `Google Vertex AI` , `Microsoft Azure`). Anthropic reports end-customer billings gross as Principal (`ASC 606-10-55-36`) whilst booking the revenue-share fees retained by the cloud platforms inside operating expenses (*Sales, marketing, and partnerships* of USD 5.529bn, which rose by at least **USD 4.800bn** YoY from channel fees alone, p. 157):

$$R_{\text{net}} = R_{\text{gross}} - F_{\text{channel}} = 33.242 - 4.800 = 28.442 \text{ USD bn} \quad (-14.44\%) \tag{3}$$

Whilst gross-versus-net presentation leaves gross profit, operating income, cash flow, and `EV / Gross Profit` strictly invariant—and Anthropic's principal designation under `ASC 606-10-55-36` is legally defensible where it controls pricing and service delivery—multiplying a 14.44% pass-through revenue layer by a headline `EV / Sales` multiple produces **USD 185.5bn (basic) to USD 254.5bn (fully diluted)** of revenue-multiple valuation inflation (`antlevee_exact_audit.json`). Further deducting the midpoint (6% = USD 1.995bn) of the 5% – 7% revenue generated by policy-violating customers Anthropic began terminating in August – September 2026 (pp. 70, 72, 151) reduces compliant net revenue to USD 26.448bn (`R_0 = USD 63.755bn` on a Q3 annualised basis).

3.3 Conventional US GAAP Functional Gross Margin Reconstruction (`85.52% → 67.50% → 33.82%`)

Total nature-based *Compute and infrastructure* expense in 9M26 is **USD 18.808bn** (p. F-8), yet Note 8 places only USD 4.812bn inside *Cost of revenue*—leaving USD 13.996bn (`74.42%` of all compute) below the gross-profit line inside R&D (`USD 19.240bn`) and S&M (`USD 6.619bn`), alongside USD 0.435bn of incremental payment-processing fees and USD 0.757bn of data-quality/evaluation expenses (p. 157). Under US GAAP `ASC 730-10` , expensing pure model research inside R&D is strictly lawful; however, because over 80% of Q3 revenue came from model versions released within the prior six months (p. 148), short-cycle foundation-model training and post-training behave economically like recurring cost of goods replenishment rather than enduring R&D (`Table 8` and `Table 9`):

$$\mathrm{CoR}(\lambda) = 4.812 + F_{\text{chan}} + F_{\text{pay+eval}} + \lambda \cdot 13.996, \qquad \mathrm{GM}(\lambda) = \frac{R - \mathrm{CoR}(\lambda)}{R} \tag{4}$$

Table 8 — Consolidated Statement of Operations: Nature-Based (`p. F-7`) vs Functional Reclassification (`9M 2026`; USD bn)

Reporting Lens (9M 2026 Revenue = USD 33.242bn)	Note 8 As-Implied	Pure Arithmetic Reclass ($\lambda = 0$)	Mid Functional ($\lambda = 0.50$)	Short-Cycle Functional ($\lambda = 0.80$)	Filing Locator / Standard
Cost of Revenue (`Nature Base = 4.812` + Direct Costs)	4.812	**10.804**	**17.802**	**22.001**	pp. F-7, F-40–F-41 (`Note 8`)
Gross Profit (`33.242 − CoR`)	**28.430**	**22.438**	**15.440**	**11.241**	Historical Note 8: `FY23 36.6%`, `FY25 39.5%`
Research & Development (`Incl. Ex-CoR Compute`)	19.240	18.483	11.485	7.286	`74.42%` (`USD 13.996bn`) compute below line
Sales, Marketing, Partners & Payment (`Excl. Channel Reclass`)	6.619	1.384	1.384	1.384	Excludes USD 4.800bn CSP + USD 0.435bn fees
General & Administrative (`As Reported`)	3.831	3.831	3.831	3.831	Incl. USD 2.086bn non-cash donations
GAAP Operating Loss (Excl. Unrecognised RSU)	**(1.260)**	**(1.260)**	**(1.260)**	**(1.260)**	Pro forma RSU adj. adds **−7.487bn** (`Table 10`)

Table 9 — Conventional Functional US GAAP Gross Margin Reconstruction (`9M 2026`; USD bn)

Restatement Level	Revenue Base	Restated Cost of Revenue	Restated Gross Profit	Restated Gross Margin	Shift vs Note 8	Basis & Justification
0. Note 8 Implied Baseline	33.242	4.812	28.430	**85.52%**	—	Face P&L omits CoR; Note 8 p. F-41
1. + Channel Partner Fees (USD 4.800bn)	33.242	9.612	23.630	**71.08%**	−14.44pp	Arithmetic reclassification (p. 157)
1b. + Payment (0.435) & Eval (0.757) [$\lambda = 0$]	33.242	10.804	22.438	**67.50%**	−18.02pp	Pure arithmetic ceiling (zero assumptions)
2a. + 50% Below-Line Compute ($\lambda = 0.5$, Gross)	33.242	17.802	15.440	**46.45%**	−39.07pp	50% short-cycle production compute
2b. + 50% Below-Line Compute ($\lambda = 0.5$, Net Rev)	28.442	13.002	15.440	**54.29%**	−31.23pp	ASC 606 net revenue basis
3a. + 80% Below-Line Compute ($\lambda = 0.8$, Gross)	33.242	22.001	11.241	**33.82%**	−51.70pp	80% short-cycle (<6m model half-life, p. 148)
3b. + 80% Below-Line Compute ($\lambda = 0.8$, Net Rev)	28.442	17.201	11.241	**39.52%**	−46.00pp	**Matches audited FY2025 gross margin (39.52%)**

Figure 03 Five-Tier Functional US GAAP Gross Margin Reconstruction (85.5% → 67.5% → 33.8%)

$185.5B–$254.5B
ASC 606 Gross-Up Valuation Halo
Day-1 close multiple applied to 14.44% toll-booth fee (basic / diluted)

–USD 11.008B
Below-Cost Partner Preferred Shares
Google & Amazon USD 25.91 Series G-2 cheap-stock expense (pp. F-31, F-39)

–23.9% to –26.4%
Zero-Overlap Normalised Operating Margin
p. 28 exact pro forma –26.3% / –USD 8.75B (36–39pp below Adjusted +12.3%)

Revenue Denominator

Restatement Tiers & Sub-Line Compute Ratio (λ)

Off-line compute shifted into CoR (λ): **80%**

RESTATED GROSS MARGIN
33.82%

NET-BASIS GM (FY25: 39.5%)
39.52%

RESTATED COST OF REVENUE
$22.00B / $11.24B

GAP VS NOTE 8 (85.52%)
–51.71pp

Form 424B4 Note 8 Implied Baseline **85.52% GM ($4.81B CoR)**

Conventional GAAP Restated (Gross Basis · λ = 0.80) **33.82% GM ($22.00B CoR)**

Note 8 Reported CoR ($4.81B) · Cloud Channel Fee ($4.80B) · Pay & Eval ($1.19B) · Reclassified Compute (λ × $14.00B) · Remaining Gross Profit

FY24 (Grant Thornton) **–94.8%** FY25 (EY Audit) **39.5%** 9M25 Reported **29.4%** 9M26 Note 8 **85.5%**

9M26 Restated: 33.8%

3.4 Zero-Overlap Normalised Operating Margin (`–23.9%` to `–26.4%`) and Frontier AI Calibration Audit

Prior to the IPO, Anthropic recognised **USD 0** of RSU compensation because the liquidity-event condition was deemed not probable; 100% of reported 9M26 SBC (USD 3.255bn) reflects stock options and other non-RSU awards (pp. 182, F-54). Two strict accounting identities govern the restatement: (1) restored RSU expense must be added on top of existing option SBC (`USD 3.255bn`); and (2) the USD 14.700bn IPO settlement charge already encompasses the USD 8.200bn service-vested as of 30 September, the USD 3.400bn 9 November modification remeasurement (67m RSUs accelerated by one day to 19 November at USD 83.00, p. F-67), and ~USD 3.100bn of Q4 pre-IPO vesting—so USD 14.7bn must never be double-counted alongside USD 32.3bn or USD 24.1bn. Thus, strict zero-overlap lifetime RSU pools are $\mathrm{Pool}_{\text{Sep30-Mod}} = \mathbf{USD\ 35.700bn}$ and, adding USD 3.700bn of post-30 September grants (p. F-66), $\mathrm{Pool}_{\text{All-RSU}} = \mathbf{USD\ 39.400bn}$ (plus USD 2.100bn options/RSAs = **USD 41.500bn**):

$$\mathrm{SBC}_{\text{norm}} = \mathrm{SBC}_{\text{rep}} + \tfrac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{\mathrm{Pool}_{\text{RSU}}}{4}, \qquad \mathrm{OI}_{\text{norm}} = \mathrm{OI}_{\text{rep}} - \tfrac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{\mathrm{Pool}_{\text{RSU}}}{4} \tag{5}$$

Table 10 — 9M 2026 Operating Income Bridge: Non-GAAP Adjusted vs GAAP vs Zero-Overlap Normalised (USD bn)

Measure / Restatement Method	Incremental RSU	Total SBC	Operating Income (Loss)	% Gross Rev (33.242)	% Net Rev (28.442)	Verification Basis
Management Non-GAAP Adjusted Operating Income	—	0.000	**+4.081**	**+12.28%**	+14.35%	Excludes USD 3.255bn option SBC & USD 2.086bn donation (p. 163)
GAAP Reported Operating Loss	0.000	3.255	**−1.260**	**−3.79%**	−4.43%	Zero RSU expense recognised pre-IPO (p. F-8)
Normalised A (4-yr Straight-Line, Sep-30 Mod `USD 35.7bn`)	+6.694	**9.949**	**−7.954**	**−23.93%**	**−27.96%**	Zero-overlap lower bound (`35.7 / 4 * 0.75`, ex post-Sep-30)
Normalised B (4-yr Straight-Line, All-RSU `USD 39.4bn`)	+7.388	**10.643**	**−8.648**	**−26.01%**	**−30.40%**	Zero-overlap all-RSU pool (`32.3 + 3.4 + 3.7 = 39.4bn`)
Normalised C (Form 424B4 p. 28 Exact Pro Forma RSU)	+7.487	**10.742**	**−8.747**	**−26.31%**	**−30.75%**	Primary filing pro forma (`USD 7,487m`, p. 28; p. F-54 `7,529m` gives **−8.789bn / −26.44%**)
Memo: B / C + Partner Financing Fair-Value Loss (`USD 11.008bn`)	+7.388 / +7.487	10.643 / 10.742	**−19.656 to −19.755**	**−59.13% to −59.43%**	**−69.11% to −69.46%**	Includes Series G-2 low-price preferred subsidy (`USD 25.91/sh`, p. F-39)

Beyond accounting classification, Anthropic's valuation moat presupposes sustained frontier-capability pricing power. Testing eight leading models on `AA-Omniscience v1.1` (Artificial Analysis, 2025, 2026) via `antlevee_bayesian_moat.py` (`Table 11`) shows that `Claude Fable 5.2 (max)` charges USD 8/USD 40 per MTok (`~USD 26.54/task` under thinking expansion vs `~USD 4.00/task` for `GPT-6.2 Astra`) yet bluffs on 59.3% of unfamiliar queries (`BF = 1.69x`), failing a `90%` verification-tax threshold even at `100%` familiarity ($\alpha^*(0.90) = 1.065 > 1$; OOD 5-step survival = `8.02%`; Ovadia et al., 2019; Kadavath et al., 2022). Conversely, all four `Gemini 4` releases (`Argon`, `Carbon`, `Hydrogen`, `Neon xhigh`) ship at `50%–81%` lower prices on internally co-designed TPUs (`SemiAnalysis`, 2026), clear $\alpha^*(0.90) < 1$ (`Argon BF 23.26x`, `alpha* 0.578`), and sweep Ranks `#1–#4` under risk-averse penalty $\lambda \geq 3$—creating structured incentive for multi-model enterprise routers (`FrugalGPT`, Chen et al., 2024; `AutoMix`, Aggarwal et al., 2024;

RouteLLM, Ong et al., 2025) to divert 84.1%–88.7% of flagship Anthropic volume (Kim et al., 2025; Andreessen Horowitz, 2026; Menlo Ventures, 2025).

Table 11 — Frontier Model Bayesian Calibration Matrix (AA-Omniscience v1.1; antlevee_bayesian_moat.py)

Frontier Model	Release	Pricing (USD / MTok)	Accuracy c	Non-Halluc. $1-h$	Cond. Halluc. h	Bayes Factor (1/h)	Crit. Fam. $\alpha^*(0.90)$	5-Step OOD Surv.	Utility $U(\lambda = 3/5)$
Gemini 4 Argon (high)	2026-10-13	2/10 intro (4/20 Dec 1)	48.3%	**95.7%**	**4.3%**	**23.26x**	**0.578 (Pass)**	**60.60%**	**41.63 / 37.18**
Gemini 4 Hydrogen (xhigh)	2026-11-12	**1.50 / 7.50 (flat)**	50.5%	91.5%	8.5%	**11.76x**	**0.858 (Pass)**	40.95%	37.88 / 29.46
Gemini 4 Carbon (high)	2026-11-10	2/10 intro (4/20 Dec 1)	58.3%	88.6%	11.4%	**8.77x**	**0.869 (Pass)**	38.25%	**44.04 / 34.53**
Gemini 4 Neon (xhigh)	2026-11-18	**3.00 / 15.00 (flat)**	60.5%	85.6%	14.4%	**6.94x**	**0.933 (Pass)**	32.42%	**43.44 / 32.06**
Claude Opus 5.5 (max)	2026	4.00 / 20.00	65.5%	49.7%	50.3%	1.99x	1.250 (Fail)	5.65%	13.44 / −21.27
Claude Fable 5.2 (max)	2026	8/40 (~USD 26.54/task)	**79.1%**	**40.7%**	**59.3%**	**1.69x**	**1.065 (Fail)**	**8.02%**	41.92 / 17.13
GPT-6.2 Sol (max)	2026	2.00 / 10.00	61.6%	44.6%	55.4%	1.81x	1.352 (Fail)	3.59%	−2.22 / −44.77
GPT-6.2 Astra (max)	2026	8/40 (~USD 4.00/task)	68.6%	40.9%	59.1%	1.69x	1.227 (Fail)	4.68%	12.93 / −24.19

3.5 Dependence-Aware Bayesian Financial Statement Audit (S1–S7 Primary vs rho Correlation Grid)

Extending Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan (2011) into a dependence-robust auditor (antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py), we extract eight reproducible Form 424B4 signals

(S1–S8) partitioned across three financial-statement domains (D1–D3 : S1–S7) and one external governance domain (D4 : S8). To prevent non-statement governance triggers from substituting for financial-statement evidence, our primary benchmark evaluates strictly the three financial-statement domains (S1–S7 , composite $\mathrm{BF}_{\text{3-dom}} = 1{,}168.20\times$) via within-domain $\max \mathrm{BF}_i$ envelope selection (S1 , S3 , S7), and applies an explicit continuous common-cause inter-domain correlation discount ($\rho \in [0, 1]$) before reporting 4-domain S1–S8 (3,446.19x) solely as a sensitivity check (Table 11B and Table 12):

$$\mathrm{BF}_{\text{corr}}(\rho) = \left(\mathrm{BF}_{\text{3-dom}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+2\rho}}, \qquad P(H_1 \mid \mathbf{E}, \rho) = \frac{\pi_0 \, \mathrm{BF}_{\text{corr}}(\rho)}{\pi_0 \, \mathrm{BF}_{\text{corr}}(\rho) + 1 - \pi_0} \tag{6}$$

Table 11B — Form 424B4 Financial Statement Presentation Signals (S1–S8) Mapped Across Four Accounting Domains

Signal	Accounting Domain	Primary Filing Ratio & Form 424B4 Locator	$P(E_i \mid H_1)$	$P(E_i \mid H_0)$	Bayes Factor BF_i	Inclusion Role
S_1	D1 Revenue & WC	**96.99% bilateral CSP mirror** (USD 4,103.84m AR vs 4,231.0m AP; DSO 50.61d vs 36.70d, pp. 165, F-16, F-38)	0.85	0.12	**7.08x**	**★ D1 Primary Envelope**
S_2	D1 Revenue & WC	Credit-loss allowance cut monotonically 5.00% → 1.836% → 1.362% while AR jumped 8.68x (Customer E 13%, p. F-16)	0.78	0.16	4.88x	Deduped within D1
S_3	D2 Cost Classification	EY switch + **74.42% (USD 13,996m)** compute outside CoR & free compute inside S&M (12.49x YoY, pp. 348, F-41)	0.88	0.08	**11.00x**	**★ D2 Primary Envelope**
S_4	D2 Cost Classification	USD −11,008m (−13,356m Level 3) Series G-2 partner subsidy (USD 25.91/sh) below OI under mandatory ASC 480/815	0.82	0.14	5.86x	Deduped (Statutory MTM)
S_5	D2 Cost Classification	ASC 718 zero pre-IPO RSU expense (USD 0 vs 7,487m p. 28) & 9 Nov 1-day vest acceleration (+USD 3.4bn)	0.72	0.28	2.57x	Deduped within D2
S_6	D3 Cash & Off-BS	ASC 230 interest wedge (35.91% OCF = USD 2,359m) + +9.9d CSP DPO stretch (USD 3,284m AP surge, pp. F-7, F-12)	0.84	0.15	5.60x	Deduped within D3
S_7	D3 Cash & Off-BS	**100.62x** uncommenced leases (USD 451.2bn), USD 156.2bn VIE exclusion & **USD 4.7bn** Note 13 unaccrued guarantees (p. F-60)	0.90	0.06	**15.00x**	**★ D3 Primary Envelope**
S_8	D4 Governance Gate	2 sitting Audit Committee members + 1 vacancy (p. 265) alongside 0.079% Class F (636x) control wedge	0.65	0.22	2.95x	Sensitivity only (S1–S8)

A balanced evaluation recognises management's lawful GAAP rationale: under `ASC 326`, 52% of receivables sit with `AA+/AAA` hyperscalers (`S2`); under `ASC 606`, principal billing leaves gross profit invariant (`S1`); under `ASC 730-10`, model research is expensed outside COGS (`S3`); and `S4–S7` largely reflect mandatory `ASC 480`, `718`, `230`, and `842` recognition thresholds rather than discretion. Crucially, `Table 12` demonstrates that isolating **strictly discretionary accounting elections (`S1 × S3 = 77.88x`) still yields `89.64%`**, whilst introducing substantial common-cause

inter-domain correlation ($\rho = 0.30$ to $\rho = 0.50$) leaves the posterior between **79.16% and 90.18%** at a sceptical 10% prior (`62.50%` under the single-signal global floor).

Figure 3.5 Dependence-Aware Bayesian Statement Audit: 3-Domain Primary (S1–S7 · 99.24%) & Correlation Stress Grid

What This Chart Is Testing: Each signal is individually permitted under US GAAP. To eliminate governance circularity, our primary benchmark retains strictly the 3 financial-statement domains (S1–S7, keeping the strongest ★ signal per domain: 1,168.20x) and explicitly tests inter-domain common-cause correlation ρ ∈ [0.30, 0.50] alongside a 4-domain S8 sensitivity check.


COMPOSITE BAYES FACTOR
1,168.20×

POSTERIOR PROBABILITY
99.24%

RESTATED GROSS MARGIN
46.75%

RESTATED 9M OP LOSS
–USD 8.69B

8 Signals Grouped by 4 Domains (★ = S1–S7 3-Domain Primary Envelope; Grey = Deduped / S8 Sensitivity)



99.24% vs 0.76%
3-Domain Posterior (S1–S7)
Excludes governance S8; even at 10% prior, accidental alignment across D1–D3 is <0.8%

46.75% vs 85.52%
Posterior Expected vs Note 8 GM
3-domain posterior expected gross margin sits 38.77pp below Note 8 implied

–USD 8.69B vs –USD 1.26B
Posterior Expected vs Rep. 9M OI
Restated operating loss including zero-overlap RSU compensation

+USD 1.25B vs +USD 6.57B
Posterior Core FCF vs Rep. OCF
Stripping ASC 230 Treasury interest & lease CapEx leaves ~19% of OCF

Table 12 — Dependence-Aware Bayesian Posterior Grid & Posterior-Expected 9M26 Financial Statements

Prior π_0	Global Floor (15.00x, $\rho = 1$)	Correlated ($\rho = 0.60$, 24.79x)	Correlated ($\rho = 0.50$, 34.18x)	Correlated ($\rho = 0.30$, 82.64x)	Discretionary Accounting (S1×S3, 77.88x)	3-Domain Statement Primary (S1–S7, 1,168.20x)	4-Domain Sensitivity (S1–S8, 3,446.19x)
5%	44.12%	56.61%	64.27%	**81.31%**	80.39%	**98.40%**	99.45%
10% (Base)	**62.50%**	**73.37%**	**79.16%**	**90.18%**	**89.64%**	**99.24%**	**99.74%**
25%	83.33%	89.21%	91.93%	**96.50%**	96.29%	**99.74%**	99.91%
50%	93.75%	96.12%	97.16%	**98.80%**	98.73%	**99.91%**	99.97%

Note: At a 10% prior under the 3-domain financial-statement primary ($w_1 = 99.24\%$), posterior-expected 9M26 economics equal **Gross Margin =** `46.75%` (vs Note 8 `85.52%`; using `4-domain 99.74%` gives `46.55%`, or `40.26%` at $\lambda = 0.65$), **Normalised Operating Income =** `USD -8,690.1m` (vs `USD -1,260m` GAAP / `+4,081m` Non-GAAP / `-8,747m` p. 28 pro forma), and **Core FCF =** `USD +1,246.8m` (`USD +1,118m` post-finance-lease midpoint vs `USD +6,569m` OCF). Replicated deterministically by `paper/analysis/antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py`.

> `PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY` **Why an 85.5% Gross Margin Turns Negative Operationally**
>
> Anthropic looks like an 85.5%-margin software business in Note 8 only because USD 14.0bn of compute bills (`74%` of total compute), USD 4.8bn of cloud marketplace revenue-shares, and USD 1.2bn of processing and evaluation costs sit below the line, while zero RSU pay for employees was booked pre-IPO. Even after applying heavy penalties for potentially correlated red flags ($\rho = 0.30$–0.50), the statistical odds that these choices all tilt the same direction by coincidence are below 10%–21%.

Chapter 4: Interest-Income Operating Cash Flow, Working-Capital Timing, and the USD 41.5bn Equity Overhang

4.1 Stripping Deposit Interest (`ASC 230`) and CapEx/Lease Prepayments Leaves `3.3%–4.0%` Core FCF

$$\mathrm{FCF}_{\mathrm{core}} = \mathrm{OCF}_{\mathrm{rep}} - \mathrm{Int}_{\mathrm{OCF}} - (\mathrm{CapEx}_{\mathrm{PPE}} + \mathrm{Prepay}_{\mathrm{lease}})\,[-\mathrm{Inv}_{\mathrm{other}}] \tag{7}$$

Substituting $\mathrm{OCF}_{\mathrm{rep}} = \text{USD } 6.569\text{bn}$, $\mathrm{Int}_{\mathrm{OCF}} = \text{USD } 2.359\text{bn}$ (p. F-8; USD 87.675bn held in money-market funds = 66.5% of USD 131.845bn liquidity, generating `35.91%` of OCF under `ASC 230-10-50-2` without supplemental cash-interest breakout on p. F-40), $\mathrm{CapEx}_{\mathrm{PPE}} = \text{USD } 0.925\text{bn}$, $\mathrm{Prepay}_{\mathrm{lease}} = \text{USD } 1.955\text{bn}$, and $\mathrm{Inv}_{\mathrm{other}} = \text{USD } 0.248\text{bn}$ (p. F-13) reduces 9M26 core operating free cash flow to **USD 1.082bn – 1.330bn (3.25% – 4.00% of gross revenue)**. Deducting USD 0.088bn of recurring finance-lease principal repayments booked inside financing cash flows (`ASC 842-20-45-5` , p. F-13) lowers recurring debt-serviced core FCF to USD 0.994bn – 1.242bn (`Table 13`).

Moreover, three non-recurring working-capital timing inflows contributed **USD 2.865bn** to 9M26 OCF—more than double core FCF: (1) CSP payables jumped from USD 0.947bn to USD 4.231bn (`+USD 3.284bn` , pp. F-38 – F-39), stretching quarterly DPO by 9.9 days (`29.58d → 39.47d`) for a USD 1.059bn one-time retention; (2) USD 1.435bn of prior-year cloud prepayment drawdowns (p. F-13); and (3) USD 0.371bn of accrued unpaid taxes (`USD 417m – USD 46m` , p. F-40). Stripping the 9.9-day CSP payables stretch drops core FCF to USD 23m – 271m (`0.1%–0.8%`), whilst `Customer E` surged to **13% of net receivables (`USD 1,025.96m`)** (`Table 14` , `Table 15`).

Table 13 — 9M 2026 Cash-Flow Reconstruction: Reported OCF to Recurring Core FCF (`USD m`)

Cash-Flow Reconciliation Bridge (Form 424B4 pp. F-7, F-12–F-13, F-18)	9M 2026 (USD m)	% Gross Rev (33,242m)	Primary Note / Accounting Driver
Reported Net Operating Cash Flow (ASC 230)	**+6,569**	**+19.76%**	Includes USD 87,675m MMF + USD 44,170m Treasury interest (66.5% / 33.5% liquidity)
– Interest & Dividend Income Included in OCF (p. F-8)	−2,359	−7.10%	Contributes 35.91% of OCF (38.41% pre-working capital); no cash coupon breakout
= Operating Cash Flow Excluding Deposit Interest	**+4,210**	**+12.66%**	Ex-interest operating cash flow
– Purchases of Property & Equipment + Leased-Equipment Prepayments	−2,880	−8.66%	CapEx USD 925m + Leased Prepayments USD 1,955m
– Other Direct Investing Activities (Conservative Floor)	−248	−0.75%	Included in conservative low bound
= Core Operating Free Cash Flow (Gross / Conservative Range)	**+1,082 to +1,330**	**+3.25% to +4.00%**	Ex-deposit interest & capitalised compute prepayments (3.81%–4.68% of net rev)
– Recurring Finance-Lease Principal Repayments (ASC 842-20-45-5)	−88	−0.26%	Classified under financing cash flows; post-lease midpoint = **+1,118m (3.36%)**
– Memo: 9.9-Day CSP Payables DPO Stretch (29.6d → 39.5d, USD +1,059m)	−1,059	−3.19%	Strips one-off CSP stretch → Core FCF drops to **+23m to +271m (0.07%–0.82%)**

Table 14 — Bilateral CSP Receivables/Payables Mirror, Customer Concentration & Reserve Contraction (USD m)

Receivables & Payables Diagnostic	YE 2024	YE 2025	Q3 2026	Implied Metric & Concentration Risk (Form 424B4 pp. 60, F-15–F-18, F-38)
Net Accounts Receivable (Gross / Allowance)	95 (100 / 5)	909 (926 / 17)	**7,892 (8,001 / 109)**	Net AR surged **8.68x** YTD whilst allowance dropped 5.00% → 1.836% → 1.362%
CSP Marketplace Share (44% 9M Rev vs 52% Q3 AR)	—	—	**4,103.84 AR vs 4,231.0 AP**	**96.99% bilateral mirror**; DSO_CSP = 50.61d vs DSO_Direct = 36.70d (+13.91d gap)
Largest End-Customer Concentration (Customer E)	Customer C 43%	Customer B 18%	**Customer E 13% (1,025.96)**	Single unnamed counterparty accounts for USD 1.026bn AR; USD 2m 9M write-offs
Allowance Restoration Gap (to YE25 1.836% / 2.50% / YE24 5.00%)	—	—	**+37.9 / +91.0 / +291.1**	Required pre-tax bad-debt charge if reserve rate reverts toward historical baselines

Table 15 — 9M 2026 Sources and Uses of Cash (USD m ; 97.2% Parked in Financial Instruments)

Cash Source / Capital Deployment Line (p. F-12–F-13)	9M 2026 (USD m)	USD bn	Share of Total Sources	Audit Implication
Net Financing Inflows (Equity Issuance + Debt Proceeds)	**110,735**	**110.74**	**94.32%**	Primary source of balance-sheet liquidity
Reported Operating Cash Flow (Incl. USD 2.359bn Interest)	6,569	6.57	5.60%	Net Core FCF excluding interest/CapEx = only USD 1.08–1.33bn
Net Cash Added to MMFs (Cash & Equivalents Bridge)	80,751	80.75	68.78%	USD 87.675bn end-period MMF balance
Net Purchases of Short-Term Treasuries / Securities (40,318 – 6,900)	33,418	33.42	28.46%	**Combined financial parking = USD 114.169bn (97.24% of inflows)**
Capital Expenditure + Leased Equipment + Other Investing	3,128	3.13	2.66%	Direct physical / pre-lease deployment represented <3% of inflows

4.2 Day-1 RSU Tax Drain (USD 4.281bn) vs Core FCF and the USD 45.4bn Post-IPO Tax Overhang

$$\text{CashTax}_{\text{RSU}} = N_{\text{vest}} \cdot \tau_w \cdot P = 101{,}333{,}940 \times 50.90\% \times \text{USD } 83.00 = \text{USD } 4.28 \quad (8)$$

On listing day alone, Anthropic remitted **USD 4.281bn** (51,578,975 withheld shares at USD 83.00, pp. 23, 129)—3.22x to 3.96x its entire nine-month core FCF. Across major modern dual-trigger U.S. technology IPOs (`Meta`, `Uber`, `Lyft`, `Snowflake`, `Airbnb`, `DoorDash`, `Robinhood`, and `Reddit`), boards confined IPO liquidity settlement to regular quarterly dates already naturally elapsed before listing; by contrast, Anthropic's 9 November 2026 1-day pull-forward (`20 Nov → 19 Nov`, `67.0m` RSUs / `66.1%` of Day-1 settlement) encompassed `639.5k` IPO-settled RSUs for CEO Dario Amodei (`USD 53.08m` at `USD 83.00`), `639.5k` for Board Chair Daniela Amodei plus `134.0k` for her spouse Holden Karnofsky (`USD 64.20m` combined), `639.5k` for each of the five other co-founders (`USD 265.39m` combined), and first-tranche RSUs for non-employee committee chairs Reed Hastings (`9,410`), Christopher Liddell (`9,410`), and Vas Narasimhan (`6,280`) ahead of the `10%` Day-1 lock-up release (`pp. 136, 270–300, 318`). Following the IPO, 1,073.70 million RSUs remain unsettled (p. 25), representing USD 24.700bn of unrecognised RSU expense (`39.4bn – 14.7bn`) and, at a 50.90% withholding rate and USD 83.00 share price, **~USD 45.36bn** of future cash tax obligations or 546.51 million sell-to-cover supply (`Table 16`).


Table 16 — Zero-Overlap `ASC 718` Equity Compensation Backlog & IPO Tax Settlement (`USD bn`)

Equity Pool / Settlement Event (pp. 23–29, 182–183, F-54, F-66–F-67)	Pool Value (USD bn)	Share Count (m sh)	P&L / Cash Impact & Zero-Overlap Rule
1. Unrecognised RSU Balance as of 30 Sep 2026	**32.30**	~1,128	Excludes post-IPO service until liquidity condition clears at Day 1
2. + 9 Nov 2026 RSU Modification Incremental Value (67m RSUs)	**+3.40**	67.0 affected	Vesting accelerated by 1 day (20 Nov → 19 Nov); remeasured at **USD 83.00** (p. F-67)
3. + Post-30 Sep RSU Grants (1 Oct – 19 Nov 2026)	**+3.70**	47.04 granted	Fair value granted in pre-IPO bridge window (p. F-66)
= Total Lifetime Zero-Overlap RSU Pool (1 + 2 + 3)	**39.40**	**1,175.0** total	+ USD 2.10bn unvested options/RSAs = **USD 41.50bn** grand total equity backlog
– IPO Day-1 Liquidity Settlement Charge (Zero-Overlap Encompassed)	**−14.70**	101.33 vested	Encompasses USD 8.2bn Sep-30 vested + USD 3.4bn mod + ~USD 3.1bn Q4 service; **USD 4.281bn** cash tax
= Post-IPO Remaining Unrecognised RSU Pool (24.70bn / 1,073.7m sh)	**24.70**	**1,073.70**	Implies **~USD 45.36bn** future withholding cash tax at 50.90% / USD 83.00 (or 546.5m sell-to-cover sh)

> PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY **Deposit Interest vs Real Operating Cash Flow**
>
> Management points to USD 6.57bn of nine-month operating cash flow as proof of self-funding. Once you strip out USD 2.36bn of T-bill and money-market deposit interest (from earlier fundraising cash), USD 2.88bn of physical server CapEx and lease prepayments, and USD 1.06bn gained temporarily by paying cloud landlords ten days slower, true business cash flow is only USD 23m to USD 271m—barely a fraction of the USD 4.28bn IPO payroll tax cheque written on Day 1.


Figure 04 9M 2026 Cash-Flow Penetration Waterfall: From USD 6.569bn Reported OCF to USD 1.082bn Core FCF

9M26 Cash-Flow Bridge: Reported OCF to Recurring Core FCF (100m USD = USD 0.1bn scale)



CSP accounts payable stretched from USD 0.947B to USD 4.231B (DPO 29.6d → 39.5d, releasing USD 1.059B), alongside USD 1.435B historical prepayment unwind and USD 0.371B tax timing = USD 2.865B non-recurring tailwind (>2x core FCF).

Scale Contrast: 9M26 Core FCF vs Day-1 RSU Tax Remittance & Unrecognised Equity Backlog (100m USD)



Chapter 5: The 192-State Non-Double-Counted Cash-Flow Survival Model and Pro-Cyclical Liquidity Triggers

5.1 Quarterly Cash-Flow Dynamics and Exact Bisection Formulation

Let quarterly revenue follow $R_{y,q} = \frac{1}{4}R_0(1+g)^{y-2026}$ from base annualised run-rate R_0, with quarterly committed compute outflow $C_{y,q}$, marginal compute ratio $\theta = 0.5817$ (2026Q3 actual `9,863 / 16,956`), non-compute cash opex ratio $\phi \in \{0.2731, 0.3002, 0.3256\}$ subject to an annual dynamic cost floor $F_y = \frac{1}{4}(R_0 \cdot \phi)(1+g_{\text{floor}})^{y-2026}$, additive ongoing RSU cash tax and non-

commitment capex $E_{\text{extra}} = \text{USD } 1.50\text{bn/quarter}$ (`USD 6.0bn/yr`), interest rate $r_{\text{cash}} = 3.0\%$ on opening cash, and Q4 2026 IPO net cash escrow injection $I_{2026,4} \in \{0,\ 50.253,\ 100.506,\ 112.707\}$ USD bn (`0%` , `50%` , `100%` base, and `100%` post-greenshoe):

$$\text{CF}_{y,q}(g) = R_{y,q}(g) - \max(C_{y,q},\ \theta R_{y,q}(g)) - \max(\phi R_{y,q}(g),\ F_y) - E_{\text{extra}} + \frac{r_{\text{cash}}}{4}\,\text{m} \quad (9)$$

$$\text{Cash}_{y,q}(g) = \text{Cash}_{y,q-1}(g) + \text{CF}_{y,q}(g) + I_{y,q}, \qquad g^* = \inf\left\{ g \geq -0.50 : \min_{(y,q)\geq(2026,} \quad (10)$$

5.2 Primary Non-Double-Counted Aggregate Benchmark (`+22.2% GS / +30.4% 50% / +37.2% 0%`) vs Upper-Bound

A zero-trust audit of the bottom-up named contract schedule (`A+B+C+D`) reveals that its 2026Q4 – 2030 outflows sum to USD 456.7bn—exceeding Anthropic's disclosed USD 451.6bn pre-2031 aggregate across the entire USD 900.9bn commitment pool (pp. 8, 40)—and that USD 451.2bn of uncommenced leases (p. F-36) may overlap with Class C neocloud leases (`Nscale USD 44.6bn` , `Lambda USD 41.3bn`). To eliminate double-counting, `Table 17` establishes Anthropic's **Company Aggregate** (`USD 900.9bn` : USD 451.6bn pre-2031 + USD 449.3bn in 2031 – 2045) plus USD 157.5bn variable (`contract_maturity` , 2027 – 2041) as our Primary Benchmark across all four IPO escrow tiers (including 100% Post-Greenshoe **`USD 112.71bn → USD 244.55bn`** cash), while reporting the named schedule plus USD 260.6bn uncommenced leases strictly as a Zero-Overlap Upper-Bound Sensitivity:

Table 17 — Exact 192-State Bisection Survival Growth Thresholds g^* Across Escrow & Schedule Regimes

Regime & Parameter Specification	IPO Escrow (USD bn)	Non-Canc. Core (714.7bn)	All Fixed (900.9bn)	All Incl. Var (1,058.4bn)	2027–2029 Cum. Rev (USD bn)	Trough Year
I. Naive Accounting Baseline (Named Schedule Only, Truncated at 2033, No Opex Floor)						
1. Naive Baseline (0% IPO Escrow)	0.00	−3.5%	22.5%	**32.1%**	364.3	2029
2. Naive Baseline (100% Base / 50% Escrow)	100.51 / 50.25	−18.1% / −10.3%	5.0% / 11.1%	**15.6% / 21.5%**	273.3 / 304.2	2030 / 2029
II. Primary Benchmark (Zero Double-Counting: Company Aggregate USD 900.9bn + USD 157.5bn Var, 2027–2041)						
3. Base Restated ($\phi = 30.02\%$, 15% flr): **100% GS** / 50% / 0%	**112.71** / 50.25 / 0	**+9.7% / +10.5% / +11.2%**	11.1% / 13.1% / 19.6%	**+15.5% / +22.1% / +29.2%**	273.3 / 307.4 / 347.1	2030
4. + Ongoing RSU Tax & CapEx (+USD 6.0bn/yr): **100% GS** / 50% / 0%	**112.71** / 50.25 / 0	**+10.7% / +11.5% / +12.1%**	12.0% / 15.4% / 23.3%	**+18.5% / +25.6% / +32.3%**	288.5 / 326.1 / 365.5	2030
5. Full Stack (Ex-6% Policy $R_0 = 63.76\text{bn}$, Q2 $\phi = 32.56\%$): 100% GS / 50% / 0%	**112.71** / 50.25 / 0	**+11.8% / +12.6% / +13.7%**	13.1% / 19.9% / 28.0%	**+22.2% / +30.4% / +37.2%**	**289.5 / 332.9 / 372.1**	**2030**
6. Oct Clean USD 76.14bn (Ex-6%, Full Stack): **100% GS** / 50% / 0%	**112.71** / 50.25 / 0	**+11.3% / +12.0% / +12.6%**	12.4% / 13.4% / 19.6%	**+15.5% / +21.9% / +28.5%**	306.8 / 343.9 / 385.1	2030
III. Upper-Bound Sensitivity (Bottom-Up Named Schedule + USD 260.6bn Uncommenced Leases, Zero-Overlap)						
7. 15-Yr Lease Spread (2027–2041, $\phi = 30.02\%$): 50% / 0%	50.25 / 0.00	+10.9% / +11.7%	24.7% / 37.5%	**34.4% / 46.0%**	378.3 / 454.7	2029
8. 15-Yr Full Stack (+USD 6.0bn/yr + Ex-6% + $\phi = 32.56\%$): 50% / 0%	50.25 / 0.00	+12.6% / +16.2%	35.8% / 48.3%	**45.2% / 56.9%**	421.8 / 503.2	2029
9. 10-Yr Actual Lease Term (2027–2036, Full Stack): 50% / 0%	50.25 / 0.00	+15.0% / +21.2%	41.8% / 53.3%	**51.3% / 62.1%**	463.2 / 542.4	2029

Note: At 100% Base IPO Escrow (`USD 100.51bn -> USD 232.35bn` cash), Row 5 Full Stack All `g*` equals `+23.4%` vs `+22.2%` under full greenshoe closing (`USD 112.71bn -> USD 244.55bn` cash, `antlevee_exact_audit.json`). Peak-year fixed+variable commitments of USD 155.0bn (`coverage_results.json`) demand breakeven revenue of $R^{*}_{\text{peak}} = 155.0/(1-\phi) = \text{USD } 213.3\text{bn/yr}$ (`3.14x` Q3 run-rate; core USD 72.7bn requires USD 100.1bn/yr).

5.3 Decelerating Trajectories, Order-Invariant Shapley Attribution, and Pro-Cyclical Liquidity Triggers

Constant-CAGR bisection eases cross-regime comparisons, but real enterprise adoption decelerates. `Table 18` replaces constant growth with five decelerating trajectories under the upper-bound lease schedule (`antlevee_stress_results.json`), whilst separating *default timing* ($U_k(g)$) from *residual recovery severity* (ρ_k):

$$\ell_k(g) = U_k(g)\,(1-\rho_k), \qquad \mathbb{E}[\ell_k] = \int U_k(g)\,(1-\rho_k)\,\mathrm{d}F(g) \tag{11}$$

Table 18 — Decelerating Revenue-Growth Paths and First Liquidity-Covenant Breach Quarter (`< USD 5.0bn`)

Revenue Deceleration Path (2027 / 2028 / 2029 / 2030+, %)	No IPO Injection Breach	50% Escrow Breach	50% Escrow Trough Cash (USD bn)	Pro-Cyclical Consequence Once Breached (pp. 39, 173–175)
1. Mild Deceleration (100 / 50 / 25 / 15)	No Breach	No Breach	**+153.1** (+170.6 base)	Clears all 2027–2041 schedules with positive cash cushion
2. Rapid Deceleration (80 / 30 / 15 / 10)	No Breach	No Breach	**+81.0** (+135.3 base)	Minimum 2027 growth required (80%+) to remain above USD 5.0bn floor
3. Post-2027 Stall (100 / 0 / 0 / 0)	**2029Q3**	**2030Q4**	**−30.3**	Exhausts buffer by 2029Q3–2030Q4 if enterprise expansion stalls
4. Commoditisation Fade (40 / 15 / 5 / 0)	**2029Q1**	**2029Q3**	**−141.9**	Breaches USD 5.0bn revolver floor mid-2029; triggers **13% PIK / 85% conv.**
5. Policy / Supply Shock (25 / 5 / −5 / −5)	**2028Q3**	**2029Q2**	**−297.5**	Revolver locked out in 2028Q3–2029Q2; sequential exit of Tiers V, D, C

Consistent with liquidity-spiral and trade-credit theory (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Brunnermeier, 2009) and Shapley value attribution (Shapley, 1953; Shorrocks, 2013), Anthropic's USD 67.0bn of undrawn supplier NPAs (`Broadcom USD 42.0bn` p. 174, `Amazon USD 15.0bn` p. 173, `Google USD 10.0bn` p. 175) and USD 15.0bn revolver (p. F-45) share a **USD 5.0bn minimum liquidity covenant** tested from 31 December 2026. Breaching this floor locks out the revolver and steps Broadcom notes from 9.00% to **13.00% per annum PIK** (accruing USD 18.60bn vs USD 12.39bn over three years, a +USD 6.21bn penalty) with an 85% conversion price—echoing structured convertible *"death spiral"* mechanics (Hillion and Vermaelen, 2004). Meanwhile, Equation `(11)` proves hardware residual value ($1 - \rho_k$) affects *loss severity* rather than *who defaults first*.

Table 19 — Shapley Gap Decomposition & Hardware Efficiency (θ) Invariance Proof

Sensitivity / Attribution Dimension	Tested Parameter Variations	Measured Threshold Impact (g^*)	Structural Proof (antlevee_exact_audit.json)
A. Shapley Gap Attribution (−0.4% → 32.1%, +32.5pp)	C Neoclouds / D SpaceXAI / V TPU+AMD across all 6 orders	**C: +7.02pp · D: +14.87pp · V: +10.62pp**	D SpaceXAI accounts for **45.7%** of gap (range 13.3–15.9pp); sum exact to 32.5pp
B. Hardware Efficiency (θ) Sweep (Row 5 Full Stack)	Marginal compute share $\theta \in \{\mathbf{0.5817}, \mathbf{0.4500}, \mathbf{0.3500}\}$	100% GS: **+22.2%** / 100% Base: **+23.4%** / 50%: **+30.4%** / 0%: **+37.2%**	**Exact 0.00pp invariance** across all 4 escrow regimes: rigid 900.9bn floors bind $\max(C_{y,q}, \theta R_{y,q}) = C_{y,q}$
C. Capacity-Cut Feedback Counterfactual (USD 779m+)	Halting C+D+V (42.9% compute cut; 10%–32% g)	Zero breach down to 10% g (min cash USD 77.9–131.8bn)	Sacrifices 28.3% fixed (42.9% incl. var) capacity, risking 6-month training-cycle obsolescence

5.6 Model Verification, Hardware-Efficiency Invariance, and Five Structural Boundaries

Cross-checking the aggregate schedule against Form 424B4 pre-2031 totals matches within 1.1% (`USD 456.7bn` vs `USD 451.6bn`), and exact bisection guarantees unique single-crossing roots across all 192 states (`antlevee_exact_audit.json`). Five structural boundaries qualify interpretation: (1) straight-line monthly proration within disclosed contract windows substitutes for undisclosed annual

payment ladders (`Appendix C #1`); (2) USD 260.6bn of non-Broadcom uncommenced leases may overlap Class C/D contracts and is therefore isolated strictly in Upper-Bound Rows 7 – 9; (3) as proven in `Table 19` , lowering marginal compute cost θ (`0.5817 → 0.3500`) yields **zero** reduction (`0.00pp`) in `g*` whenever take-or-pay floors exceed usage demand; (4) halting Class C/D/V contracts avoids covenant breach (`min cash USD 77.9bn`) only by surrendering 28.3% – 42.9% of planned compute (`compute_capacity_feedback`), whose negative revenue loop is omitted; and (5) models exclude unquantified 20-year uncapped fuel pass-throughs (p. 80) and indemnities (`pp. 54, 97, 102`).

> `PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY` **Why Cheaper Chips Do Not Rescue Fixed Contracts**
>
> Investors often assume that faster, cheaper AI chips will shrink Anthropic's compute bill. Our sensitivity test proves the opposite: even if variable compute costs per revenue dollar were cut by 40% (`theta` from `58.2%` down to `35.0%`), the survival growth hurdle stays frozen at `+22.2%–+37.2%` (`0.00` change) because take-or-pay contracts force Anthropic to pay the fixed minimum bill regardless of efficiency gains.

Figure 05 2026Q4–2035Q4 Cash Runway, USD 5.0bn Covenant Breach & Counterparty Contagion Timeline

> **How to Read This Timeline:** Each curve tracks quarter-end unrestricted cash from 2026Q4 to 2035Q4 under five revenue fade scenarios. Whenever a curve drops below the red $5.0B bank covenant line, the $15B revolver and Broadcom's $42B convertible line lock out simultaneously.

1 · IPO Proceeds Earmarked (Base 980m IPO; +$12.2B greenshoe adds ~1 qtr, Table 17)

2 · Focus Revenue Trajectory (2027–2030+ YoY Growth)

3 · Contract Exit Response

FIRST COVENANT BREACH

2029Q3 (Commoditisation)

TROUGH CASH / PEAK SHORTFALL


−$142B

SCRUBBED QUARTER CASH


2029Q3 · −$5B

COUNTERPARTIES HIT AT QUARTER

BREACH: MS $15B & AVGO $42B Lock + 13% PIK -> Hits AVGO $72B / WULF $19B / 10 Insurers



Scrub Timeline Quarter: **2029Q3 · −$5B**



Constant Survival Hurdle g* (2027–2041):

Non-double-counted Aggregate: 22.1%–30.4% (50% IPO) / 29.2%–37.2% (0%)

Irrevocable Core ($714.7B): +10.5%–+13.7% Source: antlevee_exact_audit.py (192 States)

Chapter 6: Underwriting Syndicate Conflicts, Retained Convertible Debt, Enterprise Value, and Reverse-DCF Implied Scale

6.1 Seventeen of Twenty-Two Underwriters Hold Lender or Pre-IPO Equity Conflicts (`Form 424B4 pp. 328, 336–337`)

In the final prospectus (p. 328), Anthropic upgraded seven firms from co-managers in the Pricing FWP to Bookrunners, resulting in **17 Bookrunners and 5 Co-managers** across the 22-firm syndicate (`Table 20`). Cross-checking pp. 336 – 337 confirms that 16 of 22 underwriters serve as arrangers or agents under the USD 15.0bn A&R Credit Agreement (`Exhibit 10.10`), 3 (`Morgan Stanley` , `Citigroup` , `BofA Securities`) lead Broadcom's USD 63bn SPV first-lien facility, and 5 (`Goldman Sachs` , `Morgan Stanley` , `J.P. Morgan` , `Cantor Fitzgerald` , `TD Securities`) hold disclosed pre-IPO equity (`<0.5%` each, p. 337)—meaning **17 of 22 underwriters (77.3%)** carry direct credit or equity conflicts. Evaluating dual-role certification vs conflict incentives (Puri, 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Schenone, 2004; Drucker and Puri, 2005; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010), waiving 100% of commissions on the USD 12.20bn greenshoe whilst generating USD 550.0m (`0.676%`) base fees shifts economic alignment towards reinforcing USD 244.55bn of pro forma liquidity beneath lender claims.

Table 20 — The 22-Firm IPO Underwriting Syndicate: Lending Roles, SPV Leads & Pre-IPO Equity Conflicts

Underwriting Syndicate Group (Form 424B4 pp. 328, 336–337)	Prospectus Role	USD 15bn Revolver Role	Pre-IPO Equity / SPV #2 First-Lien Conflict
Goldman Sachs	Representative & Lead Bookrunner	Joint Lead Arranger / Bookrunner	Disclosed equity `<0.5%` (p. 337)
Morgan Stanley	Representative & Lead Bookrunner	**Admin & Collateral Agent**, Lead Left	Disclosed equity `<0.5%` + **USD 63bn SPV #2 Lead Left**
Citigroup & BofA Securities (2 firms)	Active Bookrunners	Joint Lead Arrangers / Synd. Agents	**USD 63bn SPV #2 Co-Lead First-Lien Arrangers**
J.P. Morgan	Bookrunner	Joint Lead Arranger / Synd. Agent	Disclosed equity `<0.5%` (p. 337)
Barclays, Wells Fargo, Deutsche Bank, RBC, UBS (5 firms)	Bookrunners	Joint Lead Arrangers / Synd. Agents	Credit exposure to USD 15bn facility (`USD 5.0bn` floor)
BMO, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Mizuho, MUFG, **TD Securities** (6)	Upgraded FWP → Bookrunners	Joint Lead Arrangers / Bookrunners	**TD Securities** also holds `<0.5%` pre-IPO equity (p. 337)
Jefferies	Upgraded FWP → Bookrunner	Not Listed	Non-lender bookrunner
Cantor Fitzgerald	Co-manager	Not Listed	Disclosed pre-IPO equity `<0.5%` (p. 337)
BTIG, Capital One, Macquarie, SG Americas (4 firms)	Co-managers	Not Listed	Unconflicted co-managers (`5 / 22`)
Conflicted Syndicate Count	**22 Firms (`17 + 5`)**	**16 Revolver Lenders**	**17 of 22 Conflicted (`77.3%`)**

6.2 Amazon's `84.1%` Retained Convertible Notes (`USD 109.742bn`), Why It Refused Waiver, and Google's `14.99%` Debt-Flip Trigger

Because Amazon elected not to waive its 12% fully diluted ownership cap (leaving post-IPO Class N ownership at 14.6% rather than jumping to 23.6%, pp. 25, 171), only **15.91%** (`292,768,653` shares; USD 612.7m principal; USD 20.760bn fair value) converted at listing (`Table 21`). The remaining **84.09%** (`1,547,676,309` shares; USD 5.590bn principal; **USD 109.742bn** pro forma fair value—**87.2%** of pro forma total liabilities) stays on-balance-sheet as non-interest-bearing rollover notes maturing in 2034 – 2035 (pp. 25, 131 – 132, 171 – 173):

$$s_{\text{roll}} = \frac{N_{\text{roll}}}{N_{\text{conv}} + N_{\text{roll}}} = \frac{1{,}547{,}676{,}309}{1{,}840{,}444{,}962} = 84.09\%, \qquad N_{\text{conv},q} = \frac{P_{\text{roll},q}}{\min(P_{\text{fixed}},\ P_{\text{IPO}},} \tag{12}$$

Table 21 — Historical, Pro Forma Base IPO (`USD 232.35bn` Cash), and Post-Greenshoe (`USD 244.55bn`) Balance-Sheet Bridge (`USD m`)

Balance-Sheet Line (Form 424B4 pp. 131–132, 30 Sep 2026)	Historical Actual	Pro Forma Pre-IPO (Δ_1)	Base Pro Forma Adj. (Δ_2 1,048bn)	Post-Greenshoe (+147m sh / 20 Nov 2026)
Cash, Cash Equivalents & Short-Term Investments	131,845	131,845	**232,351** (+100,506)	**244,552** (+112,707 net)
Convertible Notes Carried at Fair Value (Amazon)	130,502	109,742 (–20,760)	**109,742** (87.2% of liab.)	**109,742** (Book) / **137,604 (MTM @ 88.91)**
Total Liabilities (Excl. Uncommenced Leases)	146,683	130,204	**125,913** (–4,291 tax)	**125,913** (Book)
Redeemable Convertible Preferred Stock	157,510	0 (–157,510)	**0**	**0**
Accumulated Deficit (Incl. 14.7bn RSU + 3.54bn Note Loss)	(156,193)	(174,482)	**(174,482)**	**(174,482)**
Total Stockholders' Equity / (Deficit)	(149,873)	24,116	**128,887** (NTBV USD 128.2bn)	**~141,088** (~USD 10.50/sh NTBV)
Constructive Lease-Adjusted Debt & Leases (USD 306.2–328.4bn)	—	—	**420,426 to 442,626**	**420,426 to 442,626** (3.26x–3.43x Base Eq.)

Note: Pro forma equity adjusts for mandatory conversion of USD 157,510m preferred stock and the USD 18,289m Day-1 deficit (USD 14,700m RSU charge + USD 3,540m converted-note MTM loss + USD 49m other, p. 132). Following `ASC 842` constructive capitalisation (`Table 3`), booking an equal initial Right-of-Use Asset (`USD 0` Day-1 equity impact) lifts debt-to-equity to `3.26x–3.43x` (`76.5%–77.4%` debt-to-capitalisation), whilst a 10%–30% onerous-contract ROU impairment (`ASC 360`) would erode USD –30.6bn to –98.5bn of equity.

Why Amazon Refused Waiver—and How Both Suppliers Lock Priority (`Table 22` & `Table 22B`)

Four concrete incentives explain why Amazon declined to waive the `12%` cap despite holding USD 2.09/USD 5.05 ultra-low fixed conversion prices (pp. 25, 171 – 173):

1. **Avoiding `ASC 323` Equity-Method Loss Consolidation (`23.6% >= 20%`):** Full conversion jumps Amazon to 23.6% of outstanding stock, triggering `ASC 323-10-15-8` ("significant influence") and pulling nearly one-quarter of Anthropic's billions in annual GAAP losses onto Amazon's income statement, whereas staying at 14.6% in non-voting Class N isolates holdings under `ASC 321` .
2. **Avoiding Clayton Act § 7 & `Rule 144(a)(1)` Affiliate Lock-In:** Staying below 15% with zero voting power shields AWS integration from vertical merger enforcement and prevents issuer-affiliate quarterly `1%` float resale caps.
3. **Locking Senior Debt Priority & USD 4.1bn Channel-AP Set-Off:** Leaving USD 5.590bn principal in senior notes preserves seniority ahead of ~USD 141.1bn in public equity whilst granting Amazon the unilateral right at 2034 – 2035 maturity to **set off unconverted principal directly against AWS marketplace payables owed to Anthropic** (USD 4.104bn Q3 total CSP AR, pp. 172 – 173; Myers, 1977).
4. **Retaining `100%` Upside Whilst Signalling Risk Asymmetry:** Locked at USD 2.09/USD 5.05 strikes, Amazon captures 100% upside via quarterly auto-conversion whenever it trims shares or RSU vesting widens the denominator—sending an unmistakable signal that Anthropic's largest commercial insider refused pari-passu equity risk.

Similarly, under the `Google 2026 NPA` (USD 10.0bn exercised at USD 83.00 = 120.48m shares -> 1,774.96m total Class N shares = 13.4% of outstanding stock, with USD 10.0bn undrawn through December 2030, pp. 25, 173, 175), Google capped post-money as-converted ownership at **14.99%**—0.01pp below Delaware `DGCL § 203` 's 15% threshold—and obtained an explicit `Rule 144(a)(1)` non-affiliate covenant (`Ex. 10.15 § 7.9(ii)`). Whenever drawing the remaining $D =$ **USD 10.0bn** (settled at 30-day trailing VWAP P) or share shrinkage ΔS hits $\bar{\omega}_G = 14.99\%$, share issuance halts and excess draws convert into senior 10-year `Roll-Over Notes` payable in cash (`Ex. 10.15 § 1.4` , p. 175):

$$P^{*}_{\text{trig}} = \frac{(1-\bar{\omega}_G)\,D}{\bar{\omega}_G\,(S_0-\Delta S)-G_0}, \qquad \bar{\omega}_G = 0.1499,\ G_0 = 1{,}774{,}959{,}745 \text{ shares} \tag{13}$$

Table 22 — Amazon Rollover Note Fair-Value Sensitivity (`1,547.7m` Rollover + `292.8m` Converted Shares; USD bn)

Share Price (USD)	Valuation Benchmark Date / Regime	Rollover Note FV (1.548B sh)	Delta vs 30 Sep (109.74bn)	Implied Q4 Pre-Tax FV Income / (Loss) Incl. Converted (−3.54bn)
50.00	Hypothetical Downside Case	77.38	−32.36	**+28.82bn Paper Accounting Gain (+32.36bn rollover, USD 0 cash)**
70.91	Implied `30 Sep 2026` Carrying Value	109.74	0.00	−3.54bn (Converted tranche Day-1 loss only, p. 132)
83.00	Final IPO Pricing (`19 Nov 2026`)	128.46	+18.72	**−22.26bn Q4 MTM Loss** (`USD 0` cash flow)
88.91	**Day-2 Nasdaq Close (20 Nov 2026)**	**137.60**	**+27.86**	**−31.40bn Q4 MTM Loss** (−`27.862`bn rollover + −`3.540`bn conv.)
97.17	Day-1 Nasdaq Close (`19 Nov 2026`)	150.39	+40.65	**−44.19bn Q4 MTM Loss** (−`40.646`bn rollover + −`3.540`bn conv.)
115.10	Day-1 Intraday Peak (`19 Nov 2026`)	178.14	+68.40	**−71.94bn Q4 MTM Loss** (`ASC 825` non-cash liability expansion)

$$\Delta \mathrm{FV}_{\mathrm{Q4}}(P) = -\underbrace{1.54768 \cdot (P - 70.9079)}_{\text{Rollover Notes (1.54768bn sh)}} - \underbrace{0.29277 \cdot (83.00 - 70.9079)}_{\text{Converted Tranche (}-\text{USD 3.540bn)}} \quad (\text{USD} \tag{14}$$

Table 22B — Closed-Form Google `14.99%` Ownership-Cap Debt-Flip Trigger Price (`P*` , USD/sh)

Reference Share Denominator Regime	Effective Denominator $S_0 - \Delta S$	Headroom to 14.99% (m sh)	Full USD 10bn Draw Trigger	Half USD 5bn Draw Trigger	Senior Creditor Flip Mechanism
I. Outstanding Capital Stock Basis (Form 424B4 p. 25, Ex-Amazon Notes)					
1. IPO Base Outstanding Capital Stock	13,219.6m	206.7	**USD 41.13**	USD 20.57	50.4% drawdown from USD 83 triggers 10yr Roll-Over Notes
2. Post-Greenshoe Outstanding (+147.0m sh)	13,366.6m	228.7	**USD 37.17**	USD 18.59	Full greenshoe widens denominator cushion to 55.2% below IPO
3. **5% Net Share Shrinkage (RSU withholding/buybacks, Base)**	12,558.7m	107.6	**USD 79.02**	USD 39.51	Only 11.1% below Day-2 USD 88.91; breaking USD 83 triggers debt flip
4. 5% Net Share Shrinkage (Post-Greenshoe)	12,698.3m	128.5	**USD 66.15**	USD 33.07	Concurrent buybacks + sub-IPO trading activates priority debt flip
II. As-Converted Note Capitalisation Basis (Incl. 1,547.7m Amazon Note Shares)					
5. Base As-Converted Denominator (1,936.5m / 12%)	16,137.1m	644.0	**USD 13.20**	USD 6.60	Deep buffer if retained convertibles are counted in denominator
6. Post-Greenshoe As-Converted Denominator	16,284.1m	666.0	**USD 12.76**	USD 6.38	Activated under full-dilution denominator only in severe distress

6.3 The USD 26.0bn Supplier Private Placement, 88.3% Dilution, MTM EV Bridge, and 10-Year Reverse-DCF

Table 23 — The Seven Concurrent Private-Placement Suppliers (USD 26.0bn; 313.25m Class N Shares at USD 83.00)

Supplier Investor	Class N Shares	PP Cash (USD bn)	Recycled Old Commitment	Linked Compute / Hardware Contract (USD bn)	Multiple	Lock-Up & Resale Status (pp. 19–20, 310, 347)
Google LLC	120,481,927	10.00	**100% recycled** (half of Mar 2026 USD 20bn NPA, p. 347)	121.3 fixed + 125–150 variable TPU	**12.1x–27.1x**	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m + Google RRA (Day 180)
NVIDIA Corp.	120,481,927	10.00	Indirect circularity	>206.4 GPU neoclouds (SpaceXAI, Nscale, Lambda)	**20.6x**	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m hold
AMD Inc.	30,120,481	2.50	**100% recycled** (1:1 Jul 2026 USD 5bn offset, p. 171)	>20.0 MI450 / Helios supply agreement	**>8.0x**	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m hold
Microsoft Corp.	12,048,192	1.00	Paired with Azure commitment	47.2 non-cancellable Azure contract	**47.2x**	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m hold
Broadcom Inc.	12,048,192	1.00	Paired with USD 42bn PIK NPA	161.2 lease principal (190.6 incl. interest)	**161.2x**	Exempt from lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m (RRA on NPA notes, p. 310)
Micron Technology	12,048,192	1.00	Upstream HBM memory supplier	Embedded across GPU/TPU hardware	Upstream HBM	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m hold
TSMC Partners	6,024,096	0.50	Upstream foundry partner	Wafer fabrication for accelerators	Upstream	Exempt from underwriter lock-up; Rule 144(d) 6m hold
Total / Weighted	**313,253,007**	**26.00**	**USD 12.50bn (48.08%) recycled**	**>USD 675bn direct / >880bn ecosystem**	**10x–47.2x**	**0 days underwriter lock-up; eligible Day 180**

Meanwhile, public IPO buyers suffer immediate net tangible book value dilution (`NTBV = USD 9.70/sh` base / `~USD 10.50/sh` post-greenshoe; pp. 131, 134):

$$D_{\mathrm{NTBV}}(P) = \frac{P - \mathrm{NTBV}_{\mathrm{post}}}{P} = \begin{cases} 88.31\% & (P = \text{USD } 83.00,\ \text{NTBV } 9.70) \\ 88.19\% & (P = \text{USD } 88.91 \text{ Post-GS},\ \text{NTBV } 1 \\ 90.02\% & (P = \text{USD } 97.17,\ \text{NTBV } 9.70) \end{cases} \tag{15}$$

To reconcile equity valuation cleanly across pre- and post-greenshoe tapes without mixing accounting debt bases, `Table 24` reports all three lease-adjusted Enterprise Value lenses (`Basic Book-Debt`, **Basic Mark-to-Market** pricing the `1.5477bn` Amazon note shares at spot P, and `Fully Diluted`) alongside our two-stage 10-year Reverse-DCF (`2027–2036`; `FCF margin = 0%` in `2027–2028`, stepping `0.5m -> 0.75m -> m` over `2029–2031`, fading linearly to $g_\infty = 4\%$ across `2032–2036`):

$$\mathrm{OpEV}_{\mathrm{FD}}(P) = N_{\mathrm{FD}} P + L_{\mathrm{on}} - C_{\mathrm{pf}} = \sum_{t=1}^{10} \frac{R_t(g_1)\, m_t}{(1+\mathrm{WACC})^t} + \frac{\mathrm{FCF}_{10}(1+g_\infty} {(\mathrm{WACC} - g_\infty)(1+\mathrm{V} \tag{16}$$

Table 24 — Post-Greenshoe Enterprise Value Bridge (`Basic Book / Basic MTM / FD`) & 10-Year Reverse-DCF (`USD bn`)

Valuation / Reverse-DCF Lens	Metric & Accounting Scope	@ USD 83.00 IPO (Base)	@ USD 88.91 (20 Nov Post-GS)	@ USD 97.17 (Day-1 Close)
A. Share Count, Cash & MTM Debt	Basic / FD Shares (bn)	13.220 / 18.138	**13.367 / 18.285**	13.220 / 18.138
	Basic Market Cap / FD Market Cap	1,097.23 / 1,505.42	**1,188.43 / 1,625.68**	1,284.55 / 1,762.43
	Basic MTM Debt (Amazon 1.548B * P + 4.48B lease)	132.94 (book 114.23)	**142.09 (book 114.23)**	154.87 (book 114.23)
	– Pro Forma Cash & ST Investments	−232.35	**−244.55** (full 147m GS)	−232.35
	+ PV of Uncommenced Leases (USD 451.2bn, Table 3)	+306.25–328.39	**+306.25–328.39**	+306.25–328.39
B. Lease-Adjusted EV Totals	Basic Book-Debt EV (Amortised Note Carrying Base)	1,285.4–1,307.5	**1,364.4–1,386.5**	1,472.7–1,494.8
	Basic MTM Enterprise Value (Amazon Notes at Spot P)	**1,304.1–1,326.2**	**1,392.2–1,414.4**	**1,513.3–1,535.5**
	Fully Diluted Lease-Adjusted EV (18.14B / 18.28B FD)	**1,583.8–1,605.9**	**1,691.9–1,714.0**	**1,840.8–1,863.0**
C. Two-Stage 10-Yr Reverse-DCF	Standard Operating EV (FD Mcap + 4.48B − Cash)	**1,277.6**	**1,385.6**	**1,534.6**
(2027–2036, $g_\infty = 4\%$, fade 2032–36)	Case 1 (WACC 10%, 20% FCF Margin): **Required 2031E Rev**	**USD 308.7bn** (39.7% / 52.1%)	**USD 327.2bn** (**41.3% Q3-Net** / 37.0% Gross / 53.9% 9M-Net)	**USD 351.9bn** (43.4% / 56.1%)
	Case 2 (WACC 11%, 15% FCF Margin): **Required 2031E Rev**	**USD 435.8bn** (49.7% / 63.0%)	**USD 461.7bn** (**51.4% Q3-Net** / 46.8% Gross / 64.9% 9M-Net)	**USD 496.4bn** (53.6% / 67.3%)
	Case 3 (WACC 12%, 25% FCF Margin): **Required 2031E Rev**	**USD 342.5bn** (42.6% / 55.3%)	**USD 363.1bn** (**44.3% Q3-Net** / 39.9% Gross / 57.1% 9M-Net)	**USD 390.8bn** (46.4% / 59.4%)

Note: At `@ USD 88.91` (`Post-GS OpEV USD 1,385.6bn`), justifying the market price under `WACC = 10%` and `20%` steady FCF margin requires `2031E` net revenue of **USD 327.2bn**—representing a `41.3%` five-year CAGR from normalised Q3 net run-rate revenue (`USD 58.03bn`), `37.0%` from Q3 gross run-rate (`USD 67.82bn`), and `53.9%` from 9M26 annualised net revenue (`USD 37.92bn`). By comparison, November 2026 hyperscale software peers (`Microsoft` , `Alphabet`) trade at `14x–18x EV/GP` (`+32% to +45% OPM`)

and upstream silicon (`NVIDIA`) at `22x–28x EV/GP` (`+58% to +65% OPM`), versus Anthropic's `98x–124x EV/Restated GP` and negative normalised OPM (`antlevee_exact_audit.json`).

> `PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY`
>
> **Why a Falling Share Price Creates Paper Gains Whilst Locking Up Senior Priority**
>
> Because Amazon kept 84.1% of its convertible notes on Anthropic's liability ledger, GAAP forces Anthropic to re-price those 1.55 billion underlying shares to market every quarter. When the stock fell towards USD 88.91 on Day 2, Anthropic avoided USD 12.8bn of extra paper accounting loss relative to Day 1's USD 97.17 close—yet received zero cash. Meanwhile, Amazon holds senior creditor rights and commercial AWS bill offsets, whilst Google holds a 14.99% senior-note ratchet that triggers near USD 79.02 if net share count drops 5%. To justify Day-2's USD 88.91 price under standard DCF assumptions, net revenue must reach USD 327bn–462bn by 2031.

Figure 06 Amazon Retained Convertible Notes (USD 109.74bn) & Circular Supplier Capital Loop

Conflicted Syndicate (22 Firms)

- 16 RCF lenders + 5 pre-IPO equity holders (17/22 conflicted)
- MS / BofA / Citi co-lead Broadcom USD 63B SPV #2 first lien
- 0.68% base discount; 147m greenshoe exercised 20 Nov at 0% fee

Pro Forma Balance Sheet

- Pro forma cash USD 232.35B (USD 244.55B post-GS)
- Retained Amazon notes USD 109.74B (87.2% of liabilities)
- 88.3% immediate NTBV dilution (88.19% post-GS at USD 88.91)

USD 26B PP (48.1% Recycled)

- Google USD 10B exercises 2026 NPA → USD 121.3B+ cloud
- AMD USD 2.5B credits USD 5B hardware; MSFT USD 1B → USD 47.2B
- 313.25m Class N shares exempt from lock-up (Rule 144(d) / Google RRA)

Convertible Rollover Split: USD 130.50B Pre-IPO Amazon Notes (12% Cap Unwaived)



Converted 15.9% (USD 20.76B, 292.77m sh) — **Retained 84.1% (USD 109.74B, 1547.68m sh)**

Converted at IPO (15.9%) · Retained Rollover Debt (84.1%; USD 5.59B Principal)

Rollover Note Indenture Terms

- Zero-coupon; mature 2034–2035; quarterly conversion within 12% cap
- Fixed USD 2.09 / USD 5.05 caps (share escalation only below USD 5.05)
- USD 67B+ additional supplier convertible capacity remains undrawn

Q4 Fair-Value Volatility (Mark-to-Market)

- Every USD 1 move shifts pre-tax P&L by ±USD 1.548B
- Day-1 USD 97.17 = USD −44.19B Q4 loss; Day-2 USD 88.91 = USD −31.40B
- GAAP net income swings inversely with stock price

Amazon Set-Off & Seniority

- Ranks senior to Class A common equity across principal balance
- Unilateral set-off rights against AWS marketplace payables (≤USD 5.59B)
- Commercial default triggers cross-default acceleration

Chapter 7: Discretionary Public-Benefit Dilution, the `0.079%` Control Wedge, Lock-Up Releases, and Pending Regulatory and Legal Contingencies

7.1 Discretionary Public-Benefit Dilution and Multiclass Control Architecture (`Form 424B4 pp. 13–16, 111–115, 123, 243, 253–266, 298`)

1. *Layer 1 — Discretionary Public-Benefit Dilution (`5% + 2%` Progressive Equity Framework & Asymmetric Tax/Resale Rules):* Co-founders' personal pledge to donate 80% of their wealth is explicitly *"voluntary, revocable at any time, and not legally binding"* (p. 123)—and would dilute public stockholders by `0%`. Instead, the Board transferred **846,840,960 Class N shares** (`5.0%` of 30 June FD shares; `4.67%` post-IPO FD; `USD 70.29bn` at IPO) to `Anthropic Public Benefit Fund, LLC` (`PBF`, managed initially by Dario Amodei, Daniela Amodei, Jack Clark, and LTBT Chair Dr. Neil "Buddy" Shah, p. 243). `Page 149` authorises the PBF to sell shares in registered offerings or donate them to tax-exempt `501(c)(3)` entities/DAFs (exempt from capital-gains tax), whilst loss-making Anthropic carries a full **USD 3.422bn DTA valuation allowance** (Note 11, p. F-56) alongside the `IRC § 170(b)(2)` `10%` deduction ceiling. Moreover, the Board approved issuing up to `+2%` incremental FD shares at every `+50%` share-price milestone (`USD 124.50`, `186.75`, `280.13`, `420.19`) held on 90 of 120 consecutive trading days plus an automatic 1% annual Employee Donation Matching evergreen through FY2036 (pp. 13, 23 – 24, 243):

$$d_k = 1 - \frac{1 - d_0}{(1.02)^k}, \qquad d_0 = 4.669\% \implies d_1 = 6.54\%,\ d_2 = 8.37\%,\ d_3 = 10.17\% \tag{17}$$

2. *Layer 2 — Perpetual Control Separation & Bankruptcy-Only Takeover (`Table 25`):* Across Anthropic's multi-class structure (`Class A` 1 vote/sh; non-voting `Class N/E`; `1 Class T` LTBT share electing 4 of 7 directors with one vacancy; `1 Class F` share held by `Founder LLC`'s seven co-founders carrying 50.1% aggregate vote, pp. 253 – 256, 298), selling down to 2% across three co-founders (`0.079%` FD / `636.2x` wedge) leaves public Class A buyers with `6.4%` aggregate voting power. On listing day, Board voting sits 3 – 3 (tie votes fail, p. 264) whilst Dario and Daniela Amodei block any `80%` (`6/7`) supermajority alongside Dario's irrevocable proxies over `Daffy/Dechomai` DAFs (`4.62m+` sh, p. 293)—making hostile takeovers legally impossible short of Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2009; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2010; Bebchuk and Kastiel, 2017, 2019).

3. *Layer 3 — Delaware PBC Shield & Nasdaq Controlled Company Exemptions:* As a Delaware PBC with *"no direct public company precedent"* (p. 111), directors must balance public-benefit safety objectives (such as declining to commercialise consumer image/video models, p. 115), whilst

`LTBT/Class T` invokes Nasdaq Rule 5615(c) Controlled Company exemptions (`2 sitting Audit Committee members + 1 vacancy` , p. 113, 265 – 266).

Table 25 — Multiclass Governance Architecture, Voting Wedges & Progressive `PBF` Dilution (`Form 424B4`)

Share Class / Governance Body	Post-IPO Economic Share / Reservation	Voting Rights (pp. 25, 253–266, 298)	Structural Entrenchment Effect
Class F (`Founder LLC`, 7 Co-founders)	Drops to **`0.079%` FD (`0.108%` outst.) floor**	**50.1% aggregate vote (636.2x / 464x wedge)**	Permanent veto over mergers, Board removals & equity changes until down to 2%/3 founders
Class T (LTBT Trustees)	1 nominal share (`Shah, Fontaine, Bernanke, Stubbs`)	Elects **4 of 7 directors**; Nasdaq 5615(c) trigger	Trustees co-select successors with management; Audit Committee runs `2 + 1` vacancy
Class N (`Suppliers, Amazon, PBF`)	`1,774.96m` Google + `1,936.5m` Amazon + `846.84m` PBF	**0 votes/sh** (`auto-converts 1:1 to Class A on sale`)	Concentrates supplier equity without triggering `ASC 323` or `DGCL § 203` thresholds
Class A (`IPO Public & Unlocked Insiders`)	`1,127m` post-GS public (`+15,483m` Day-365 unlock)	**~6.4% aggregate vote** (`1 vote/sh`)	Absorbs `88.3%` NTBV dilution, `5%+2%` PBF issuances & `USD 24.7bn` RSU backlog

7.2 The 23-Date Lock-Up Release Schedule (`7.74x` Expanded / `8.91x` Base Float) and Regulatory Contingencies

Following USD 4.818bn of pre-IPO tender cash-outs (p. 293) and USD 1.963bn of co-founder IPO secondary sales (p. 298), 315 million shares unlocked on Day 1 alongside `121,886,381` Form S-8 resale shares (`Table 26` ; Field and Hanka, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003). Cumulative released float expands sharply relative to opening public supply:

$$M_{\text{unlock}}(t) = \frac{\text{Cumulative Shares Released Through Day } t}{N_{\text{public,IPO}}}, \qquad N_{\text{public,IPO}} = \begin{cases} 98 \\ 1, \end{cases} \tag{18}$$

Table 26 — Key Milestones Across the 23-Date Staged Lock-Up & Resale Schedule (`pp. 19, 310, 317–320, 333–335`)

Lock-Up Release Window	Cumulative Unlocked (m sh)	Base Float (980m)	Post-GS Float (1,127m)	Key Selling Groups & Concurrent Catalysts
Day 1 (19 Nov 2026 + Form S-8)	**315** (+121.9m S-8)	0.32x (+S-8)	0.28x	Non-founder officers (CFO Rao, CAO Nunes), directors & early employees
Day 76 (Early Feb 2027)	**1,627**	**1.66x**	**1.44x**	Tranche II insider/institutional pre-earnings staggered release
FY26 Earnings + 69 Days	**5,727**	**5.84x**	**5.08x**	Broad early-investor & employee post-10-K liquidity window
Day 180 (May 2027 Mega-Cliff)	**8,727**	**8.91x**	**7.74x**	**Rule 144(d) on 313.25m supplier PP + Google RRA expiry + Co-founders 29% (~485m sh)**
Day 195 / Day 365 (Nov 2027)	**9,446 / 15,483**	**9.64x / 15.80x**	**8.38x / 13.74x**	+719m derivative hedging unlock (p. 333) + remaining co-founder 71% tranches

Concurrently, `Table 27` catalogues five active federal procurement, regulatory, export-control, copyright/antitrust, and unquantified indemnity exposures disclosed across `Form 424B4 pp. 54–55, 76, 96–102, F-65`.


Table 27 — Active Federal Procurement, Antitrust, Export-Control, and Indemnity Contingencies

Legal / Regulatory Contingency	Statutory Authority & Ruling Status (2026)	Potential Commercial & Cash Impact (424B4 Locators)
1. Federal Supply-Chain Risk Designations	10 U.S.C. § 3252 (N.D. Cal. appeal) & FASCSA § 4713 (**D.C. Cir. 2–1 loss** 25 Sep, en banc pending)	Threatens defence/federal prime-contractor API integration (pp. 54–55, 76, 96–97)
2. FTC Civil Investigative Demand (CID)	Active inquiry under 15 U.S.C. § 57b–1 targeting consumer/agentic disclosures	Discovery burden and prospective consent-decree operational limits (p. 97)
3. Commerce Export Controls (Jun 2026)	Worldwide disablement order affecting Fable 5 and Mythos 5 frontier weights	Direct revenue lock-out across restricted enterprise/overseas endpoints (p. 76)
4. Copyright & Sherman Act § 1 Class Suits	Concord/BMG/Sony/Reddit copyright claims post-USD 1.50bn Bartz settlement + Sep 2026 Sherman § 1	Treble-damages & recurring licensing royalties (USD 1.0bn+ P17 threshold, pp. 101–102)
5. Uncapped Customer & Evaluator Indemnities	Broad contractual IP/safety indemnities with zero liability dollar cap	Management warns *"insurance may not fully cover such claims"* (pp. 54, 97, 102)

PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY **Control-Wedge Entrenchment and the Day-180 Supply Wave**

Public Class A shareholders bought into 88% net tangible book dilution and just 6.4% of votes while co-founders can lock 50.1% control down to a 0.079% stake—leaving corporate change of control impossible absent bankruptcy. Meanwhile, six months post-IPO (Day 180), over 8.7 billion locked-up shares—equal to 7.74x the enlarged public float—plus all USD 26bn of supplier private-placement stock become eligible for sale.

Figure 07 First-Year 23-Date Lock-Up Release Cascade (8.91x Base Float by Day 180; 15.80x by Day 365)



Excluded above: 121.9m Form S-8 shares, 313.25m lock-up-exempt private placement shares (Rule 144(d) 6m / Google RRA), Day-180 co-founder 29% release (485m sh, p. 335) & Day-195 719m share hedging channel.

5% + 2%/+50%
Board PBF Issuance Framework
Founders' 80% pledge revocable vs 5% upfront transfer & +2%/+50% issuances (USD 124.50 gate)

464–636x
Class F Voting Wedge
1 Class F share holds 50.1% votes down to 0.079%–0.108% FD ownership floor

0% → 4/7 Seats
LTBT Zero-Equity Board Control
Layered atop Delaware PBC fiduciary shield (p. 115) vs 6.4% Class A public vote

5 Legal Fronts
Procurement, Antitrust & Copyright
DoW §4713 2–1 loss · FTC CID · Music/Reddit · Sherman Act treble damages

Chapter 8: Conclusion — Upstream Suppliers Rank Senior, Public Equity Absorbs Drawdowns, and Compute Debt Transfers Across Four Institutional Layers

Core Verdict: Anthropic's trillion-dollar valuation operates as a one-way risk-allocation contract. Upstream silicon and cloud suppliers, commercial bank syndicates (`0%` proprietary SPV retention), and the `0.079%` -wedge founder core lock in senior priority, marketplace payable set-offs, capped wraps, and irrevocable voting control—shifting `USD 900.9bn` of fixed

compute liabilities, asymmetric `5% + 2%` equity dilution, and residual credit losses onto `6.4%`-vote `Class A` public shareholders and, via statutory `NAIC` rating gates, onto U.S. life-insurer general accounts, private-credit BDCs, and household `401(k)` funds.

8.1 Three-Chain Synthesis (`Payment / Funding / Credit`), Four-Layer Transfer & Perimeter Loss Waterfall

Three-Chain Convergence and Wrong-Way Risk Concentration (`Figure 8A` & `Table 28`)

Evaluating AI infrastructure solvency requires separating three transmission channels frequently conflated in equity research: (1) the **Payment Chain** (enterprise token spend → frontier labs → hyperscalers, neoclouds, and SPV lessors → SPV noteholders), (2) the **Funding Chain** (equity issuances, customer prepayments, supplier convertibles, project notes, and bank revolvers), and (3) the **Credit Chain** (residual-value guarantees, site-level Credit Support Agreements, parent recourse, and capacity backstops).

Wrong-way risk concentrates because the exact same counterparties occupy all three chains simultaneously (`Table 28` and `Figure 8A`). Under an industry AI-spend slowdown, variable chip orders shrink at the precise moment lessor rents strain, conditional convertibles lock in senior claims, and capped supplier credit wraps are tested simultaneously.

PAYMENT CHAIN & RISK TRANSFER · H1–H5

Five-Link Payment Chain & Cross-Market Risk Transfer (AI Lab ➔ SPV ➔ Life Insurers / 401(k))



01 · H1 Pricing Origin

Enterprise Compute Demand (Cash Origination)

9M 2026 revenue of USD 33.242B (79.13% usage-based); consensus assumes lower per-token pricing expands volume enough to cover fixed infra costs.

LOSS-BEARING PARTY & ANCHOR

Revenue softness hits the front-end cash funnel first → Sec. 3.6 & Hypotheses H1 / H4

Figure 8A Tri-Chain Convergence and Wrong-Way Core Node Overlap




Table 28 — Tri-Chain Convergence and Wrong-Way Risk Overlap Across Five Core Counterparties

Core Overlapping Node	Chain 1: Payment (Revenue / Rent)	Chain 2: Funding (Equity / NPAs / Loans)	Chain 3: Credit Backstops (Wraps / CSAs)	Wrong-Way Resonance Under Slowdown
Alphabet / Google (GOOGL)	USD 121.3bn fixed cloud + USD 125–150bn TPU	USD 10bn PP + USD 10bn NPA (14.99% flip at USD 41.13 / 37.17)	**USD 19.0bn** TeraWulf Hawesville CSAs	Demand shock cuts variable TPU backlog, triggers debt-flip seniority & crystallises site CSAs
NVIDIA (NVDA)	Core upstream GPU & neocloud silicon supplier	USD 10bn PP + USD 98.9bn equity book + USD 32bn neocloud	**USD 118.0bn** Q3 FY27 wraps (incl. USD 105bn SB Energy)	Secondary GPU markdown compresses neocloud collateral, equity marks & infra wraps together
Broadcom (AVGO)	USD 161.2bn principal / USD 190.6bn gross leases	USD 1.0bn PP + **USD 42.0bn** NPA (13% PIK / 85% conv.)	**USD 72.0bn** dual-SPV wraps (85%/$29bn + 72.5%/$43bn)	Lessee stress hits rack payments, forces costly PIK dilution & calls off-BS residual wraps
Amazon (AMZN)	USD 110.0bn AWS take-or-pay + 44% marketplace	**USD 109.74bn** retained notes (USD 5.59bn prin.) + USD 15bn NPA	Unilateral **AWS AP offset** (≤ USD 5.59bn) via 12% cap	Retains creditor priority ahead of equity & sweeps AWS marketplace payables against principal
SoftBank Group	USD 64.6bn cumulative OpenAI equity stake	Aug 2026 **USD 10.0bn** SVF2 loan linked to OpenAI FV	Multi-tier SVF II debt placed into insurers (1.G / 2.C Z) & BDCs	Lab valuation drawdown triggers cash-collateral prepayments & SVF II insurer rating stress

Table 28B — Verbatim Contractual Mechanics Protecting Upstream Priority Across Primary Filings

Contractual Shield / Mechanism	Source & Exact Locator	Audited Terms & Economic Priority Effect
Amazon 12% Ownership Cap & Non-Waiver	Form 424B4, pp. 23, 25, 171–172	Amazon elected not to waive its 12% fully diluted ownership cap at IPO: only 15.91% (USD 0.613bn principal) converted into 292.77m shares, while **84.09%** (USD 5.590bn principal / USD 109.742bn carrying FV, 87.2% of total liabilities) stayed debt ahead of Class A equity alongside unilateral AWS payable set-off rights.
Google 14.99% Senior-Note Fallback Trigger	Form 424B4 Ex. 10.15 §1.4, p. 175	Once additional USD 10.0bn drawdowns breach 14.99% ownership (P* = USD 41.13 pre-GS / USD 37.17 post-GS), Google stops receiving common equity and automatically receives **10-year zero-coupon senior rollover notes** payable in cash at maturity.
Broadcom Dual-SPV Residual Wraps (No Pre-Acceptance Wrap)	Broadcom Inc. 8–K (27 Oct 2026)	Broadcom caps net shortfall indemnification strictly at **USD 29.0bn** (85% on USD 35bn SPV #1) and **USD 43.0bn** (72.5% on USD 63bn SPV #2) = USD 72.0bn total —and covers zero pre-acceptance construction or delivery-delay risk.
Google-TeraWulf Site CSAs (USD 19.0bn)	TeraWulf Inc. 8–K Ex. 10.1 (4 Nov 2026)	Executed 15 days pre-IPO across three 401 MW Hawesville leases; Google wraps landlord payments if Anthropic defaults, proving sophisticated landlords refused standalone Anthropic credit even with USD 244bn pro forma liquidity plans.
Athene 15% WHCO Guarantee (USD 0 Accrued)	Athene Q3 2026 10–Q, Note 12	Athene wraps the exact missing **15%** of SPV #1 (USD 5,250m gross / USD 3,412.5m net after 35% third-party indemnity) off-balance-sheet with **USD 0** ASC 460/450 contingent loss accrued, completing 85% + 15% = 100% of SPV #1.
CoreWeave 88.73% Parent Recourse & ECF Sweep	CoreWeave Q3 2026 10–Q, Note 10	**USD 42,152m** (88.73%) of USD 47,505m total debt carries parent recourse, DDTL 5.0/5.5 sweeps 100% of excess cash flow (1.20x DSCR covenant), and USD 25.9bn of encumbered SPV assets sit ahead of USD 20.81bn unsecured/convertible debt.

Pre- vs Post-Acceptance Bifurcation, Project DSCR Cushion & Hyperscaler Constructive Leverage (Eq. (19) & Table 29)

Project-finance compute SPVs carry razor-thin debt-service buffers while shifting pre-acceptance construction risk completely onto developers and unsecured bondholders. Under standard 1.20x Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) sizing, net cash-flow leakage $x^* = 1 - \rho_T/\rho_0$ and net SPV shortfall ℓ_{SPV} obey:

$$x^{*} = 1 - \frac{\mathrm{DSCR}_{\mathrm{target}}}{1.20} \in \{4.2\%,\ 8.3\%,\ 12.5\%,\ 16.7\%\}, \qquad \ell_{\mathrm{SPV}} = \max(0,\ B_{\mathrm{SPV}}$$ (19)

A cash-flow erosion of just `4.2% / 8.3% / 12.5% / 16.7%` via SLA availability penalties, power pass-through leakage, or post-default re-leasing discounts drives DSCR down to `1.15x / 1.10x / 1.05x / 1.00x` (`Morningstar DBRS, 2026a, 2026b`), mitigated temporarily by 6-month DSRAs and `100%` ECF sweeps. Worse, take-or-pay wraps trigger *only post-acceptance*: Anthropic's August 2026 `USD 34.9bn` `Lambda` lease became mutually terminable on 2 – 10 November following construction delays; Nebius Group N.V. (2026) (`95.4%` of `USD 16.478bn` debt in parent convertibles, incl. `USD 5.75bn` of 2030 – 2034 notes alongside `USD 13.862bn` uncommenced leases) pushed New Jersey delivery to 2027Q2 while Microsoft retains grace-period refund claims over ~ `USD 6.958bn` (`~40%`) of prepayments; CoreWeave reclassified `USD 1.915bn` into cancellable liabilities; and Anthropic holds `USD 4.7bn` of unaccrued developer (`USD 4.2bn`) and power (`USD 0.5bn` to 2038) guarantees (`Form 424B4 Note 13, p. F-60`).

Meanwhile, supplier exposures surged into late November 2026 (`Table 29`). NVIDIA Corporation (2026b) Q2 FY27 Note 10 disclosed `USD 56.0bn` of additional commitments (`USD 36bn` AI cloud backstops + `USD 20bn` third-party leases) alongside `USD 29bn` R&D cloud and `USD 3.529bn` derivative wraps; its Q3 FY27 Form 10-Q (NVIDIA Corporation, 2026c, Q3 rev `USD 115.8bn`) jumped off-balance-sheet infrastructure guarantees to **`USD 118.0bn`** (driven by `USD 105.0bn` on SB Energy's `PORTS-Pike` 4.25 GW campus + `USD 9.5bn` power/systems + `USD 3.5bn` neocloud land/shell) plus `USD 32.0bn` contingent neocloud commitments. Elsewhere, Nscale Limited (2026) lifted convertibles to `USD 3.36bn`; Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (2026) approved `USD 500m` stakes each in Anthropic and OpenAI; Advanced Micro Devices (2026) carried `USD 1.2bn` customer warrants; SoftBank Group Corp. (2026b) closed a `USD 10.0bn` SVF2 loan with cash-collateral triggers tied to OpenAI marks; Oracle Corporation (2026) raised `USD 20bn` together with WEC Energy Group Inc. (2026) `1.3 GW` below-`A-/A3` collateral disclosures; and Cerebras Systems Inc. (2026) reported `USD 829.1m` remaining on OpenAI's `6.0%` bill-offset loan.

Table 29 — Five-Hyperscaler Constructive Lease Capitalisation (`L0 → L2`) and Neocloud Credit Repricing Benchmarks

Counterparty / Cohort (Filing Date)	Reported Debt L0 (Debt / EBITDA)	Uncommenced / VIE Leases (30 Sep 2026)	Constructive Pro Forma L2 (Debt / EBITDA)	Late-November 2026 Market & Filing Stress Signal
Five Hyperscalers Aggregate (MSFT, GOOGL, AMZN, META, ORCL)	0.77x reported net/gross leverage base	**USD 1,303.8bn** (USD 844.4bn PV)	**2.41x** (3.13x L0 multiple expansion)	Off-BS leases triple aggregate hyperscaler leverage once constructive obligations capitalise
Oracle Corporation (31 Aug / 31 May 2026)	Heavy capex debt issuance (+USD 20bn)	Multi-decade Stargate / 1.3 GW PSCW leases	**10.10x** (31 Aug) / **10.79x** (31 May)	Moody's/S&P scrutiny; 1.3 GW Vantage PSCW triggers below A-/A3 (WEC Energy)
Meta Platforms (Q3 2026 10-Q)	Modest parent balance-sheet bonds	**Beignet Investor** (Hyperion VIE structure)	**3.20x–3.34x** incl. off-BS VIE	Beignet NPORT-P median mark fell 102.07% (Jun) → **92.22%** (Sep, low 92.11%)
CoreWeave (CRWV) (Q3 2026 10-Q, 20 Nov)	USD 47.505bn total (88.73% recourse)	USD 25.9bn SPV-encumbered assets	USD 13.407bn 15m wall (**3.20x cash**)	Unsecured 2030/31 notes at **14.9%–15.8%** yields; 5Y CDS 1,000–1,250 bps; GPU LTV 50–60%; 7 Form 144s
Nebius / IREN / Nscale (Nov 2026 Filings)	Convertibles: NBIS USD 5.75bn, IREN USD 2.60bn, Nscale USD 3.36bn	NBIS USD 13.862bn uncommenced leases	Parent convertible concentration (NBIS 95.4%)	NBIS delayed NJ to 2027Q2; MSFT refund claim ~USD 6.958bn (~40% prepay)

We strictly separate arithmetic restatements (Tables 8–10 arithmetic rows) from parametric scenarios (Table 9 compute reclassification and Table 17 survival paths). Even on management's unverified 28-day October USD 81.0bn run-rate, cleaning the 6% policy-violating pool and enforcing dynamic opex plus recurring RSU taxes still requires **21.9%–28.5%** CAGR on the non-double-counted stack (39.2%–49.6% on 10-year leases) and +12.0% to +12.6% permanent compounding on strictly non-cancellable contracts alone (Table 17).

Four-Layer Institutional End-Holder Ledger and Statutory NAIC Gate (Figure 8B , Table 30 & Eq. (20))

Trading and statutory filings confirm commercial banks retain 0% proprietary long-dated SPV project debt (IREN Hardware 3). Trillion-dollar compute debt transfers instead across four institutional layers (Figure 8B):

Figure 8B Commercial-Bank Exit (0% Prop) → NAIC RBC Rating Cliff → Four Terminal Holder Layers

STAGE 0 · COMMERCIAL BANK SYNDICATION SHIELD (IREN HW3 · BROADCOM $63B SPV #2)

0.0% PROP HOLD

↓

NAIC RBC & PBBD RATING CLIFF (H5)

1.F PL (0.816%) → [IG Wrap Loss] → 3.B FE/PL (4.537%, 5.56x/11.12x) → Schedule BA (30%–45%, 29.5x–44.3x)

LAYER 1 · U.S. LIFE INSURERS (10 CO. 3Q26) — **117.3%–156.4% AHL Equity**

Athene USD 7.045B Big Sky + USD 5.25B WHCO Guarantee ($0 Liab.)

- AAIA p. 2523 proves 5.56x same-day RBC jump (1.F vs 3.B)
- MetLife 3Q26 Digital Infra ABS: USD 2.561B (USD –91M MTM)

LAYER 2 · PRIVATE CREDIT BDCs (16 FUNDS) — **–15.55 pt Mark Gap**

GECC Marks DDTL V at 100.65% vs Parent Debt at 85.10%

- Blue Owl, Blackstone BCRED & GECC absorb mezzanine debt
- SPV collateral shell masks parent subordination risk

LAYER 3 · 401(k), MUTUAL FUNDS & ANNUITIES — **$15.17B+ XML Hits**

100% NPORT-P: 224 Big Sky (55 series, $714M) · 2,214 CRWV · 1,369 Beignet

- Spans Loomis Sayles, Fidelity HY, PIMCO & Artisan
- Beignet median marks slid from 102.07% (Jun) to 92.22% (Sep 2026)

LAYER 4 · NEOCLOUD & CLOUD ON–BS RESTATEMENT — **88.73% Parent Recourse**

CoreWeave USD 47.51B Debt (USD 42.15B Recourse) · 3.2x Wall

- 15m maturity wall USD 13.41B; Nov 20 shows 7 insider Form 144s
- 5 hyperscalers L0 0.77x → L2 2.41x pro forma (USD 1.304T)

1. **Layer 1 — U.S. Life Insurers & Offshore Sidecars (`Table 30`):** Athene Holding Ltd.'s Q3 2026 10-Q (Athene Holding Ltd., 2026; Apollo Global Management, 2026) documents **`USD 7,045m`** of Anthropic/Broadcom SPV #1 (`Big Sky / WHCO`) exposure (`USD 845m` funded + `USD 6,200m` unfunded across Related-Party AFS and consolidated Risk-Retention VIEs), *plus* its off-BS **`15%`** (**`USD 5,250m` gross / `USD 3,412.5m` net) WHCO Guarantee** (`USD 0` GAAP liability). Combined with `Valor Compute` (`xAI`, `USD 2,779m`) and `SoftBank/OpenAI` (`USD 5,903.5m`), Athene holds **`USD 15,727.5m`** funded/committed (`USD 19,140.0m` net / `USD 20,977.5m` gross incl. WHCO)—equal to **`117.26%–156.40%`** of AHL GAAP equity (`USD 13,413m`), **`76.90%–102.56%`** ex-AOCI (`USD 20,454m`), or **`53.96%–71.98%`** incl. ACRA NCI (`USD 29,144m`). Meanwhile, auditing 10 U.S. life-insurer Q3 statements (`AAIA` 4,450 pp., `AANY` 368 pp., 8 of 11 `IREN` filers; IREN Limited, 2026; Genworth Financial, 2026; Securian Financial, 2026; MetLife, 2026; Corebridge Financial, 2026; MetLife showing `USD 2,561m` Digital Infra ABS and `11.38x` higher gross unrealised losses `USD −91m`, alongside initial April 2026 AG 55 filings) proves Hypothesis **`H5`**: across identical September 2026 tranches (`20 Oct 2035` maturity), Broadcom-wrapped `AP Compute Class A–2` (`5.75%`, `USD 116.61m`) clears at **`1.F PL`** (`0.816%` pre-tax `LR002`) whereas unwrapped `Class B` (`8.50%`, `USD 83.29m`) drops to **`3.B FE/PL`** (`4.537%` = **`5.56x`** jump), and `SVF II Finco B4` (`1.G Z`, `1.016%`) sits seven notches above SoftBank parent (`3.A FE`, `3.151%`).

Table 30 — Hypothesis `H5` Statutory Rating Gates, Three-Tier Insurer Equity Concentration, and NAIC RBC / Schedule BA Cliffs

Statutory Dimension / Entity (Q3 2026 Filings)	Audited Balance / Filing Anchor	Effective NAIC RBC / Capital Ratio	Downgrade / Disqualification Escalator (Eq. (20))
Athene Combined Frontier AI vs 3 Capital Bases (AHL 10–Q Notes 4, 11–12)	USD 15.73bn (Big Sky 7.05 + xAI 2.78 + SB/OAI 5.90) / USD 19.14bn net / USD 20.98bn gross	AHL GAAP (USD 13.41bn): **117.3%–156.4%**; ex-AOCI (USD 20.45bn): **76.9%–102.6%**; Total (USD 29.14bn): 54.0%–72.0%	U.S. AAIA/AANY bound by NAIC RBC (Iowa §511.8 / NY Reg 130); Bermuda AHL/ALRe under BMA EBS/BSCR
Broadcom-Wrapped Senior (AP Compute Class A–2) vs Unwrapped (Class B) (AAIA p. 2523)	**1.F PL** (USD 116.61m, 5.75%) vs **3.B FE/PL** (USD 83.29m, 8.50%)	0.816% → 4.537% pre-tax LR002 (0.679% → 3.775% post-tax ×0.832)	**5.56x** base jump; **11.12x** (9.074%) if top-10 LR010 exemption (1.A–1.G only) is lost
SoftBank / OpenAI Same-Day Ledger Arbitrage (AAIA pp. 2521, 2523, 23 Sep 2026)	SVF II Finco B4 (USD 947.8m, **1.G Z**) & Tsubaki (**2.C Z**) vs SoftBank Parent (**3.A FE**)	1.016% (1.G Z) vs 3.151% (3.A FE); provisional Z (Genworth/PLIC) expires in 120d (late Jan 2027)	**3.10x** on Z lapse; **29.5x–44.3x** (30%/45% Schedule BA vs 1.G) under PBBD
NAIC PBBD (SSAP 26R/43R) & SVO Override (NAIC 2021, 2026; AAIA p. 2516)	Non-bond SPV reclass to Schedule BA (Line 51 6.80%; Line 43/53.3 30.0%; Line 45 **45.0%**)	Post-tax (×0.79 for BA C–1cs eq./residual): **23.70%–35.55%**	**8.33x / 36.8x / 55.15x** pre-tax vs 1.F (29.5x / 44.3x vs 1.G); triggers AG 53/55 adequacy tests

Actuarial precision distinguishes U.S. statutory `LR002` pre-tax base factors (`0.816%` `1.F`, `1.016%` `1.G`, `4.537%` `3.B`), `LR002` Portfolio Adjustment Factors (`2.40x` first 50 issuers to `0.82x` `>500`), and `LR030` post-tax bond multipliers (`×0.8320`) from `45%` Schedule BA residual tranches (`×0.79`, yielding `35.55%` post-tax; National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2021, 2026; Drehmann and Eren, 2026; FSOC, 2025):

$$\mathrm{RBC}_{\mathrm{eff}}(\mathrm{NAIC}_i) = f_i \cdot \mathrm{PAF} \cdot \tau_i \cdot (1 + \mathbf{1}_{\mathrm{Top10} \wedge \mathrm{NAIC} \geq 2}) \in \Big[\underbrace{0.679\%}_{\text{1.F PL post-tax}}, \underbrace{9.074\%}_{\text{Top10 3.B pre-ta}} \Big] \quad (20)$$

2. **Layer 2 — Private-Credit BDCs:** Q3 2026 schedules across 16 top U.S. BDCs reveal Apollo `ADS` holding CoreWeave `DDTL 5.0/5.5` (`USD 17.67m`), `SoftBank SVF II Tsubaki` (`USD 55.0m`), and `QTS Project Ram` (`USD 36.77m`); Blue Owl `OBDC/OCIC/OTF` holding `USD 60.0m` committed (`USD 35.88m` funded) `DDTL 5.5` at `95.12%` cost, `USD 393.3m` `Nscale`

`UK`, and `USD 28.91m` `Valor Compute` equity; Blackstone `BCRED` holding `USD 219m` `Lambda Compute II`; and Great Elm (`GECC`) marking `DDTL 5.0` at `100.65%` against CoreWeave `9.625% 2032` unsecured notes at `85.10%` on the exact same date (**`15.55-point` structural subordination gap**).


3. **Layer 3 — 401(k)s, Mutual Funds & Variable Annuities (`100%` Full-Population `NPORT-P` XML Audit):** Zero-sampling parsing of all `2,411/2,411` matched SEC `NPORT-P` XML filings (`1 July – 23 November 2026`, `verify_nport_full.py`) uncovers widespread household fixed-income penetration: `Big Sky Funding` (`224` EFTS hits / `58` XML schedules / `55` series, deduplicated **USD 713.77m**, `75.2%` Level 3, led by `Loomis Sayles`, `Artisan`, `Janus`, `TCW MetWest`; weighted marks slipping monotonically from `99.87%` in June to `97.50%` in September); `CoreWeave` debt (`2,214` debt hits / `762` XML schedules / `616` series, **USD 4,664.98m**, led by `BlackRock`, `iShares`, `PGIM`, `Fidelity`, `PIMCO`); and Meta's `Beignet Investor` (`1,369` hits / `548` XML schedules / `394` series, **USD 9,793.35m**, `PIMCO Funds` alone `USD 6,067.14m`; median mark down `102.07% → 92.22%`, low `92.11%`).
4. **Layer 4 — Recourse Concentration & Late-November Stress:** CoreWeave Q3 2026 Note 10 confirms `88.73%` (`USD 42,152m` of `USD 47,505m`) is parent recourse (`USD 13,407m` 15m wall = `3.20x` cash; `74.09%` of equity from 2026 private injections), triggering `14.9%–15.8%` bond yields and `1,000–1,250 bps` 5Y CDS by 20 November 2026.

Terminal Loss Allocation Waterfall Within the Direct `USD 1,075.9bn` Anthropic Perimeter (`Figure 8C` & `Table 31`)

Isolating Anthropic's direct `USD 1,075.9bn` contractual perimeter cleanly from exogenous sector exposures (`CoreWeave USD 47.51bn` and `NVIDIA USD 118.0bn` infra wraps reported separately below) resolves exactly how losses distribute in distress (`Figure 8C` and `Table 31`).

Figure 8C Direct Contractual Perimeter Waterfall (USD 1,075.9B) & Ex-Anthropic Sector Benchmarks

Direct Anthropic Perimeter Waterfall (USD bn): USD 1,075.9B Gross Commitments to Senior Caps and Uncapped Tail



UPSTREAM PROTECTED & CAPPED SENIORITY

- **Commercial Banks (MS/Citi/BofA):** `0.0%` prop hold on SPV #2 & IREN HW3; syndication fees collected upfront.
- **Amazon & Suppliers:** Unwaived `12%` cap retains `USD 109.74B` senior notes with AWS payable set-off rights.
- **Broadcom & Google Caps:** Hard contractual ceilings of `USD 72.0B` (85% → 72.5%) and `USD 19.0B` CSA stop further bleeding.

DOWNSTREAM UNCAPPED FIRST-LOSS & CREDIT TAIL

- **Public Class A Shareholders:** Post-GS cash (`USD 244.55B`) absorbs 100% of operating burn, RSU tax drain, and `7.74x` lock-up supply prior to bankruptcy.
- **U.S. Life Insurers & BDCs:** Hold `~USD 26.25B` uncapped dual-SPV gap + Athene `USD 5.25B` WHCO guarantee at `USD 0` accrual.
- **Household Savers (NPORT-P):** `55` mutual fund series hold `USD 713.77M` in `Big Sky` alone (weighted mark down to `97.50%` by Sep).

SECTOR CONTAGION BENCHMARKS (EX-ANTHROPIC PERIMETER)

- **CoreWeave (`CRWV`) Parent-Recourse Debt:** `USD 47.51B` total principal (`88.73%` / `USD 42.15B` recourse; `14.9%–15.8%` Nov bond yields; `USD 4.66B` across 616 `NPORT-P` funds).
- **NVIDIA (`NVDA` Q3 FY27) Infra Guarantees:** `USD 118.0B` max gross wraps (incl. `USD 105.0B` `SB Energy PORTS-Pike` excluding GPU salvage) plus `USD 32.0B` contingent neocloud commitments.

Table 31 — Anthropic Direct Contractual Loss-Allocation Waterfall (USD 1,075.9bn Perimeter) & Sector Benchmarks

Risk Layer / Participant Class	Contractual Magnitude (USD bn)	Shield / Cap Mechanism	Ultimate Economic Loss-Bearer	Primary Documentation
1. Upstream Cancellable & Unfunded Buffer	**~365.7** (within 1,075.9 gross)	Variable TPU/AMD (175bn) unplaced; SpaceXAI (120.5bn) terminated on 90d notice past 19.6bn floor; Nscale (44.6bn) / Lambda (34.9bn) pre-delivery	**Zero direct Anthropic/insurer cash loss**; absorbed via supplier idle capacity & secondary GPU depreciation	424B4 pp. 178–179; Table 2
2. Bank Prop Shield & Amazon AP Set-Off	**Bank 78.0 / AMZN 5.59**	MS/Citi/BofA syndicate 15bn revolver + 63bn SPV #2 distributed off bank books (0% prop hold); Amazon sets off 5.59bn note principal vs AWS AP	Commercial banks take ~**USD 0** prop SPV loss; Amazon stays senior to equity via marketplace AP offset	424B4 pp. 172–173; 10 Insurer Q3s
3. First-Loss Cash & Public Class A Equity	**244.55** Post-GS Liquidity	Public Class A shares carry zero put protection while absorbing 88.19% NTBV dilution, 5%+2% PBF issuances & 7.74x Day-180 lock-ups	Pre-bankruptcy, **100% of operating burn and multiple compression hit Class A equity** before debt is impaired	424B4 pp. 19, 131, 243; Table 21
4. Capped Corporate Guarantor Wraps	**Cap 91.0** (AVGO 72.0 + GOOG 19.0)	Broadcom wraps **USD 72.0bn** max net shortfall across SPV #1 (85%/$29bn) & SPV #2 (72.5%/$43bn); Google wraps **USD 19.0bn** TeraWulf CSAs	Net shortfall above rack salvage up to strict contractual dollar caps absorbed by Broadcom & Alphabet balance sheets	Broadcom 8-K (27 Oct); TeraWulf 8-K (4 Nov)
5. Terminal Credit Bearers (Ex-Cap Perimeter)	**~26.25** dual-SPV gap + multi-yr leases	98bn dual-SPV principal minus 72bn cap leaves **~USD 26bn uncapped first-loss** (incl. Athene USD 5.25bn gross WHCO wrap at USD 0 accrual) + direct developer leases	**U.S. life-insurer general accounts** (AAIA 5.56x–55.15x NAIC cliffs), **BDC junior lenders**, and **401(k) / bond-fund savers** (USD 713.77m Big Sky)	Athene 10-Q; AAIA p. 2523; Full NPORT-P
Sector Memo (Ex-Anthropic Perimeter)	**CRWV 47.51 + NVDA 118.0**	CoreWeave 88.73% recourse (10-Q Note 10) & USD 4.66bn NPORT-P debt; NVIDIA USD 105.0bn SB Energy wrap + USD 13.0bn neocloud wraps (Q3 FY27 10-Q)	Industry contagion beyond Anthropic: NPORT-P bond funds (USD 4.66bn CRWV + USD 9.79bn Beignet), BDCs (NBIS/CRWV/Lambda), and NVIDIA shareholders	CRWV 10-Q; NVDA Q3 FY27 10-Q; Full NPORT-P

> PLAIN-LANGUAGE TAKEAWAY **Chapter 8 — Where Does the Money End Up If AI Demand Stumbles?**
>
> If enterprise AI growth misses expectations, the losses do not evaporate inside Wall Street trading desks. Commercial banks have largely sold the SPV bonds off their balance sheets, while Amazon (`12%` cap + AWS bill offsets), Google (`USD 19bn` capped CSAs + debt-flip triggers), and Broadcom (`USD 72bn` capped wraps) protected their contractual exit doors first. Public `Class A` stockholders take the first hit on operating cash burn, and any project-debt losses beyond the supplier caps land quietly inside insurance-company annuity reserves (Athene holds over `117%` of GAAP equity in frontier-AI paper), private-credit BDCs, and everyday `401(k)` bond funds.

8.2 Core Conclusions, Rebuttals to Market Counter-Arguments & Future Research

8.2.1 Core Empirical Conclusions of the Monograph

Synthesising Form 424B4, ten US life-insurer Q3 2026 statutory filings, and all `2,411` SEC `NPORT-P` XML portfolio schedules establishes three core conclusions:

1. **Divergence Between Headline Growth Narrative and Economic Solvency:** Restated to functional US GAAP (`Tables 8–10`), 9M26 gross margin drops from Note 8's implied `85.5%` to **`67.5%`** (**`46.5%–33.8%`** under compute reclassification), zero-overlap normalised operating loss reaches **`USD −7.954bn to −8.789bn`** (`−23.9% to −26.4%`), and recurring FCF excluding deposit interest falls to **`USD 1.082bn–1.330bn`** (`3.3%–4.0%`). Funding `USD 900.9bn` of fixed compute requires **`22.1%–37.2%`** multi-year CAGR (`Table 17`), colliding with `79%` usage-based revenue and a `65.3x` duration mismatch against `USD 13.8bn` RPO (`Table 2`).
2. **Asymmetric Seniority and Governance Control:** Suppliers, conflicted underwriters (`17/22`), and founders insulate themselves via Broadcom's `USD 72.0bn` dual-SPV caps, Google's **`USD 19.0bn`** Hawesville CSA structure (**`USD 91.0bn`** **combined** with Broadcom), Amazon's retained `USD 109.742bn` rollover notes, Google's `14.99%` senior-note flip (`USD 41.13 / 37.17`), and a `0.079%` founder wedge exercising `50.1%` votes above `7.74x` Day-180 float unlocks (`Tables 20–26`).
3. **Four-Layer Non-Bank Contagion Beyond Commercial Banks:** With banks holding ~`0%` long-dated project SPVs, supplier-wrapped paper clears NAIC rating gates into life-insurer general

accounts (lifting Athene to `117.3%–156.4%` of GAAP equity), 16 top BDCs, household `401(k)` bond funds (`Big Sky USD 713.77m`, `CoreWeave USD 4,664.98m`, `Beignet USD 9,793.35m`), and `88.73%`-recourse neoclouds facing `5.56x–55.15x` statutory capital cliffs (`Table 30`).

8.2.2 Empirical Assessment of Four Core Bullish Objections

1. *High-growth compounding objection:* Even starting from October's unverified 28-day `USD 81.0bn` run-rate, cleaning the `6%` policy-violating pool and enforcing dynamic opex plus recurring RSU taxes still requires **`21.9%–28.5%` CAGR** through 2041 (`39.2%–49.6%` on 10-year leases) and `+12.0%–+12.6%` permanent compounding on strictly non-cancellable contracts (`Table 17`). Usage-based revenue duration (`>80%` from `<6`-month models) remains structurally shorter than 5-to-20-year leases.

2. *Static liquidity cushion objection (`USD 244.55bn` post-greenshoe cash):* Cash is a static snapshot, whereas `Table 2` captures cumulative multi-year commitments peaking in 2029 – 2031. Had issuer liquidity satisfied project creditors, TeraWulf landlords would not have demanded `USD 19.0bn` in Google CSAs 15 days pre-IPO, nor would Broadcom SPVs have required `USD 72.0bn` vendor wraps and Athene's `USD 5.25bn` WHCO guarantee (`Tables 28B & 31`).

3. *Physical hardware collateral objection:* Residual salvage dictates post-default loss severity ($1 - \rho_k$), not payment seniority or default timing (`Eq. (11)` & `Eq. (19)`). Because accelerators span 2 – 3 generations across a 5-year lease (Kroll Bond Rating Agency, 2026), Broadcom itself stepped residual coverage down from `85%` (SPV #1) to `72.5%` (SPV #2) in under six months (`Table 4`).

4. *Efficient-disclosure objection:* Statutory availability in Form 424B4 does not yield functional comparability. Separating inference compute in Note 8, pro forma RSU taxes in footnotes, channel commissions in S&M, retained convertibles in capitalisation tables, and 23 lock-up cliffs beyond page 300 raises investor processing costs (McVay, 2006; Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010).

8.2.3 Observability Boundaries and Future Research Directions

Three data boundaries frame this study (`Appendix C`): Form 424B4 does not disaggregate customer inference from R&D pre-training compute, cash coupons from non-cash accretion inside `ASC 230` interest income, or `Customer E`'s identity; overlap between Note 7's `USD 260.6bn` non-Broadcom

leases and neocloud contracts awaits FY2027 commencements; and Rule 144A / 4(a)(2) private credit holdings lack `NPORT-P` reporting. Four follow-up programmes flow directly from our sealed `P1–P18` ledger:

1. **Secondary Accelerator Depreciation Curves:** Tracking 2027 – 2028 off-contract Hopper and early-Blackwell re-leasing rates against 6-year GAAP lives to pin down empirical ρ_k.
2. **Insurer `SSAP 26R/43R` and `AG 55` Migration Audits:** Monitoring `AAIA`, `AANY`, `MetLife`, and `Corebridge` Schedule D/BA shifts across 2026 – 2027 filings around 120-day `Z` expirations (`23 Jan 2027`).
3. **Enterprise Multi-Model Routing Telemetry:** Measuring token diversion elasticities between `Gemini 4` and `Claude` as routers optimise marginal cost against abstention reliability.
4. **Lock-Up Supply and Governance Discount Studies:** Testing abnormal volume, Form 4/144 sales, and dual-class discounts across all 23 `ANT` unlock dates (`Table 26`) and federal procurement appeals (`Table 27`).

8.3 Eighteen Scheduled Empirical Verification Items and Filing Checkpoints (`Table 32`, `2026-11-23` Live Audit Update; Seal `397622d1a932d9e1` / Initial `7b3c8b4a78ba73c6`)

Rather than offering directional commentary detached from statutory reporting calendars, Table 32 decomposes our core empirical risks into 18 Scheduled Verification Items (`P1–P18`), stating each Form 424B4 baseline, expected observation, disconfirmation bound, specific awaited filing or regulatory event, and verified status as of `2026-11-23`.

Table 32 — Eighteen Scheduled Verification Items and Public Filing Checkpoints (`P1–P18`)

ID	Finding & Target Variable	Primary Filing Baseline (30 Sep / 19 Nov 2026)	Expected Observation (Schec
P1	Finding 2 · Gross margin & below-line compute share	Note 8 implied GM 85.5%; 74.4% of compute booked in R&D/S&M (p. F-41)	Restated functional GM (incl. c 80% short-life compute) rema compute/rev >55% in FY26/FY
P2	Finding 4 · Cancellation sequence vs equity dilution	USD 900.9bn fixed commitments (20.7% terminable/contingent, p. 178)	If YoY revenue growth slows be exercises SpaceXAI 90d notice neoclouds, OR raises dilutive c
P3	Finding 1 · Uncommenced lease migration & VIEs	USD 451.2bn uncommenced leases (USD 156.2bn VIEs, p. F-36); USD 4.48bn on-BS	On-BS lease liabilities + VIE dis >USD 50bn PV across FY2026 2028 cohorts commence
P4	Finding 4/5 · Pro-cyclical supplier NPA draw terms	USD 67bn undrawn NPAs (Broadcom USD 42bn 9%/13% PIK, 90%/85% conv, p. 174)	Any Broadcom/Google NPA dra deceleration (<40% YoY) trigg discount or covenant waiver/de
P5	Finding 3 · Core FCF vs RSU cash tax drain	9M26 Core FCF USD 1.08–1.33bn (3.3%–4.0%) vs Day-1 RSU tax USD 4.281bn	In FY2026 10-K and FY2027, interest income minus capex & negative or <RSU cash tax witl
P6	Finding 3 · CSP payables DPO stretch reversal	CSP payables USD 4.231bn (DPO stretched 29.6d → 39.5d = +USD 1.059bn, p. F-39)	CSP payables DPO plateaus or toward 30–33 days in Q4'26–F >USD 1.0bn working-capital ta
P7	Finding 1/4 · Class C neocloud financing bottlenecks	Nscale USD 44.6bn (financing uncommitted) & Lambda USD 41.3bn (USD 34.9bn terminable, p. 179)	At least one Class C neocloud downsized, delayed >6 months requires Anthropic/hyperscaler

ID	Finding & Target Variable	Primary Filing Baseline (30 Sep / 19 Nov 2026)	Expected Observation (Sched
P8	Finding 1/4 · SpaceXAI USD 120.5bn 90-day clause	USD 3.1bn/mo Dec 2026–Dec 2029; 90-day bilateral termination right (p. 179)	Contract is renegotiated, parti under-utilised relative to USD before December 2029
P9	Finding 1 · TeraWulf / Google CSA IG rating gate	3 Google CSAs on USD 19bn Hawesville lease until 3-mo IG rating (WULF 8-K 11-04)	Anthropic remains unrated or s grade through FY2027, keepin TPU site lock-in active
P10	Finding 5 · Amazon USD 109.74bn rollover notes & Q4 MTM	84.1% retained (1,547.68m sh); Day-1 close USD 97.17 implies USD –44.19bn Q4 loss	FY2026 10-K books >USD 30 note FV loss (at P ≥ USD 90) a >USD 50bn liability into 2027
P11	Finding 5/6 · 313.25m supplier PP Rule 144(d) & Google RRA	USD 26bn PP (0d underwriter lock; Rule 144(d) 6m; Google RRA Restricted Period p. 310)	Upon Day-180 / Q1'27+2d exp resale registration or ≥1 suppli Class N stake
P12	Finding 6 · PBF 5% + 2% progressive dilution & 1% evergreen	846.84m sh issued; +2% per +50% after 90/120d >USD 124.50 gate (p. 243) + 1%/yr match	If 90/120d >USD 124.50 gate up to +2% (~363m sh) to PBF evergreen Donation Match res
P13	Finding 6 · Class F 0.079% wedge & LTBT/Controlled Company	Class F 50.1% vote (464–636x wedge); LTBT 4/7 directors; Nasdaq 5615(c) status	Co-founders reduce economic sales while retaining >50% Cla LTBT/Controlled Company exe
P14	Finding 5 · Google Purchase Agreement s. 1.4 cap check	S-1/A-2 hypothesis: USD 83 pricing might breach Google ownership cap into rollover notes	**CONFIRMED / RESOLVED (42** Expanded FD share count prev all 120.48m shares issued as (
P15	Finding 6 · 23-date / 8.91x lock-up cliff & Day-195 hedging	Day-1 closed –12.85% vs open; 8,727m sh (8.91x) unlock by Day 180; +719m Day-195 hedge	Windows around FY26+2d (1. (3.00bn sh + co-founder 29%) exhibit excess volume & negat

ID	Finding & Target Variable	Primary Filing Baseline (30 Sep / 19 Nov 2026)	Expected Observation (Schec
P16	Finding 6 · DoW §4713 supply-chain risk & FTC CID	D.C. Cir. 2–1 loss on §4713 (p. 55); active FTC CID under 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (p. 97)	Federal defence/agency procu persists or requires structural CID leads to consent decree o
P17	Finding 6 · Copyright, Sherman Act treble-damages & export bans	Music/Reddit suits; Sep 2026 Sherman Act suit; Jun 2026 Fable 5/Mythos 5 export ban (p. 76)	Legal settlements, licensing fe payouts, or export-control con exceed USD 1.0bn cumulative
P18	Finding 1 / Sec. 8.1 · Neocloud credit spread & GPU renewal repricing	CoreWeave 6y GPU life, 88.2% OCF from prepayments, 130k/170k GPUs off-contract 2027/28	AI neocloud credit spreads or GPU renewal rates compress > 2028, validating residual-value

Note: All 18 verification rows preserve the pre-registered Form 424B4 baselines, expected observations, and disconfirmation thresholds verbatim whilst tracking live `2026-11-23` resolution statuses and awaited statutory filings in the right-hand columns (updated `2026-11-23` EN Table 32 seal `397622d1a932d9e1`, listing-week baseline `7b3c8b4a78ba73c6`, pre-revision 20 Nov `fd0d18a37c9485c0`; full 64-character SHA-256 digests stored in `paper/analysis/antlevee_exact_audit.json` and `paper/dossiers/catalog.json`). **Post-Seal Continuous Tracking (20–23 November 2026):** Official closing with full `147m`-share greenshoe (`1,127m` public shares; `USD 244.55bn` pro forma cash) and Day-2 Nasdaq close at `USD 88.91` (`USD 83.05` low; `-20.26%` vs open) correspond to `USD -31.402bn` Q4 Amazon convertible MTM loss under `P10`, `7.74x` expanded Day-180 float coverage under `P15`, and live EDGAR checks showing 18 Nov `Form 3` initial ownership statements alongside 20 Nov CoreWeave insider `Form 144` notices.

8.4 Editorial Independence, Zero-Position Declaration, and Scope Notice

This monograph is an independent empirical accounting, contractual, and statutory credit-channel examination conducted by AntLevee Research strictly from public SEC EDGAR filings, U.S. insurer statutory statements, CrossRef-verified academic records, and official Nasdaq exchange tapes current through 23 November 2026. All empirical claims distinguish primary facts, zero-parameter arithmetic

restatements, cross-document inferences, and explicit parametric scenarios without alleging accounting fraud or statutory illegality (`Table 0` and `Table A–4`). Neither AntLevee Research nor any author or contributor holds any long, short, option, swap, convertible, or derivative position in `Anthropic, PBC (NASDAQ: ANT)` or any supplier, neocloud, BDC, or insurer discussed herein, nor has any party compensated AntLevee Research for producing or distributing this study. The monograph is published solely for academic and institutional research transparency and does not constitute investment advice or a solicitation to buy or sell any security.

References

(Formatted in strict accordance with British Harvard (Cite Them Right) academic conventions, ordered alphabetically by author surname or institutional body; sequential filings by the same issuer in the same year carry chronological letter suffixes. All academic works carry CrossRef-verified DOI links, and all central-bank, regulatory, and primary filings carry direct official URLs.)

Academic, Regulatory and Policy References

Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P. and Suarez, G. (2013) 'Securitization without risk transfer', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 107(3), pp. 515 – 536. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.004 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Adrian, T., Crump, R.K. and Moench, E. (2014) *Treasury term premia: 1961 – present*. Liberty Street Economics, 12 May. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Available at: https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/05/treasury-term-premia-1961-present/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Aggarwal, P., Madaan, A., Anand, A., Potharaju, S.P., Mishra, S., Zhou, P., Gupta, A., Rajagopal, D., Kappaganthu, K., Yang, Y., Upadhyay, S., Faruqui, M. and Mausam (2024) 'AutoMix: automatically mixing language models', *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2024)*, 37. arXiv:2310.12963. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.12963 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Aggarwal, R. (2000) 'Stabilization activities by underwriters after initial public offerings', *Journal of Finance*, 55(3), pp. 1075 – 1103. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00241 (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Aldasoro, I., Doerr, S. and Rees, D. (2026) *Financing the AI boom: from cash flows to debt*. BIS Bulletin No 120, 7 January. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/bulletin-120-financing-ai-

boom-cash-flows-debt.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Andreessen Horowitz (2026) *Enterprise AI application and multi-model routing survey 2026*. Menlo Park, CA: a16z. Available at: https://a16z.com/ai/ (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Artificial Analysis (2025) *AA-Omniscience: evaluating cross-domain knowledge reliability in large language models*. arXiv preprint arXiv:2511.13029. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13029 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Artificial Analysis (2026) *AA-Omniscience v1.1 leaderboard and frontier model comparisons (Claude Fable 5.2, Opus 5.5, GPT-6.2 and Gemini 4 family)*, November 2026. Available at: https://artificialanalysis.ai/models/comparisons/gemini-4-neon-vs-gemini-4-hydrogen (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Atrani Capital (2026) *Voters hit the brakes on the AI buildout*, 6 November. Available at: https://atranicapital.substack.com/p/voters-hit-the-brakes-on-the-ai-buildout (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bank for International Settlements (2026a) 'Financing the AI infrastructure boom: on- and off-balance sheet borrowing', *BIS Quarterly Review*, March, pp. 1 – 16. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/qr-202603/financing-ai-infrastructure-boom-on-and-off-balance-sheet-borrowing (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bank for International Settlements (2026b) 'Progress and peril', in *BIS Annual Economic Report 2026*, Chapter I, 28 June. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/aer-2026/progress-peril (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bank of England (2026) *Financial Stability Report*, July 2026. London: Bank of England. Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-report/2026/july-2026 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Barth, M.E., Gow, I.D. and Taylor, D.J. (2012) 'Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R', *Review of Accounting Studies*, 17(3), pp. 526 – 562. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-012-9192-9 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bebchuk, L.A. and Kastiel, K. (2017) 'The untenable case for perpetual dual-class stock', *Virginia Law Review*, 103(4), pp. 585 – 688. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2954630 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bebchuk, L.A. and Kastiel, K. (2019) 'The perils of small-minority controllers', *Georgetown Law Journal*, 107(6), pp. 1453 – 1514. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128375 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Beneish, M.D. (1999) 'The detection of earnings manipulation', *Financial Analysts Journal*, 55(5), pp. 24 – 36. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v55.n5.2296 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Benmelech, E. and Bergman, N.K. (2009) 'Collateral pricing', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 91(3), pp. 339 – 360. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.03.003 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

BigGo Finance (2026) *Upstream AI GPU rental pricing and NVIDIA B200 hourly rate surge*, November 2026. Available at: https://finance.biggo.com/news/e930df83b00077bf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bloomfield, R.J. (2002) 'The "Incomplete Revelation Hypothesis" and financial reporting', *Accounting Horizons*, 16(3), pp. 233 – 243. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2002.16.3.233 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bosio, F., Coulier, L., Dieckelmann, D., Emambakhsh, T., Grodzicki, M. and Puga, M.L. (2026) 'The debt financing of AI and its implications for financial stability', *ECB Financial Stability Review*, November 2026, Box 3. Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank. Available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/financial-stability-publications/fsr/focus/2026/html/ecb.fsrbox202611_03~4fd1449eaa.en.html (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bowen, R.M., Davis, A.K. and Rajgopal, S. (2002) 'Determinants of revenue-reporting practices for internet firms', *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 19(4), pp. 523 – 562. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1506/9728-4yg8-gc3l-fpfa (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Bradshaw, M.T. and Sloan, R.G. (2002) 'GAAP versus the Street: an empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings', *Journal of Accounting Research*, 40(1), pp. 41 – 66. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00038 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Brav, A. and Gompers, P.A. (2003) 'The role of lockups in initial public offerings', *Review of Financial Studies*, 16(1), pp. 1 – 29. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0001 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Brunnermeier, M.K. (2009) 'Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007 – 2008', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 23(1), pp. 77 – 100. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.23.1.77 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Burkart, M. and Ellingsen, T. (2004) 'In-kind finance: a theory of trade credit', *American Economic Review*, 94(3), pp. 569 – 590. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464579 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Chen, L., Zaharia, M. and Zou, J. (2024) 'FrugalGPT: how to use large language models while reducing cost and improving performance', *Transactions on Machine Learning Research (TMLR)*. arXiv:2305.05176. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2305.05176 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Davis, A.K. (2002) 'The value relevance of revenue for internet firms: does reporting grossed-up or barter revenue make a difference?', *Journal of Accounting Research*, 40(2), pp. 445 – 477. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.00056 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Dechow, P., Ge, W. and Schrand, C. (2010) 'Understanding earnings quality: a review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 50(2 – 3), pp. 344 – 401. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Dechow, P.M., Ge, W., Larson, C.R. and Sloan, R.G. (2011) 'Predicting material accounting misstatements', *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 28(1), pp. 17 – 82. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01041.x (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Dixit, A.K. and Pindyck, R.S. (1994) *Investment under uncertainty*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830176 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Drehmann, M. and Eren, E. (2026) *Building AI on credit: structures and spillovers*. BIS Bulletin No 140, 27 October. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/bulletin-140-building-ai-credit-structures-and-spillovers.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Drucker, S. and Puri, M. (2005) 'On the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting', *Journal of Finance*, 60(6), pp. 2763 – 2799. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00816.x (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) 'Building theories from case study research', *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), pp. 532 – 550. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1989.4308385 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Eisfeldt, A.L. and Rampini, A.A. (2009) 'Leasing, ability to repossess, and debt capacity', *Review of Financial Studies*, 22(4), pp. 1621 – 1657. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn026 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

El-Erian, M. (2026) *Anthropic's mega-IPO flow-of-funds drain and market-wide cost-of-capital impact*, quoted in Business Insider, 19 November. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/anthropic-ipo-ant-stock-market-nasdaq-2026-11 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Field, L.C. and Hanka, G. (2001) 'The expiration of IPO share lockups', *Journal of Finance*, 56(2), pp. 471 – 500. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00334 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Financial Accounting Standards Board (2014) *Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-09, Revenue from Contracts with Customers (Topic 606)*, May. Norwalk, CT: FASB. Available at: https://www.fasb.org/page/PageContent?pageId=/standards/accounting-standards-updates-issued.html (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Financial Accounting Standards Board (2016) *Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-02, Leases (Topic 842)*, February, Sections A, B and C. Norwalk, CT: FASB. Available at: https://storage.fasb.org/ASU 2016-02_Section A.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Financial Accounting Standards Board (2024) *Accounting Standards Update No. 2024-03, Income Statement—Reporting Comprehensive Income—Expense Disaggregation Disclosures (Subtopic 220-40): Disaggregation of Income Statement Expenses*, November. Norwalk, CT: FASB. Available at: https://www.fasb.org/page/PageContent?pageId=/standards/accounting-standards-updates-issued.html (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) (2025) *2025 Annual Report*, 11 December. Washington, DC: US Department of the Treasury. Available at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2025AnnualReport.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Fitch Ratings (2026) *Surging AI borrowing to raise corporate bond market volatility in 2027*, 18 November. New York: Fitch Ratings. Available at: https://technode.global/2026/11/18/surging-ai-borrowing-to-raise-corporate-bond-market-volatility-in-2027-says-fitch/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Frost, J., Kansal, R., Rishabh, K., Shreeti, V. and Zhang, L.S.Y. (2026) *Circular relationships among AI firms*. BIS Bulletin No 137, 1 October. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publications/bulletin-137-circular-relationships-among-ai-firms.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2010) 'Extreme governance: an analysis of dual-class firms in the United States', *Review of Financial Studies*, 23(3), pp. 1051 – 1088. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp024 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1990) 'Property rights and the nature of the firm', *Journal of Political Economy*, 98(6), pp. 1119 – 1158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/261729 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Healy, P.M. and Wahlen, J.M. (1999) 'A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting', *Accounting Horizons*, 13(4), pp. 365 – 383. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365

(Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Hepp, S. (2026) *The AI infrastructure debt complex: where the leverage behind artificial intelligence sits, how it connects, and who would bear the loss*. SSRN Working Paper No 7161938, July. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7161938 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Hillion, P. and Vermaelen, T. (2004) 'Death spiral convertibles', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 71(2), pp. 381 – 415. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00209-5 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Imhoff, E.A., Lipe, R.C. and Wright, D.W. (1991) 'Operating leases: impact of constructive capitalization', *Accounting Horizons*, 5(1), pp. 51 – 63. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2308/ah-9604010111 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

International Monetary Fund (2026) *Global Financial Stability Report: October 2026*, 13 October. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/gfsr/issues/2026/10/13/global-financial-stability-report-october-2026 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Invesco (2026) *Bonds, AI, and a bull market that has kept going (CoreWeave 5Y CDS and neocloud credit repricing)*, October – November 2026. Atlanta, GA: Invesco. Available at: https://www.invesco.com/us/en/insights/bonds-ai-bull-market-that-has-kept-going.html (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976) 'Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 3(4), pp. 305 – 360. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Johnson, M. (2026) *Train on the engineering work that still fails* [Keynote address, 12 November 2026]. New York: AI Engineer CODE Summit 2026. Available at: https://ai.engineer/code/2026/talks/melvin-johnson (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Kadavath, S., Conerly, T., Askell, A., Henighan, T., Drain, D., Perez, E., Schiefer, N., Hatfield-Dodds, Z., DasSarma, N., Tran-Johnson, E., Johnston, S., El-Showk, S., Jones, A., Elhage, N., Hume, T., Chen, A., Bai, Y., Bowman, S., Fort, S., Ganguli, D., Hernandez, D., Jacobson, J., Kernion, J., Kravec, S., Lovitt, L., Ndousse, K., Olsson, C., Ringer, S., Amodei, D., Brown, T., Clark, J., Joseph, N., Mann, B., McCandlish, S., Olah, C. and Kaplan, J. (2022) *Language models (mostly) know what they know*. arXiv:2207.05221. San Francisco, CA: Anthropic. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.05221 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Kalai, A.T., Nachum, O., Vempala, S. and Zhang, E. (2025) *Why language models hallucinate*. arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.04664. San Francisco, CA: OpenAI. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.04664 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Kim, D.H. and Wright, J.H. (2005) *An arbitrage-free three-factor term structure model and the recent behavior of long-term yields and distant-horizon forward rates*. Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) No 2005-33. Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/200533/200533pap.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Kim, E.M., Garg, A., Peng, K. and Garg, N. (2025) 'Correlated errors in large language models', *Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2025)*. arXiv:2506.07962. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.07962 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Klein, B., Crawford, R.G. and Alchian, A.A. (1978) 'Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process', *Journal of Law and Economics*, 21(2), pp. 297 – 326. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1086/466922 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Kohlbeck, M. and Mayhew, B.W. (2010) 'Valuation of firms that disclose related party transactions', *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy*, 29(2), pp. 115 – 137. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.10.006 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Kroll Bond Rating Agency (2026) *AI compute financings: evaluating re-leasing risk for GPUs and TPUs*. New York: KBRA, 22 June. Available at: https://www.kbra.com/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Li, F. (2008) 'Annual report readability, current earnings, and earnings persistence', *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 45(2 – 3), pp. 221 – 247. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.02.003 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Lim, S.C., Mann, S.C. and Mihov, V.T. (2017) 'Do operating leases expand credit capacity? Evidence from borrowing costs and credit ratings', *Journal of Corporate Finance*, 42, pp. 100 – 114. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.10.015 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Loughran, T. and Ritter, J.R. (2002) 'Why don't issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in IPOs?', *Review of Financial Studies*, 15(2), pp. 413 – 444. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/15.2.413 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Masulis, R.W., Wang, C. and Xie, F. (2009) 'Agency problems at dual-class companies', *Journal of Finance*, 64(4), pp. 1697 – 1727. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01477.x (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

McVay, S.E. (2006) 'Earnings management using classification shifting: an examination of core earnings and special items', *The Accounting Review*, 81(3), pp. 501 – 531. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2006.81.3.501 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Menlo Ventures (2025) *2025: The state of generative AI in the enterprise*. Menlo Park, CA: Menlo Ventures. Available at: https://menlovc.com/perspective/2025-the-state-of-generative-ai-in-the-enterprise/ (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Minoiu, C., Schneider, A. and Wei, M. (2026) *Term premium and bank lending*. Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) No 2023-049 (revised 2026). Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2023049r1pap.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Moody's Ratings (2026) *Hyperscaler off-balance-sheet data centre lease commitments (USD 662bn uncommenced leases)*, February. New York: Moody's Ratings (reported in Fortune, 25 February 2026). Available at: https://fortune.com/2026/02/25/hyperscaler-risk-off-balance-sheet-662-billion-data-center-commitments-meta-amazon-microsoft-oracle-alphabet/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Myers, S.C. (1977) 'Determinants of corporate borrowing', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 5(2), pp. 147 – 175. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2021) *Revisions to the RBC C1 bond factors*. Report prepared by Moody's Analytics for the NAIC and the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), April (Table 1, p. 7; section 4.6, p.

33). Kansas City, MO: NAIC. Available at: https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/2021 Revisions to the RBC C1 Bond Factors.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2026) *Official response letter to U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren regarding private credit, Principles-Based Bond Definition (SSAP 26R/43R), SVO discretion, Private Letter Ratings and Actuarial Guidelines AG 53 & AG 55*, 24 September 2026. Washington, DC: NAIC Government Relations. Available at: https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/govaffairs-letter-sen-warren-private-credit-20260924.pdf (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Ofek, E. and Richardson, M. (2003) 'DotCom mania: the rise and fall of internet stock prices', *Journal of Finance*, 58(3), pp. 1113 – 1137. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00560 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Ong, I., Almahairi, A., Wu, V., Chiang, W.-L., Wu, T., Gonzalez, J.E., Kadous, M.W. and Stoica, I. (2025) 'RouteLLM: learning to route LLMs with preference data', *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2025)*. arXiv:2406.18665. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.18665 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Ovadia, Y., Fertig, E., Ren, J., Nado, Z., Sculley, D., Nowozin, S., Dillon, J.V., Lakshminarayanan, B. and Snoek, J. (2019) 'Can you trust your model's uncertainty? Evaluating predictive uncertainty under dataset shift', *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019)*, 32. arXiv:1906.02530. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.02530 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Pari Passu (2026) *Data center financing primer*, 17 November. Available at: https://restructuringnewsletter.com/p/data-center-financing-primer (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G. (1997) 'Trade credit: theories and evidence', *Review of Financial Studies*, 10(3), pp. 661 – 691. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/10.3.661 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Puri, M. (1996) 'Commercial banks in investment banking: conflict of interest or certification role?', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 40(3), pp. 373 – 401. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(95)00855-9 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan (2026) *Emerging litigation risks in financing AI data centers boom*, Client Alert, 13 March. Los Angeles: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP. Available at: https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/client-alert-emerging-litigation-risks-in-financing-ai-data-centers-boom/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Ramaswamy, S., Searls, S., De Vere, H. and Ozil, I. (2026) *Term funding premium: time is money even absent interest rate risk*, 25 June. Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Available at: https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2026/0625 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Ramp (2026) *Ramp AI Index: Enterprise AI spend and effective token pricing (November 2026 Report)*. New York: Ramp Business Corporation. Available at: https://ramp.com/data/ai-index-nov-2026 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Schenone, C. (2004) 'The effect of banking relationships on the firm's IPO underpricing', *Journal of Finance*, 59(6), pp. 2903 – 2958. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00720.x (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Seeking Alpha (2026) *AI memory supply-chain crunch: DRAM, HBM and enterprise SSD input-cost inflation*, November 2026. Available at: https://seekingalpha.com/article/4919168-micron-is-up-900-percent-heres-why-the-ai-memory-trade-may-still-have-room-to-run (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

SemiAnalysis (2026) *InferenceX benchmark: Google TPU v7 Ironwood versus NVIDIA Blackwell B200/B300 FP8 inference performance-per-dollar*. Available at: https://www.semianalysis.com/ (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Shapley, L.S. (1953) 'A value for n-person games', in Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W. (eds) *Contributions to the theory of games, Volume II*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 307 – 317. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Shorrocks, A.F. (2013) 'Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: a unified framework based on the Shapley value', *Journal of Economic Inequality*, 11(1), pp. 99 – 126. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10888-011-9214-z (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Silicon Data (2026) *LLM Token Expenditure Index (SDLLMTK) and NVIDIA B200 GPU Rental Index*, October – November 2026. Available at: https://www.silicondata.com/products/silicon-index/llm-token-expenditure-index (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Sloan, R.G. (1996) 'Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?', *The Accounting Review*, 71(3), pp. 289 – 315. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9608042309 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Su, Z. and Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2026) *Clouds of credit: mapping the financial web behind AI compute*. NBER Working Paper No 36032, November. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w36032 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2022) *Non-GAAP financial measures: compliance and disclosure interpretations*, last updated 13 December 2022. Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/non-gaap-financial-measures.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2026) *Financing the AI buildout*. NBER Working Paper No 35865, October. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w35865 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Williamson, O.E. (1985) *The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting*. New York: Free Press. Available at: https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-Economic-Institutions-of-Capitalism/Oliver-E-Williamson/9780684863740 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Wong, A. (2026a) *Why Anthropic's IPO may mark the end of the AI trade*, Bloomberg Economics (@TheTerminal / @AnnaEconomist), 19 – 20 November. New York: Bloomberg LP. Available at: https://x.com/AnnaEconomist/status/2123473348508193239 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Wong, A. (2026b) *Bloomberg's version of the Consumer Price Index (Bloomberg Price Project: October ~4.6% inflation reading)*, NPR Marketplace, 12 November. Available at: https://www.marketplace.org/story/2026/11/12/bloombergs-version-of-the-consumer-price-index (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Yin, R.K. (2018) *Case study research and applications: design and methods*. 6th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Available at: https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/case-study-research-and-applications/book250150 (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Primary SEC Filings, Legal and Regulatory Documents

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (2026) *Form 10-K for fiscal 2025* and *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 September 2026* (filed 4 November 2026, accession no. 0000002488-26-000191: USD 1.2bn customer warrant liability). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2488/000000248826000191/amd-20260926.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026a) *Form S-1 registration statement*, filed 26 October 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-067168, CIK 2130357, including Exhibit 10.10 Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated 4 September 2026). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026067168/anthropicpbc-sx1.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026b) *Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 1)*, filed 2 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-068676). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026068676/anthropicpbc-sx1ax1.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026c) *Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 2)*, filed 10 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-072484, including Exhibit 10.15 Google Subscription Agreement). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026072484/anthropicpbc-sx1ax2.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026d) *Issuer free writing prospectus (EEA prospectus dated 11 November 2026)*, filed 12 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-073040). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026073040/anthropicpbc-fwpxeeaprospea.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026e) *Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 3)*, filed 17 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074338) and *Form 8-A12B* (Nasdaq Global Select Market ticker `ANT`). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074338/anthropicpbc-sx1ax3.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026f) *Form S-1MEF (Registration Statement pursuant to Rule 462(b), USD 83.00 final offering price and +178,250,000 Class A shares)*, filed 18 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074904). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074904/anthropic-sx1mef.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026g) *Issuer free writing prospectus (pricing term sheet: 980,000,000 shares of Class A common stock at USD 83.00)*, dated 18 November 2026, filed 19 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074937). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074937/anthropicpbc-fwppricing.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026h) *Prospectus (Form 424B4)*, filed 19 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074944; Registration Nos. 333-299633 and 333-300148). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074944/anthropicpbc-424b4.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026i) *Form S-8 registration statement (Amended and Restated 2021 Stock Plan), including a reoffer prospectus for 121,886,381 shares of Class A common stock*, filed 19 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074934). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074934/anthropicpbc-sx8resale.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Anthropic, PBC (2026j) *Form S-8 registration statement (2026 Equity Incentive Plan, 2026 Employee Stock Purchase Plan and Amended and Restated 2021 Stock Plan)*, filed 19 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-074931). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2130357/000162828026074931/anthropicpbc-formsx8.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Apollo Global Management, Inc. (2026) *Form 10-K for fiscal 2025* (filed 25 February 2026), *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June 2026* (filed 10 August 2026) and *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026* (filed 5 November 2026, Notes 16 & 17 'Commitments and Contingencies'). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1858681/000185868126000059/apo-20260930.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Athene Holding Ltd. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026* (filed 5 November 2026, Notes 4, 11 & 12: Big Sky Funding / WHCO USD 7.045bn & 15% Purchase Obligation Guarantee, Valor Compute, SVF II Finco; accession no. 0001527469-26-000041) and *Quarterly Statutory Statements for Athene Annuity and Life Company (AAIA, pp. 2516, 2521, 2523) and Athene Annuity & Life Assurance Company of New York (AANY, p. 337)*, November 2026. Washington, DC: SEC & Iowa/New York Insurance Divisions. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527469/000152746926000041/ahl-20260930.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Broadcom Inc. (2026a) *Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended 2 August 2026*, filed 10 September 2026 (accession no. 0001730168-26-000080). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1730168/000173016826000080/avgo-20260802.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Broadcom Inc. (2026b) *Form 8-K* (Item 2.03), dated 26 October 2026, filed 27 October 2026 (accession no. 0001193125-26-434271). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1730168/000119312526434271/d148323d8k.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Cerebras Systems Inc. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026* (accession no. 0001628280-26-073494: USD 1,004.6m OpenAI working-capital loan reduced via USD 175.5m service offsets to USD 829.1m at 6.0% fixed rate). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2021728/000162828026073494/cbrs-20260930.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Corebridge Financial, Inc. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026*, filed 3 November 2026 (confirming April 2026 initial NAIC Actuarial Guideline 55 asset adequacy testing filings). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001889539 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

CoreWeave, Inc. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026* (filed November 2026, Note 10 Debt: USD 47.505bn total principal, 88.73% recourse vs 11.27% non-recourse, DDTL 5.0 & 5.5, USD 13.407bn 15-month maturity wall, USD 25.9bn encumbered SPV assets) and *Forms 8-K* (18 May, 10 August, 22 September & 10 November 2026). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001769628 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Genworth Financial (2026) *Quarterly Statutory Statements for the Period Ended 30 September 2026 (Genworth Life Insurance Company [GLIC], Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company [GLAIC] and Genworth Life Insurance Company of New York [GLICNY] — Schedule D Parts 3 & 4)*, November 2026. Richmond, VA: Genworth Financial. Available at: https://investor.genworth.com/financial-information/statutory-statements (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

IREN Limited (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026 and Form 8-K convertible senior notes disclosures* (CIK 0001878848: IE US Hardware 3, LLC facility tranches and USD 2.60bn 2033 convertible notes). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001878848 (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

MetLife, Inc. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026*, filed 6 November 2026 (Digital Infrastructure ABS USD 2.561bn fair value, USD −91m gross unrealised losses). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001099219 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Morningstar DBRS (2026a) *Morningstar DBRS assigns credit rating of A (low) with a stable trend to CoreWeave Compute Acquisition Co. VIII, LLC*, 3 April 2026 (with Intrinsic Assessment scorecard and Rule 17g-7 disclosure). Available at: https://dbrs.morningstar.com/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Morningstar DBRS (2026b) *Morningstar DBRS assigns credit ratings of A (low) to Lambda Compute I LLC*, 1 October 2026 (with Intrinsic Assessment scorecard and Rule 17g-7 disclosure). Available at: https://dbrs.morningstar.com/ (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Nasdaq (2026) *ANT: Anthropic, PBC Class A common stock – quote, summary and intraday chart data for 19 – 20 November 2026* (Day-1 open ~USD 111.50, close USD 97.17; Day-2 intraday low USD 83.05, high USD 92.56, close USD 88.91). New York: Nasdaq, Inc. Available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/ant (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Nebius Group N.V. (2026) *Form 6-K* (Q3 2026 condensed financial statements and shareholder letter, accession nos. 0001104659-26-126238 / 0001104659-26-126008; USD 5.75bn 2030 – 2034 convertible notes), *Form 6-K* (17 July & 22 October 2026, Compute II & bridge facilities), and *Form 20-F for fiscal 2025* (filed 30 April 2026, Exhibit 4.4 Microsoft statement of work). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1513845/000110465926126238/nbis-20261112x6k.htm (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Nscale Limited (2026) *Form S-1 registration statement* (filed 18 September 2026, Exhibit 10.25) and *Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 1)*, filed 12 November 2026 under Nscale plc (accession no. 0001193125-26-458722). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2110365/000119312526458722/ck0002110365-20261112.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

NVIDIA Corporation (2026b) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 26 July 2026* (filed 26 August 2026: Note 10 USD 56bn additional commitments [USD 36bn AI cloud capacity backstop, USD 20bn third-party data-centre leases], USD 29bn cloud R&D, USD 25bn equity commitments, USD 98.9bn equity holdings, USD 3.529bn AI cloud guarantees with USD 712m escrow). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001045810 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

NVIDIA Corporation (2026c) *Form 10-Q for the third quarter of fiscal 2027 ended 25 October 2026*, filed 17 November 2026 (CIK 0001045810: Q3 revenue USD 115.8bn, data-centre USD 107.6bn, Q4 guidance USD 130.0bn; USD 118.0bn maximum gross infrastructure guarantees [USD 105.0bn SB Energy PORTS-Pike 4.25 GW 20-year OpenAI campus, USD 9.5bn power/systems, USD 3.5bn neocloud land/shell] plus USD 32.0bn contingent neocloud commitments). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001045810 (Accessed: 22 November 2026).

Oracle Corporation (2026) *Final prospectus supplements (Forms 424B2 & 424B5: USD 10bn notes and USD 10bn common stock)* and *Form 8-K* (4 November 2026). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0001341439 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

SB Energy Inc. (2026) *Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1 registration statement* (CIK 0002133037, filed 4 September 2026, Exhibits 10.30 & 10.31: PORTS-Pike 4.25 GW 20-year OpenAI lease and USD 105bn minimum-value guaranty covering land, power, transmission and shell infrastructure, terminating upon OpenAI investment-grade rating). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=0002133037 (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Securian Financial (2026) *Quarterly Statutory Statements for the Period Ended 30 September 2026 (Minnesota Life Insurance Company and Securian Life Insurance Company — Schedule D Parts 3 & 4)*, November 2026. St. Paul, MN: Securian Financial Group. Available at: https://www.securian.com/about-us/financials-and-reports/minnesota-life-statutory-state-filings.html (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

SoftBank Group Corp. (2026b) *Consolidated financial report for the six-month period ended September 30, 2026*, 10 November 2026 (USD 64.6bn cumulative OpenAI investment; Note 16 August 2026 SVF2 USD 10.0bn loan secured by cash collateral account with OpenAI preferred fair-value mandatory prepayment trigger). Tokyo: SoftBank Group Corp. Available at: https://group.softbank/media/Project/sbg/sbg/pdf/ir/financials/financial_reports/financial-report_q2fy2026_01_en.pdf (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2026) *Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 September 2026*, filed 22 October 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-066880). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026066880/spcx-20260930.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (2026) *Form 6-K* (resolutions of the board of directors: approving up to USD 500m each in Anthropic common and OpenAI Group PBC preferred stock), 10 November 2026 (accession no. 0001046179-26-000797). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1046179/000104617926000797/tsm-boardx202611xx.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

TeraWulf Inc. (2026a) *Form 8-K* filed 6 July 2026 (accession no. 0001104659-26-080583, Exhibit 99.1 announcing 20-year Hawesville data-centre leases with Anthropic). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1083301/000110465926080583/tm2619468d1_8k.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

TeraWulf Inc. (2026b) *Form 8-K* (Items 1.01, 7.01, 8.01 and 9.01; three Google LLC Credit Support Agreements for the 401 MW Hawesville leases; Exhibits 10.1 and 99.1), filed 4 November 2026 (accession no. 0001628280-26-069810). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1083301/000162828026069810/wulf-20261104.htm (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2026) *EDGAR filing index: Anthropic, PBC (CIK 0002130357)*. Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://data.sec.gov/submissions/CIK0002130357.json (Accessed: 20 November 2026).

WEC Energy Group Inc. (2026) *Form 8-K* (filed 6 November 2026, accession no. 0000783325-26-000109, Exhibit 99.1: Vantage Stargate 1.3 GW campus, Oracle PSCW financial security obligations and below-A-/A3 collateral rules). Washington, DC: SEC. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/783325/000078332526000109/a112026november.htm (Accessed: 21 November 2026).

Note: Page numbers cited for primary filings refer to printed prospectus pages; Anthropic (2026h) denotes the Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) filed on 19 November 2026. NAIC life risk-based capital (RBC) bond factors for designations 1.A through 5.B match Table 1 of NAIC (2021), with 5.C and NAIC 6 at 30%. All journal volumes, issues, page numbers and DOIs are verified against official CrossRef publication records.

Note: Authored and verified independently by AntLevee Research (`AntLevee Research Team`) solely from public SEC filings, U.S. insurer statutory statements, CrossRef bibliographic records, and Nasdaq trade tapes; all underlying Python 3 standard-library engines (`antlevee_gaap_restatement.py`, `antlevee_stress_model.py`, `antlevee_exact_audit.py`, `antlevee_bayesian_moat.py`, `antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py`, `antlevee_insurers_q3_audit.py`, `antlevee_payment_chain_audit.py`, `coverage_model.py`, `postperiod_model.py`, and `onbs_proforma.py`) are archived with SHA-256 verification checksums in the accompanying replication package.

Appendix A: Primary Filing Archive Index, Replication Guide & Cryptographic Seals

A.1 Local Primary SEC Filing Archive & Dataset Provenance

Table A-0 — Verified Local Primary Filings and Quantitative Audit Datasets (Paths Relative to Repository Root)

Filing / Dataset	Filing Date / Retrieved	Local Repository Path	In-Text Citation
Form 424B4 (Final Prospectus, USD 83.00)	2026-11-19	`docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/2130357_000162828026074944_anthropicpbc-424b4.htm`	Anthropic (2026h)
Issuer FWP (Pricing Term Sheet)	2026-11-19	`docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/2130357_000162828026074937_anthropicpbc-fwppricing.htm`	Anthropic (2026g)
Form S-8 (Resale Prospectus, 121,886,381 sh)	2026-11-19	`docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/2130357_000162828026074934_anthropicpbc-sx8resale.htm`	Anthropic (2026i)
Form S-8 (2026 Equity & ESPP Plans)	2026-11-19	`docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/2130357_000162828026074931_anthropicpbc-formsx8.htm`	Anthropic (2026j)
Form S-1/A-3, Form 8-A12B & Form S-1MEF	2026-11-17 / 11-18	`docs/edgar_r4_2026-11-19/r4_ant/`	Anthropic (2026e, 2026f)
Form S-1/A-2 Exhibits 10.15 & 10.16	2026-11-10	`docs/anthropic_exhibits/2130357_000162828026072484_exhibit1015-sx1ax2.htm`, `exhibit1016-sx1ax2.htm`	Anthropic (2026c)
Form S-1, S-1/A-1, S-1/A-2 & EEA FWP	2026-10-26 to 11-12	`docs/edgar_nov2026/`	Anthropic (2026a, 2026b, 2026c, 2026d)
Broadcom 10-Q & 2026-10-27 8-K (72.5% / USD 43bn Guarantee)	2026-09-10 / 10-27	`docs/offtakers/AVGO_10-Q_Q3FY2026_2026-09-10.htm`, `docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/avgo_2026-10-27_8k.htm`	Broadcom (2026a, 2026b)
TeraWulf 8-Ks & Google CSA Ex. 10.1 / 99.1	2026-07-06 / 11-04	`docs/anthropic/WULF_8-K_ex99-1_2026-07-06.htm`, `docs/edgar_r5_2026-11-20/wulf_2026-11-04_8k.htm`	TeraWulf Inc. (2026a, 2026b)

Filing / Dataset	Filing Date / Retrieved	Local Repository Path	In-Text Citation
NVIDIA Q2 FY27 10-Q & Q3 FY27 Form 10-Q (USD 118bn + USD 32bn)	2026-08-26 / 11-17	`docs/offtakers/NVDA_10-Q_Q2FY2027_2026-08-26.htm`, `paper/analysis/antlevee_payment_chain_audit.json`	NVIDIA Corporation (2026b, 2026c)
SpaceX, Nscale, Apollo & Five Hyperscaler 10-Ks/10-Qs	2026	`docs/spacex/`, `docs/offtakers/`, `paper/analysis/onbs_inputs.json`	Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2026); Nscale Limited (2026); Apollo Global Management (2026)
Athene 3Q26 10-Q & Ten US Life-Insurer Q3 Statutory Statements	2026-11	`paper/analysis/antlevee_insurers_q3_audit.json`, `paper/analysis/antlevee_payment_chain_audit.json`	Athene Holding Ltd. (2026); Corebridge Financial (2026); MetLife (2026)
CoreWeave 3Q26 10-Q & All `2,411` SEC `NPORT-P` XML Filings	2026-11-23 Retrieved	`paper/analysis/nport_full_audit.json`, `docs/offtakers/CRWV_10-K_FY2025_2026-03-02.htm`	CoreWeave (2026); SEC (2026)
AA-Omniscience v1.1 & Eight-Signal Bayesian Audit Datasets	2026-11	`paper/analysis/antlevee_bayesian_moat.json`, `paper/analysis/antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.json`	Artificial Analysis (2026)
EDGAR Index (`CIK 0002130357`) & Nasdaq Days 1–2 Tape	2026-11-20/21	`paper/analysis/ant_day1_nasdaq.json` (`18b5fd68f47f1329`)	SEC (2026); Nasdaq (2026)

Table A-1 — Model Payment Windows and Contractual Classifications (USD bn)

Arrangement	Class	Total (USD bn)	Start	End	Verification Locator
Microsoft Azure	A	47.2	2026-11	2033-06	Form 424B4 pp. 177–178
Google Cloud & Colocation	A	121.3	2026-04	2033-07	Form 424B4 p. 178
Amazon AWS & Trainium	A	110.0	2026-05	2036-04	Form 424B4 p. 178
Broadcom Device Leases (incl. 6.6% interest)	B	190.6	2027-01	2031-12	Form 424B4 pp. 178, F-36 (USD 161.2bn ex-interest)
SpaceXAI (37 months × USD 3.1bn/mo)	D	114.7	2026-12	2029-12	Form 424B4 p. 179 (contract cap USD 120.5bn)
Nscale	C	44.6	2028-01	2033-12	Form 424B4 p. 179; Nscale Draft S-1
Lambda	C	41.3	2027-01	2034-12	Form 424B4 p. 179 (USD 34.9bn Aug 2026 deal terminable)
Google Additional TPUs (Midpoint)	V	137.5	2029-01	2033-12	Form 424B4 p. 178 (USD 125–150bn range)
AMD Helios / MI450	V	20.0	2027-07	2031-06	Form 424B4 p. 171 (>USD 20bn)
Primary Benchmark: Company Aggregate	All Fixed	900.9	2026-10	2045-12	Form 424B4 pp. 8, 40 (USD 451.6bn pre-2031 + USD 449.3bn post-2030)
Upper-Bound Sensitivity: Other Uncommenced Leases	B (UB)	260.6	2027-01	2041-12 / 2036-12	Form 424B4 p. F-36 (USD 451.2bn – USD 190.6bn Broadcom)
Additive Ongoing RSU Cash Tax & Non-Commit CapEx	Cash Drain	6.0 / yr	2027-01	2041-12	`coverage_model.py` (`extra_cash_outflow_annual = 6.0`)

A.2 One-Command Standard-Library Replication Pipeline

```
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_gaap_restatement.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_stress_model.py
```

```
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_exact_audit.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_bayesian_moat.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_insurers_q3_audit.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/antlevee_payment_chain_audit.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/coverage_model.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/postperiod_model.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/onbs_proforma.py
python3 -I paper/analysis/editorial_lint.py paper/web/articles/en-gb/flagship.md
python3 -I paper/analysis/check_citations.py paper/web/articles/en-gb/flagship.md
node paper/web/build_web.cjs paper/web/articles/en-gb/flagship.md --out=paper/web --lang=en-gb
python3 -I paper/analysis/prepublish_audit.py --web paper/web --lang en-gb --strict-discovery
```

A.3 Cryptographic SHA-256 Verification Seals

Full 64-character SHA-256 digests are stored in `paper/analysis/antlevee_exact_audit.json` and `paper/dossiers/catalog.json` (truncated 16-char prefixes below): EN Table 32 Scheduled Verification Items `P1–P18` (`397622d1a932d9e1`, initial listing-week seal `7b3c8b4a78ba73c6`, pre-revision 20 Nov seal `fd0d18a37c9485c0`), `antlevee_gaap_restatement.py` (`e7e8bc76829b3c4f`), `antlevee_gaap_restatement.json` (`ecc9d7d6458c6d4d`), `antlevee_stress_model.py` (`0e8f569fdf4c1679`), `antlevee_stress_results.json` (`c4093b772c21e9cd`), `antlevee_exact_audit.py` (`a1de43bcf0ea2251`), `ant_day1_nasdaq.json` (`18b5fd68f47f1329`), `antlevee_bayesian_moat.py` (`c2c2deae38abf70e`), `antlevee_bayesian_moat.json` (`2b4e8cd4aa41fc37`), `antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.py` (`1f67c078a2c3699c`), `antlevee_bayesian_accounting_audit.json` (`7cbd93976e9a8cce`), `antlevee_insurers_q3_audit.py` (`35b5e16551990769`), `antlevee_insurers_q3_audit.json` (`16b12f9cc48e11fd`), `verify_nport_full.py` (`47b70d1f33fa4ea1`), `nport_full_audit.json` (`ee49d9ca28421373`), `antlevee_payment_chain_audit.py` (`57b6043abbf8291c`), `antlevee_payment_chain_audit.json` (`898816644191e43b`), `coverage_model.py` (`fea4c607460cede1`), `postperiod_model.py` (`3f420f4a70b7dabf`), `onbs_proforma.py` (`7a30eb78b3107539`), and `prepublish_audit.py` (`22d374b0726c71cc`).

A.4 Monograph Source Provenance & Verification Matrix

To preserve strict empirical clarity across this standalone monograph (Chapters 1 – 8 and Appendices A – C), Table A-4 separates fourteen core findings into four verifiable categories: *Primary Fact*, *Exact Identity* (zero free parameters), *Parametric Model / Theorem*, and *Scheduled Verification* (bound to future filings `P1–P18` & enterprise routing benchmarks):

Table A-4 — Monograph Source Provenance and Verification Matrix

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
1	Chapter 3	Restated GM `46.5%–33.8%`	Exact Identity (`λ=0`: `67.5%`) + Parametric Scenario (`λ∈[0.5,0.8]`)	**Fact:** USD 13.996bn compute sits below the line (p. F-41); audited FY25 GM = `39.5%`. **Undisclosed:** Internal split between customer inference vs R&D pretraining (Appendix C).	$\mathrm{CoR}(\lambda) = 4.812 + 4.800 +$
2	Chapter 3	ASC 606 gross-up mcap `USD 185.5–254.5bn`	Primary Fact (floor) + Exact Identity + Parametric Scenario (constant P/S)	**Fact:** YoY increase of USD 4.8bn in cloud partner fees (p. 165) sets a strict lower bound. **Assumption:** Constant Day-1 P/S multiple applied to net revenue.	$\Delta V = (F_{\text{chan}}/R_{\text{gross}}) \cdot V_{\text{mkt}}$
3	Chapters 3 & 4	Pre-IPO pull-forward (`Customer E = 13% AR`)	Primary Fact (red flags) + **Pending Verification (P6 / 10-K Note 2)**	**Fact:** Global Q3 DSO (`42.8d`) ≈ 25Q4 (`41.0d`, no global stuffing); `Customer E` = `13%` net AR (`USD 1.026bn`, p. F-16). **Unverified:** Customer identity & Q1'27 fade (P6).	$\mathrm{DSO}_{Q3} = 7.892/16.956 \times$

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
4	Section 3.4 & App. C	**Bayesian Calibration (`Fable 5.2` `59.3%` blind-spot hallucination, `α*(0.90)=1.065`)**	Primary Fact (`AA` scores/prices incl. `Gemini 4 Neon xhigh`) + Exact Identity (Theorem 1) + Scenario (`α=0.6`, const. h)	**Fact:** `Fable 5.2` `c=79.1%`, `h=59.3%`, ~USD 26.54/task vs `Astra` ~USD 4.00/task; `Argon/Carbon` USD 2/10 intro **expires 30 Nov → USD 4/20 on 1 Dec 2026**. **Assumptions:** `α=0.6` is illustrative (solved continuously via Theorem 1); constant h is a *conservative upper bound* per Ovadia et al. (2019) & Kadavath et al. (2022); partial $p \geq 0$ makes $c/(c+i)$ an upper bound.	$\alpha^*(P^*) = \frac{1}{c}\frac{P^*h}{1-P^*+P^*h}$; `antlevee_bayesian_moa`
5	Section 3.4 & App. C	**3-Layer Bayesian Router Cost Cut & Blind Cross-Family Audit**	Primary Literature (routing) + Parametric Theorems 2–3 + **Pending Live Test (App. C)**	**Fact:** `FrugalGPT` (up to 98%), `AutoMix` (>50%), `RouteLLM` (35%–85%) verify routing savings; `Kim et al. (ICML 2025)` proves correlated errors across 350+ LLMs.	Theorem 2 & Theorem 3

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				Self-Correction: Pure cascade (ρ=0) saves only 17.5%–36.0%; RAG routing (ρ=0.75) cuts total customer bill 37.4%–69.4% while diverting **84.1%–88.7% of Anthropic flagship volume**; Theorem 3 Fréchet-Hoeffding blind audit interval = **95.9%–97.5%** (Fable+Argon) / **87.4%–92.1%** (Fable+Neon xhigh).	
6	Chapter 2	Google custom TPU (Ironwood/Trillium) cost advantage	Primary Fact (SemiAnalysis + 424B4 pp. 178–179)	**Fact:** Google is Anthropic's largest cloud/TPU landlord (USD 121.3bn fixed + USD 125–150bn variable); SemiAnalysis InferenceX benchmarks TPU v7 Ironwood up to **50% better perf/dollar** vs B200/B300 (USD 0.181 vs	SemiAnalysis (2026); For 179

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				`0.222/0.276` per MTok). **Precision:** GCP also operates NVIDIA GPUs for cloud tenants; custom TPU advantage applies to internally co-designed Gemini training/serving.	
7	Chapters 2 & 5	Uncommenced lease PV (`USD 306.2–328.4bn`) & overlap	Primary Fact (`USD 451.2bn` face) + Parametric Model (discount & overlap)	**Fact:** `USD 451.2bn` uncommenced (`USD 156.2bn` VIEs, p. F-36). **Undisclosed:** Overlap between `USD 260.6bn` non-Broadcom leases & named neoclouds (split into Primary vs UB).	$\mathrm{PV} = \sum_t \mathrm{CF}_t/(1+r)^t,\ r$
8	Chapter 4	ASC 230 interest exclusion (`USD 2.359bn`)	Primary Fact (P&L interest) + Parametric Proxy (cash interest)	**Fact:** P&L interest income = `USD 2.359bn` (p. F-7). **Undisclosed:** Exact split between cash coupons and non-cash discount accretion (Appendix C).	$\mathrm{Core\ FCF} = \mathrm{OCF} - \mathrm{IntIn}$

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
9	Chapter 5	192-state survival CAGR `g*` (`22.1%`–`37.2%` primary)	Parametric Scenario (exact bisection over explicit parameters)	**Fact:** `USD 900.9bn` fixed schedule, `USD 100.51bn` pre-greenshoe net IPO cash (`USD 244.55bn` post-greenshoe liquidity), `USD 5.0bn` covenant. **Assumptions:** Uniform 2031–2041 spread, `USD 6.0bn/yr` RSU tax/CapEx, no new dilutive raises.	$\min_q C_q(g^*) = 5.0$ (`antlevee_exact_audit.`
10	Chapter 7	Board `+2%` PBF progressive issuance dilution	Primary Fact (charter) + Parametric Scenario (board exercise)	**Fact:** Initial `5%` (`846.84m` sh) transferred; `+2%` per `+50%` rally (`90/120d` gate, p. 243) is discretionary. **Assumption:** Schedule shows upper-bound full 2% exercise.	$d_k = 1 - (1 - d_0)/1.02^k$ (P
11	Chapters 6 & 7	`48.1%` recycled PP, `17/22` syndicate & `8.91x` base (`7.74x` expanded) lock-up	Primary Fact (statutory filings) + **Pending Market/Court Outcome (P15–P16)**	**Fact:** Google+AMD = `48.1%` (p. 347); `17/22` conflicted; `1,127m` public sh post-greenshoe (`USD 244.55bn` pro forma liquidity);	Form 424B4 pp. 19, 317· `ant_day1_nasdaq.json`

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				8,727m Day-180 unlocks; §4713 2–1 loss. **Unverified:** Actual insider sell-through & appellate ruling (P15, P16).	
12	Chapters 2 & 8	CoreWeave GPU depreciation (Q3 5y −130 to −185m / 4y −635 to −773m; 9M26 5y −773m), 88.7% recourse, USD 13.41bn 15m wall & GECC 15.55-pt gap	Primary Fact (7Q 10-Q Note 10, Rev. Amend. 4, GECC 10-Q & late-Nov credit marks) + Exact Back-Test + Parametric Scenario (5y/4y life)	**Fact: USD 42.152bn (88.73%)** of USD 47.505bn debt is parent-recourse (only Meta-backed DDTL 4.0 + OEM 11.27% non-recourse); 15m maturity wall **USD 13.407bn (3.20x cash)**; USD 25.9bn SPV-encumbered assets; GECC marks DDTL V 100.65% vs Parent 85.10% (**15.55-pt** gap); 2026 private equity injections (USD 2.982bn) = **74.09%** of equity; 88.2% 7Q OCF from deferred rev; late-Nov repricing shows 5Y CDS 1,000–	$\Delta D_q(L) = \frac{1}{4}\mathrm{PPE}_{\mathrm{tech}}(\frac{1}{L} -$ crwv_restatement.py, antlevee_payment_chai

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				1,250 bps, 2030/2031 yields 14.9%–15.8%, GPU LTVs 50%–60%, Nebius USD 5.75bn & IREN USD 2.60bn convertibles. **Scenario:** 5y/4y chip life.	
13	Section 8.1	**Hypothesis H5 (Rating Gate) & Four-Layer Debt-Transfer Ledger (Athene USD 7.045bn + 15% WHCO Guarantee + BDCs/NPORT-P)**	Primary Fact (10 insurer Q3 PDFs, Athene/MetLife/Corebridge/NVIDIA/16 BDC 10-Qs, 2,411/2,411 NPORT-P XMLs, NAIC Warren letter) + Exact Identity (RBC multipliers) + Statutory Law	**Fact:** Athene holds **USD 7.045bn** Big Sky (52.52% AHL equity) + **15% (USD 5.25bn gross / 3.41bn net)** WHCO guarantee at USD 0 liability, lifting combined frontier-AI exposure to **USD 15.73–20.98bn (117.3%–156.4% AHL equity)**; AAIA p. 2523 proves 1.F PL vs 3.B FE/PL (**5.56x** capital jump) on the exact same day; 100% NPORT-P XML parsing captures Big Sky (224 hits / 55 series, USD	verify_nport_full.py, antlevee_payment_chai

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				713.77m), CoreWeave debt (2,214 hits / 616 series, USD 4,664.98m), Beignet (1,369 hits / 394 series, USD 9,793.35m); NAIC PBBD (SSAP 26R/43R) imposes **30%–45% (29.5x–44.3x)** Schedule BA cliff; NVIDIA Q3 FY27 Note 10 expands max gross guarantees to USD 118.0bn (+USD 32.0bn contingent). **Legal precision:** Distinguishes regulatory disqualification from 18 U.S.C. § 1033 / Rule 10b–5 fraud triggers.	
14	Section 3.5	**Dependence-Aware Bayesian Statement Audit (99.24% 3-Domain S1–S7 Primary; 90.18% at rho=0.30)**	Primary Fact (424B4 footnote ratios) + Bayesian Update (3-Domain Primary + ρ Grid)	**Fact:** Bilateral CSP offset 96.99% (USD 4,103.84m AR vs USD 4,231.0m AP; 50.61d vs 36.70d DSO); allowance cut	antlevee_bayesian_acc Dechow et al. (2011)

#	Chapter / Section	Claim / Parameter	Verification Type	Primary Fact vs. Explicit Modelling Assumption / Pending Test	Formula & Replication
				5.00% → 1.362% (Customer E 13%); 74.42% ex-CoR compute (p. 348, pp. F–40–F–41), USD −11.008bn subsidy, **USD 4.7bn unaccrued Note 13 guarantees**, and **2-member Audit Committee + 1 vacancy** (p. 265). **3-domain S1–S7 BF = 1,168.20x -> 99.24%** posterior at 10% prior (90.18% at $\rho = 0.30$; 79.16% at $\rho = 0.50$; 89.64% discretionary S1×S3; 62.50% global floor; 3,446.19x / 99.74% incl. S8).	

A.5 Originality Attribution & 2026 Prior-Canon Comparison Matrix

To uphold UK Academy standards for attribution and novelty, Table A-5 explicitly separates concepts established by prior 2026 central-bank and academic publications from AntLevee Research's independently verifiable, code-replicated contributions:

Table A-5 — Originality & Prior-Canon Attribution Matrix

Research Pillar	Prior 2026 Authoritative Canon (Explicitly Credited)	AntLevee Research Original, Code-Verified Contribution	Verification Status
AI Credit Structure & Circularity	BIS Bulletins 137/140 (Frost et al., 2026; Drehmann and Eren, 2026), ECB FSR Box 3 (Bosio et al., 2026), IMF GFSR (2026), and NBER w35865/w36032 (Van Nieuwerburgh, 2026; Su and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2026) mapped macro debt totals, circularity (>55%), and Meta Hyperion	(1) Micro-level **Payer-Tier × Contract-Cancellability (A/B/C/D/V) taxonomy** proving residual value is a second-order variable that does not alter loss order; (2) **Shapley-value decomposition** of the survival-threshold gap; (3) 13-filing (`170/170` verbatim quotes) five-hyperscaler `L0 0.77x → L2 2.41x` pro forma restatement (`onbs_proforma.py`)	**Verified** (`495/495` leaves `0` diff)
Anthropic IPO GAAP Restatement & Survival Engine	Earnings-quality, gross-vs-net, and constructive capitalisation theory originates with Sloan (1996), Bowen et al. (2002), McVay (2006), Imhoff et al. (1991); Wong (2026a) highlighted pricing-power erosion colliding with rising term premia	(1) First Form 424B4 (`USD 83.00`) functional GAAP reconstruction and **192-state zero-overlap survival engine** (`antlevee_gaap_restatement.py` / `antlevee_exact_audit.py`), refuting the 32% headline threshold and eliminating the USD 8.2bn RSU double-count (`USD 41.5bn` exact overhang); (2) Complete audit of `17/22` syndicate conflicts, `48.1%` recycled private placement, and the `0.079%` (`636x`) control wedge	**Verified** (`66/66` quotes, `40/40` CrossRef DOIs `0` diff)
Bayesian Moat Calibration & Routing Theorems	Kalai et al. (2025) analysed hallucination incentives; Artificial Analysis (2025, 2026) published AA-Omniscience scores; FrugalGPT/AutoMix/RouteLLM (2024–2025) introduced routing; Kim et al. (2025) proved correlated LLM errors	Derived closed-form **Critical Familiarity Theorem 1** ($\alpha^*(0.90) = 1.065 > 1$ for `Fable 5.2`), **3-Layer RAG-Diverted Routing Theorem 2** (`84.1%`–`88.7%` flagship volume diversion), and **Frechet-Hoeffding Blind Audit Bounds (Theorem 3)** linked quantitatively to Anthropic's USD 900.9bn fixed compute bill (`antlevee_bayesian_moat.py`)	**Theorems 1–2 verified; Theorem 3 & live enterprise routing benchmark pending**
CoreWeave Luckin Calibration, `88.7%`	Multi-channel registry/trade audits follow established institutional investment research traditions; Invesco	(1) 13-mechanism SEC Luckin comparison + **calibration back-test proving Beneish M (`-3.04`) misses Luckin while Altman Z″**	**Verified** (`check_probes.py` `544/544` hits + `antlevee_payment_chain_audit.py`)

Research Pillar	Prior 2026 Authoritative Canon (Explicitly Credited)	AntLevee Research Original, Code-Verified Contribution	Verification Status
Recourse & Cross-Default Audit	(2026) cited mid-October CoreWeave 5Y CDS >1,140 bps	**(−1.04 to −1.30) flags CoreWeave distress**; (2) Q3 10-Q Note 10 audit proving **88.73% (USD 42.152bn) parent recourse**, DDTL 5.0/5.5 100% ECF sweep, **USD 13.407bn 15m wall (3.20x cash)**, USD 25.9bn encumbered assets, and **GECC's 15.55-pt same-day subordination gap**; (3) Revolver Amend. No. 4 USD 28.439bn cross-default & UK/Spain DDTL 2.0 waiver proof	
Hypothesis H5 (Rating Gate) & Four-Layer Debt-Transfer Ledger	Hepp (2026) and FSOC (2025) identified insurer end-holders; NAIC (2021, 2026) established 20-tier RBC C-1 factors and PBBD (SSAP 26R/43R)	(1) Formulated & proved Hypothesis H5 via **four controlled natural experiments** (AAIA p. 2523 1.F PL vs 3.B FE/PL = **5.56x**, CoreWeave 1.G vs 3.B, SoftBank 3.A vs SVF II 1.G/2.C Z, PBBD 30%–45% cliff), precisely separating regulatory disqualification from 18 U.S.C. § 1033 / Rule 10b-5 fraud; (2) First CUSIP-level audit of **10 U.S. life-insurer Q3 2026 statutory filings + Athene 3Q26 10-Q** (**USD 7.045bn Big Sky + 15% WHCO guarantee**, **117.3%–156.4%** combined frontier-AI equity concentration), **16 top BDCs**, and **100% (2,411/2,411) full-population SEC NPORT-P mutual-fund/401(k)/annuity XMLs** (verify_nport_full.py)	**Verified** (10 Q3 statutory PDFs + full XML population + SHA-256)

Appendix B: Registration Cycle Reconciliation Ledger (`Form S-1` to `Form 424B4` & `20 Nov Closing`)

Table B-1 — Fourteen-Item Reconciliation Across `S-1/A-2`, `Form 424B4`, and Post-Greenshoe Closing (`USD 83.00 / 88.91`)

Item	Initial S-1/A-2 & S-1MEF (USD 74.00 Midpoint)	Final Form 424B4 (USD 83.00) & 20 Nov Closing (USD 88.91)	Primary Locator
1. Public Offering Size & Gross Proceeds	980m base shares (USD 72.52bn at USD 74)	**1,127m post-greenshoe shares** (USD 93.541bn public; USD 119.541bn w/ USD 26bn PP)	424B4 Cover; SEC Closing
2. Pro Forma Cash & NTBV / Share	Base cash ex-GS (USD 232.35bn at IPO 424B4 base)	**USD 244.55bn post-GS cash**; NTBV **USD 9.70** (base) / **USD 10.50** (post-GS; 88.19% gap)	424B4 p. 131; Table 21
3. Nov 9 RSU Modification Charge	~USD 3.0bn (at USD 74.00 midpoint)	**USD 3.4bn** (remeasured at USD 83.00 across 67m RSUs)	424B4 p. F-67
4. Day-1 RSU Charge & Withholding Tax	USD 14.2bn charge / USD 3.8bn cash tax	**USD 14.7bn** charge / **USD 4.281bn** cash tax (51.58m sh withheld at 50.90%)	424B4 pp. 23, 29, 129–130
5. Zero-Overlap Equity Comp Overhang	USD 40.9bn (32.3 + 3.0 + 3.5 + 2.1)	**USD 41.5bn** exact zero-overlap (32.3 + 3.4 + 3.7 + 2.1; USD 39.4bn RSU-only)	424B4 pp. 28–29, F-66–F-67
6. Normalised 9M26 Operating Loss	Management Adjusted OI: **USD +4.081bn (+12.3%)**	Zero-overlap normalised: **USD −7.954bn to −8.789bn** (−23.9% to −26.4%; p. 28 **−8.747bn**)	424B4 pp. 28, 162–163
7. Off-BS Compute & Post-Period Stack	USD 451.2bn uncommenced leases + 563bn disclosed	**USD 900.9bn** fixed (USD 1,075.9bn total incl. USD 175bn variable TPU/AMD)	424B4 Note 7 & pp. 178–179
8. Broadcom Dual-SPV Caps & Leases	USD 35bn SPV #1 (85% / USD 29bn wrap)	**USD 98.0bn** dual SPVs (**USD 72.0bn** cap = 29bn + 43bn), USD 161.2bn prin. (190.6bn gross)	424B4 pp. 176–177; AVGO 8-K
9. TeraWulf Hawesville Site CSAs	Signed Jul 2026 (401 MW 20-year leases)	**USD 19.0bn** three Google LLC Credit Support Agreements executed 4 Nov 2026	TeraWulf 8-K (4 Nov 2026)
10. Amazon 12% Cap & Q4 MTM Swing	USD 6.203bn principal convertible rollover	**15.91% conv.** (292.77m sh) / **84.09% retained** (1,547.68m sh, USD 109.742bn FV; −31.40bn Q4 at 88.91)	424B4 pp. 25, 171–172; Nasdaq
11. Google 14.99% Senior-Note Flip	Undrawn USD 10.0bn note purchase agreement	Triggered below **P* = USD 41.13** (base) / **USD 37.17** (post-GS; USD 79.02 at −5% net count)	424B4 Ex. 10.15 §1.4, p. 175
12. Concurrent Private Placement	Sized across strategic compute suppliers	**USD 26.0bn** (313.25m Class N shares at USD 83.00, 48.1% supplier-recycled)	424B4 p. 131; Table 23
13. Underwriting Syndicate Conflicts	10 Bookrunners + 12 Co-managers (FWP)	**17 Bookrunners + 5 Co-managers**; **17/22 conflicted** (16 lenders + 5 pre-IPO holders)	424B4 pp. 328, 336–337

Item	Initial S-1/A-2 & S-1MEF (USD 74.00 Midpoint)	Final Form 424B4 (USD 83.00) & 20 Nov Closing (USD 88.91)	Primary Locator
14. Day-2 Tape & Lock-Up Float Ratios	315m Day-1; 8,727m Day-180 (8.91x base float)	Day-1 close USD 97.17; Day-2 **USD 83.05** low / **USD 88.91** close (–20.26%); **7.74x** Day-180 float	424B4 pp. 19, 317–320; Nasdaq

Table B-2 — Post-IPO Capitalisation, Float Supply, and Control Reconciliation (`Form 424B4` & `20 Nov Closing`)

Capitalisation / Control Layer	Share Count / Magnitude (m sh)	Share of Base / Post-GS FD (18,138m / 18,285m)	Governance, Lock-Up & Seniority Characteristics
Public Class A Float (Post-Greenshoe)	1,127.0m (980.0m base + 147.0m GS)	6.21% Base FD / **6.16% Post-GS FD** (8.43% Basic)	1 vote/sh (~6.4% aggregate vote); bears 100% first-loss equity volatility and 5%+2% PBF dilution
Basic Shares Outstanding (Pro Forma)	13,220m Base / **13,367m Post-GS**	72.89% / 73.10% of FD	Excludes unissued RSU overhang, Amazon retained notes, and undrawn Google/Broadcom/AMZN NPAs
Amazon Rollover + Converted Equity	292.77m conv. + 1,547.68m rollover (1,936.5m total)	10.68% Base FD (11.99% w/ cap math)	15.91% converted to Class N (0 votes); 84.09% (USD 109.74bn FV) retained as senior debt w/ AP offset
Alphabet / Google Class N Position	1,774.96m shares (incl. USD 10bn PP)	9.79% Base FD / 9.71% Post-GS FD	0 votes (ASC 323 bypass); USD 10bn undrawn tranche flips to 10-yr senior note past 14.99% cap
Anthropic PBF Initial Transfer (5%)	846.84m Class N shares (USD 70.29bn at IPO)	4.67% Base FD (4.63% Post-GS)	Managed by insiders; exempt from cap-gains tax via 501(c)(3) donations while DTA carries 100% allowance
Day-1 to Day-365 Staged Lock-Up Supply	315m (+121.9m S-8) → 8,727m → **15,483m**	**7.74x (Day 180)** → **13.74x (Day 365)** Post-GS	23 release dates across Year 1; Founder LLC 1 Class F share retains **50.1% vote** down to 0.079% FD

Appendix C: Fifteen Open Empirical Questions for Issuer & Auditor Clarification

Table C-1 — Unresolved Accounting, Contractual & Regulatory Disclosure Gaps Requiring Management or Statutory Clarification

#	Domain	Specific Open Question (Form 424B4 / Statutory Filing Gap)	Primary Locator / Anchor
1	**Lease Overlap**	What exact dollar portion of Note 7's USD 451.2bn uncommenced leases (and USD 156.2bn VIEs) overlaps named Nscale (USD 44.6bn), Lambda (USD 41.3bn), and SpaceXAI (USD 120.5bn) commitments?	424B4 Note 7, p. F-40; pp. 178–179
2	**Cost Allocation**	Inside Note 8's USD 13.996bn 9M26 compute expense, what exact share funded commercial customer inference (COGS) versus pre-training model research (R&D)?	424B4 Note 8, p. F-41; Table 9
3	**Revenue Quality**	Following the October 6% (USD 4.8bn annualised) policy-violating surge, what gross-to-net retention and margin profile attaches to enterprise cohorts vs API traffic?	424B4 pp. 25, 161; Table 7
4	**Customer Concentration**	Is Customer E (13% of net AR / USD 1.026bn on p. F-16) an enterprise end-user, a CSP marketplace reseller, or an affiliate of the seven USD 26bn PP suppliers?	424B4 Note 2, p. F-16; Table 14
5	**ASC 230 Interest**	Of USD 2.359bn in 9M26 interest income embedded inside Operating Cash Flow, how much represented cash coupon receipts vs non-cash Treasury discount accretion?	424B4 p. F-11; Note 3; Table 13
6	**Prepayment Mix**	Which counterparties received the USD 3.168bn of net 9M26 vendor prepayments and deposits classified inside operating vs investing cash flows?	424B4 p. F-11; Table 13
7	**RSU Tax Cash Flow**	For USD 24.7bn of remaining post-IPO vesting over Q4 2026–2029, will management enforce net-share settlement (50.90% cash drain) or switch to sell-to-cover?	424B4 pp. 29, 130; Table 16
8	**Amazon Rollover**	Under what stock-price or commercial conditions, if any, would Amazon convert or monetise its USD 5.590bn retained principal (USD 109.742bn FV) vs invoking AWS AP offsets?	424B4 pp. 25, 171–172; Table 22
9	**Google NPA Trigger**	Does Anthropic expect to draw Google's USD 10.0bn note commitment, and will net-settled RSU share retirements push P* above USD 37.17 toward the USD 79.02 stress band?	424B4 Ex. 10.15 §1.4; Table 22B
10	**Developer Wraps**	What cash collateral, DSCR triggers, and default acceleration clauses govern Note 13's USD 4.2bn developer guarantees and USD 0.5bn power guarantees?	424B4 Note 13, p. F-60
11	**20-Year Fuel Escalators**	What is the stress sensitivity of unquantified 20-year uncapped energy/fuel pass-through leases if industrial U.S. grid tariffs rise 25%–50% above baseline assumptions?	424B4 Risk Factors, p. 80; Sec. 5.6

#	Domain	Specific Open Question (Form 424B4 / Statutory Filing Gap)	Primary Locator / Anchor
12	**PBF Milestone Trigger**	Do +2% incremental Class N issuances at USD 124.50 / 186.75 activate automatically upon meeting the 90/120-day price rule, or remain wholly discretionary?	424B4 pp. 13, 243; Eq. (17)
13	**Big Sky & WHCO Loss**	Under what exact cumulative credit-loss threshold on Big Sky SPV #1 would Athene recognise its first ASC 450/460 GAAP liability on the 15% WHCO guarantee?	Athene Q3 10-Q Notes 11–12; Table 30
14	**120-Day Z Ratings**	Will SVO affirm 1.G / 2.C bond status for SVF II Finco, Tsubaki, Genworth, and PLIC holdings before the 120-day Z window closes on 23 Jan 2027?	AAIA p. 2523; Genworth; Securian
15	**PBBD & AG 55 Reclass**	How much industry Digital Infrastructure ABS faces Schedule BA (30%–45%) reclassification under SSAP 26R/43R across FY2026 AG 55 asset-adequacy tests?	NAIC (2026); Corebridge; MetLife

Cite This Monograph

AntLevee Research Team (2026) *Off-Balance-Sheet Compute Commitments, Normalised Gross Margins, and Cross-Market Credit Transfer: An Empirical Study of Anthropic, PBC (NASDAQ: ANT): Balance-Sheet Reconstruction, Payment-Chain Attribution, and Bayesian Calibration from Form 424B4, Early-Session Exchange Tapes, and Counterparty Filings*. Institutional Research Monograph, 22 November. Available at: https://antlevee.com/paper.html.

BibTeX

Copy BibTeX

```
@techreport{antlevee2026ant,
  title       = {Off-Balance-Sheet Compute Commitments, Normalised Gross Margins, and Cross-Ma
  author      = {{AntLevee Research Team}},
  institution = {AntLevee Research},
  year        = {2026},
  month       = {11},
  type        = {Institutional Research Monograph},
  url         = {https://antlevee.com/paper.html}
}
```

AntLevee Research

A thousand-mile levee gives way through hidden ant-burrows
—we are the anteater, excavating the off-balance-sheet
fissures beneath frontier AI.

Monograph Request Data (.zip) research@antlevee.com

Primary Filings & Machine Index ▾

© 2026 AntLevee Research. Published for informational purposes only and not investment advice; zero long, short, or derivative positions.

High-Contrast